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Web 2.0 is a massive social experiment, and like any experi-
ment worth trying, it could fail. There’s no road map for how
an organism that’s not a bacterium lives and works together
on this planet in numbers of excess of 6 billion. But 2006 gave
us some ideas. This is an opportunity to build a new kind of inter-
national understanding, not politician to politician, great man
to great man, but citizen to citizen, person to person.
Cover story TIME Magazine Dec 25th, 2006. Lev Grossman
Preface
‘Person of the Year’ is an annual issue of the American news magazine Time, fea-
turing someone or something that “has done the most to influence the events of
the year” [1]. The list of the last decade contains famous names such as Barack
Obama, Vladimir Putin, Bono, and Bill Gates, just to name a few. However, in
2006, the honor went to ‘You’ [49]. Yes, indeed. You. If you did not invent a life-
saving vaccine, or won the lottery that year and let everyone share in your gains,
you are probably wondering what it is exactly that you did to deserve this...
When people ask me to explain what I have been working on during the last
five years, I usually start talking about ‘social networks’, ‘recommender sys-
tems’ and ‘Web 2.0’. The latter is the umbrella term used most often to refer
to the current generation of social web applications. The driving forces behind
these applications are collaboration, interaction and information sharing; the
key factor to their success being the users themselves, in other words: you and
me. Without our enthusiasm and curiosity, the social networking site Facebook1
would not be so popular; without our movie ratings, the e-commerce giant
Amazon.com1 or the movie rental system Netflix1 would not be able to recom-
mend us a movie that we are very likely to enjoy; without our hotel reviews,
only a few would think of consulting the travel guide TripAdvisor1 for their next
holiday, and so on.
1See www.facebook.com, www.amazon.com, www.netflix.com, www.tripadvisor.com
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The start of a Ph.D. is very often characterized by an extensive reading period,
and so was mine. During my getting-up-to-date-with-Web-2.0-phase, I discov-
ered the following quotation:
It’s a story about community and collaboration on a scale never seen
before. It’s about the cosmic compendium of knowledge Wikipedia
and the million-channel people’s network YouTube and the online
metropolis MySpace. It’s about the many wresting power from the
few and helping one another for nothing and how that will not only
change the world, but also change the way the world changes.
The source of the quote turned out to be the cover article for the Time issue
of December 2006. The authors decided that we had a great influence on that
year’s events. You and me. Because we “control the Information Age”: thanks
to our input, millions of users can freely look up information on the online en-
cyclopedia Wikipedia2, MySpace2 can make people wonder about other lives,
YouTube2 becomes a way for common people to publish and distribute content
online, etc.
But these are only a few examples. In fact, I did not realize it right away, but
while looking up the Time article, I came across several of Web 2.0’s success sto-
ries: typing ‘2006 time magazine person of the year’ yielded over more than 18
million results on Google; the fourth and fifth hit were two influential blogs (on-
line journals that are frequently updated) and the second one was a Wikipedia
page, the textbook example of a wiki (a website where users can easily add
or change content). The first hit was the magazine’s web page. On that page I
could indicate if I wanted to share the article with my friends (on Facebook), if I
wanted to ‘retweet’ it (via the micro-blogging service Twitter3) or ‘digg’ the arti-
cle (an application3 to discover and share content on the web). Clearly, the Web
2.0 experiment has not failed so far. On the contrary, four years after the publi-
cation of the Time article, social web applications are alive and very kicking.
Of course, not everything stemming from the Web 2.0 wave is wonderful and
useful, and consequently the 2006 nomination caused some controversy. I, too,
am skeptical about all these hip and shiny applications/toys/gadgets (as some
of my colleagues will confirm, I am sure), but I am also convinced that it has
brought us a lot of social applications that we can truly benefit from. In this
2See wikipedia.org, www.myspace.com, www.youtube.com
3See twitter.com and digg.com
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work, I will focus on one such set of applications, namely social recommender
systems. In particular, I will show how trust networks, a specific type of social
networks, can enhance the recommendation experience.

It’s not what you know but who you
know that makes the difference.
Anonymous
1 Introduction
Although the saying above is an old one, it is surprisingly applicable to the
Information Age we are living in now. We are flooded with social networking
sites on which we can manage our friends, relatives, or business relations. Some
of them are merely used to keep track of our acquaintances, but others can be
quite convenient for other purposes too, think e.g. of the business oriented social
networking tool LinkedIn or the image hosting website and online community
Flickr. Many other useful applications will follow in the next sections.
As will become clear throughout this dissertation, the proverb at the top
of this page is especially true for the application that we will focus on. Trust-
enhanced recommender systems are designed to help us to form an opinion
on matters that are not entirely known to us, or even not at all: ‘will I like this
book?’, ‘is this a movie that I can see with my kids?’, ‘which hotel will suit me the
best?’, ... Trust-based recommender systems can provide us with personalized
answers (or ‘recommendations’) because they use information that is coming
from a social network consisting of people we (may) trust.
1.1 Trust Networks
Social web applications often allow people to express their view on other users
of the system. We call the resulting network a social network. The relations
and/or evaluations between the users come in many flavors: users can add
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their connections as ‘friends’ in Facebook, bookmark ‘interesting people’ in Ama-
zon.com, allow ‘followers’ in Twitter and ‘fans’ in Yahoo!Answers1 (which, as the
name suggests, gives users the opportunity to ask and answer questions), etc.
Apart from these positive labels, in a large group of users, each with their own
intentions, tastes and opinions, it is only natural that also negative evaluation
concepts are needed. For example, the technology news web site Slashdot2 lets
its users tag each other as ‘friends’, ‘fans’, ‘foes’ or ‘freaks’, and the political
forum Essembly2 as ‘friends’, ‘allies’ or ‘nemeses’. A lot of the social web appli-
cations rely heavily on the relations between their users, and frequently mine
the underlying social network to offer new services. Users of Last.fm2, e.g., are
able to listen to personalized radio stations which are based on the music tastes
of their friends. As another example, users of the social bookmarking system
Delicious2 can discover the web pages that their friends like.
In this work, we focus on one type of social networks, namely social networks in
which the users explicitly express their opinion as trust and distrust statements.
We refer to this kind of social networks as trust networks. A popular example is
the trust network of the consumer review site Epinions.com3, a large American
e-commerce site where users can write reviews about consumer products and
assign a rating to the products and the reviews. The main novelty of Epinions,
however, is that users can also evaluate other users, by adding them to their
personal web of trust or block list (indicating distrust), based on their quality as
a reviewer. Another interesting application is CouchSurfing3, a large worldwide
hospitality exchange network. Users can create a profile and indicate if they are
offering sleeping accomodation; other users looking for a couch can then browse
through the profiles and try to determine which users are trustworthy enough to
be their host (and vice versa). To this aim, CouchSurfing provides several eval-
uation possibilities, such as leaving references or creating friendship relations.
After a couch experience, users can also indicate how much they trust or distrust
each other, which constitutes a large trust network among the CouchSurfers.
Forming your own opinion on the users might have been easy when the
network was still rather small, but nowadays CouchSurfing contains over one
million users, making it increasingly difficult to find the hosts/guests that you
would get along with well, let alone the ones that are trustworthy. In the same
respect, in Epinions, users may find it overwhelming to form an opinion on a
1See answers.yahoo.com
2See slashdot.org, www.essembly.com, www.last.fm, delicious.com
3See www.epinions.com and www.couchsurfing.org
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particular reviewer: if there are –very often conflicting– opinions of hundreds
of users available, how do you find the users that reflect your tastes the most?
As many trust networks are large, it is very unlikely that all users know each
other directly. In other words, the network is unlikely to be fully connected.
This means that, if a user a wants to form a trust opinion about an unknown
user x, a has to inquire about x with one of its own trust relations, say b, who
in turn might consult a trust connection, etc., until a user connected to x is
reached. The process of predicting the trust score along the thus constructed
path from a to x is called trust propagation. Since it often happens that a has
not one, but several trust connections that it can consult for an opinion on x,
we also require a mechanism for combining several trust scores originating from
different sources. This process is called trust aggregation. Propagation and ag-
gregation are the two key building blocks of trust metrics, a set of techniques
which aim to estimate the trust between two unknown users in the network.
Note that the word metric has a different meaning here than the traditional
mathematical notion of metric as distance measure in a metric space.
So far, we have not mentioned context and/or goal, although this is an impor-
tant factor in computing trust estimations and taking decisions based on them:
for example, your neighbor might be very good at fixing bicycles, so naturally
you would trust him with your flat tire, but that does not imply that you would
trust him to baby-sit your six months old daughter. A lot of trust frameworks
take into account the trust context, especially when they are general models
to be used in several kinds of applications/networks, see e.g. [3, 64]. In this
dissertation, we omit the context factor for the sake of simplicity (Chapters 2-4)
and because we focus on recommendation systems for one type of items only;
in other words, we work on recommendations and trust statements that belong
to the same domain/context (Chapters 6-7).
Omitting the context factor does not harm generality: while an agent in a
simplified trust model without context can choose between one or more trust
statement types (e.g. trust and distrust in a binary application such as Epinions,
or 6 gradual trust levels in CouchSurfing), in a trust application that takes into
account context, each one of these possible statements must be accompanied
by a context statement. In this respect, we can see a trust connection between
two agents as a couple (trust statement,context statement). The operators of
Chapters 3 and 4 can then easily be applied in context-aware trust applications
as well, since propagation and aggregation can only be performed sensibly on
trust estimations within the same context.
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Obviously, context and goal are also present when defining trust. For example,
Gambetta defines trust as a subjective probability that an agent will perform a
particular action which affects his own actions [34], and Jøsang et al. as the
extent to which one is willing to depend on somebody in a given situation [66].
As trust is used in a wide range of application domains, plenty of trust defini-
tions exist. Many of them focus on a different aspect of trust, or stem from a
different background (e.g. social sciences versus agent theory): Mui et al. see
trust as a subjective expectation about an agent’s future behavior based on the
history of encounters between the agents [102], while Castelfranchi and Fal-
cone augment Gambetta’s definition with a competence dimension [19]. These
examples illustrate that there is no consensus on how to define trust. In this
dissertation, in which we focus on trust that is explicitly given by the users of
a recommender application domain, we adopt the general definition of Jøsang
et al. We will define trust more precisely when needed to grasp the rationale
behind trust operators and their properties.
1.2 Recommender Systems
In the previous pages, we mentioned a lot of Web 2.0 applications: Facebook,
MySpace, Twitter, Last.fm, blogs, wikis, ... For the remainder of this work,
however, we will focus on one specific type of applications, namely social rec-
ommender systems. Social recommender systems use information about their
user’s profiles and/or relationships to suggest items that might be of interest to
them [123]. Such suggestions (recommendations) can come in many forms:
top 10 lists, promotions, ‘people who liked movie x also liked movie y’, ‘80%
of all people found the following review helpful’, etc. And it is certainly not all
about movies, cds or books only; also other fields might benefit from a good
recommendation system; think for example of research papers, travel packages,
courses, and so on.
Good and accurate recommender applications that guide users through the
vast amounts of online information are gaining tremendous importance, as the
wealth of information makes it increasingly difficult to find exactly what you
want or need; all the more because every person has his own preferences. Sup-
pose that you want to go to the movies, but have no idea what to choose: you
can surely find a lot of opinions and reviews online, but how do you know
which ones are the closest to your tastes and likes? This is where personalized
recommendation systems come into play.
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From an e-commerce perspective too, the value of a good recommender system
cannot be underestimated: Cinematch, the recommender of the American on-
line movie rental system Netflix4, delivers two third of Netflix’s rented movies,
Google News4 recommendations generate 38% click-throughs, and Amazon.com
claims that 35% of their sales results from recommendations [75]. Their impor-
tance is even more illustrated by the Netflix prize competition, which offered a
$ 1 000 000 reward for any recommendation algorithm that is 10% more accu-
rate than their own Cinematch5.
Most widely used recommendation systems are either content-based or col-
laborative filtering methods. Content-based systems tend to have their rec-
ommendation scope limited to the immediate neighborhood of a user’s past
purchase or rating record. For instance, if you have highly rated a romantic
movie with Keanu Reeves, your next recommendation might be a romantic
movie or a movie featuring Keanu. The system will continue to recommend
related items only, and not explore your other interests. In this sense, recom-
mender systems can be improved significantly by (additionally) using collabo-
rative filtering, which typically identifies users whose tastes are similar to yours
(we call them ‘neighbors’) and recommends items that they have liked. This
technique allows for more serendipitous recommendations: you might receive
recommendations for movies in a genre that you are not familiar with but that
are appreciated by your neighbors, so that there is a good chance that you will
like them too.
The advanced recommendation techniques that we will discuss in this dis-
sertation adhere to the collaborative filtering paradigm, in the sense that a
recommendation for an item is based on ratings by other users for that item,
rather than on an analysis of the item’s content. In this sense, as with collab-
orative filtering systems, they also belong to the class of social recommender
systems. More specifically, we will focus on one present-day set of social rec-
ommenders, namely trust-enhanced recommender systems. The social dimension
reaches a whole new level, since trust-enhanced recommenders mine the trust
network among their users to offer their services. Such systems incorporate a
trust network in which the users are connected by scores indicating how much
they trust and/or distrust each other, and use that knowledge to generate rec-
ommendations: users can receive recommendations for items rated highly by
people in their web of trust (WOT), or even by people who are trusted by these
4See www.netflix.com and news.google.com
5See http://www.netflixprize.com
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WOT members (through trust propagation and aggregation) etc., yielding more,
more accurate, and more personalized recommendations.
1.3 Overview
Trust metrics and recommendation technologies constitute the two pillars of
trust-enhanced recommender systems. Trust metrics are covered in detail in
Chapters 2-4, while Chapter 5 deals with the basics of recommender systems. In
Chapters 6-7 we focus on the intersection of the two fields, viz. trust-enhanced
recommender systems.
In Chapter 2 we give an overview of existing trust and distrust models and
explain their shortcomings. Current models are either not capable of properly
handling inconsistency, or cannot differentiate unknown agents from malicious
agents. These shortcomings can possibly have a large effect on the (ranking)
of trust estimations, recommendations, etc. Therefore, to meet the needs for a
framework that can help agents to make better informed (trust) opinions, we
propose a new bilattice-based model that preserves valuable provenance infor-
mation including partial trust, partial distrust, ignorance and inconsistency.
The following two chapters focus on the mechanisms that are needed to
predict trust and distrust values in this framework. Chapter 3 covers the prop-
agation problem. Whereas there is a general consensus on how trust can be
propagated, the picture gets much more complicated when also distrust is in-
volved. We describe the state of the art of trust propagation, and embark upon
the problem of distrust propagation, a research area that has not received much
attention so far. We discuss possible distrust propagation strategies, propose
and examine a set of propagation operators that exhibit the desired behavior,
and illustrate them by investigating propagation patterns in real-world data sets
from Epinions and CouchSurfing.
Chapter 4 concentrates on aggregation techniques for trust and distrust val-
ues. This field, too, is still in its very infancy. To help in reaching a better
understanding of the problem, we propose a set of properties that aggregation
operators should fulfill in a (dis)trust context. We demonstrate that the clas-
sical aggregation operators for bilattice elements are not always suitable, and
therefore propose new families of aggregation operators for trust-enhanced ap-
plications. We examine their behavior and show their applicability on data sets
from CouchSurfing and Epinions.
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The results in this part of the thesis have been published in, or submitted for
publication in international journals or in the proceedings of international con-
ferences. The trust framework was introduced in [146], the propagation opera-
tors were analyzed in [142, 147], and the aggregation operators were discussed
in [24, 141, 143, 144, 145].
The second part of the dissertation deals with the application of trust metrics
and their operators in the field of recommender systems. In Chapter 5 we cover
the recommender basics which are vital for a good understanding of the sub-
sequent chapters. We explain the collaborative filtering mechanism and discuss
common evaluation methods and measures (related to coverage and accuracy).
We examine the problems of classical recommendation systems – transparency,
sparsity, malicious users, cold start users, controversial items – and propose a
new detection measure for the latter, which is more suited for evaluation of the
corresponding shortcoming.
In Chapter 6, we focus on trust- and distrust-enhanced recommendation sys-
tems, and show how they can alleviate the problems pointed out in the previous
chapter. We provide a comparative coverage and accuracy analysis of the per-
formance of collaborative filtering and trust-enhanced algorithms for controver-
sial and random items, conducted on data sets from Epinions, and introduce a
new algorithm that maximizes the synergy between collaborative filtering and
its trust-based variants. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, we also
provide the first attempt to experimentally evaluate the potential of utilizing
distrust in the recommendation process; we investigate the use of distrust as
debugger, filter and as an indication to reverse deviations, and its role in the
aggregation process for trust-enhanced recommendations.
In Chapter 7, we give special attention to the user cold start problem, one of
the main difficulties faced by collaborative filtering and trust-enhanced recom-
mender systems. The users of such systems are highly encouraged to connect
to other users to expand the trust network, but choosing whom to connect to is
often a difficult task. Given the impact this choice has on the delivered recom-
mendations, it is critical to guide newcomers through this early stage connection
process. To this aim, we identify several classes of key figures in a trust network,
and introduce measures to evaluate the influence of these users on the coverage
and accuracy of the recommendation algorithm. Experiments on a dataset from
Epinions support the claim that generated recommendations for new users are
more beneficial if they connect to an identified key figure compared to a ran-
dom user; it is indeed who you know that makes the difference.
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The results in this second part have been published in a recommender systems
handbook, and international journals and conference proceedings. In particular,
the results described in Chapters 5-6 were reported in [148, 150, 152], while
the user cold start issue was discussed in detail in [149, 151, 153].
Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any
human disclosure; seldom can it happen that something
is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken.
Emma, 1815. Jane Austen
2 Trust Models
Multi-agent systems consist of a large number of intelligent, interactive and
(partially) autonomous agents that must cooperate to complete a certain task,
often too difficult to solve for an individual agent. Such systems are used in a
wide range of applications, ranging from mobile environments [76], over the
creation of crowd-related effects for movies1, to online trading [60]. Multi-
agent systems can often benefit from a trust system, especially when the cir-
cumstances do not allow for perfect information about the interaction partners’
behavior and intentions [119]. They may for example incorporate a trust net-
work to monitor and control the behavior of the agents that participate in a pro-
cess, think e.g. of an online market place such as eBay. Another nice illustration
can be found in [69], in which a trust network is used to alleviate the problem
of corrupt sources in peer-to-peer file-sharing networks by keeping track of the
peers’ trustworthiness. With the advent of the Semantic Web [14], even more
applications and systems will need solid trust mechanisms. The Semantic Web
is an extension of the current web where content is annotated (see RDF2 and
OWL3) such that machines and computers are able to understand its meaning
and reason with it. Hence, since more and more intelligent agents will take over
human tasks in the future, they also require an automated way of inferring trust
in each other, see for instance [125].
1Massive Software, see www.massivesoftware.com
2Resource Description Framework, see www.w3.org/TR/rdf-primer
3Web Ontology Language, see www.w3.org/TR/owl-features
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Nowadays, effective models already play an important role in many Web 2.0
applications. Question answering systems can compute trust indications along
with the answers based on how much trust the user puts into certain sources
[165], recommender systems can produce suggestions more tailored to the
users’ tastes (Chapter 6), consumer review sites can show personalized order-
ings of reviews based on which people the user trusts (think of Epinions), etc.
In the first part of this dissertation (Chapters 2-4) we will focus on the most
general use of trust models; trust in social networks will be discussed in detail
in the second part. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, we will use the
term ‘agent’ to refer to the people/machines that participate in a certain process,
and only use the term ‘user’ in the specific context of social network applications.
A lot of agent and social applications (will) use, in one way or another, a web of
trust that allows agents to express trust in other agents. Trust recommendations
derived from these networks are supposed to help them to develop their own
opinions about how much they may trust other agents and sources. However,
despite recent developments in the area, most of the trust models and metrics
proposed so far tend to lose potentially important trust-related knowledge.
In the following sections, we give an overview of existing trust models (Sec-
tion 2.1) and explain their shortcomings with regard to preserving trust prove-
nance information (Section 2.2). These are serious drawbacks in large networks
where many users are unknown to each other and might provide contradictory
information. Therefore, to meet the needs for a framework that can help agents
to make better informed (trust) decisions, we propose a new trust model in
which trust values are derived from a bilattice that preserves valuable trust
provenance information including partial trust, partial distrust, ignorance and
inconsistency (Sections 2.3 and 2.4).
2.1 Classification of Trust Models
Trust and trust models have been used in many fields of computer science, and
also in a wide range of applications; a nice overview can be found in [9] in
which Artz and Gil classify trust research in four major areas: models that use
policies to establish trust (enforcing access policies, managing credentials, etc.),
general trust models such as [29] and [170], models for trust in information
sources such as [165], and reputation-based trust models. The first category
deals with ‘hard’ trust, which involves identity verification and authorization.
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However, it is not because an agent is who he claims to be, that everyone auto-
matically should trust his actions, statements or intentions; some agents might
trust a particular agent while others do not. In this dissertation, we will not
handle the ‘security side’ of trust, but focus on ‘soft’, interpersonal trust; trust
that can be computed among two individuals in a network. In particular, we
will mainly discuss trust models and metrics that belong to Artz and Gil’s last
category. This category includes, among others, research that uses the history
of an agent’s actions or behavior (see e.g. [69, 106]), and work that computes
trust over social networks, such as [53, 89]. The trust-enhanced recommender
techniques that we will describe in Chapter 6 all belong to this class.
Trust models come in many flavors and can be classified in several ways.
We focus on two such classifications, namely probabilistic versus gradual ap-
proaches, and representations of trust versus representations of both trust and
distrust. Table 2.1 shows some representative references for each class.
A probabilistic approach deals with a single trust value in a black or white
fashion — an agent or source can either be trusted or not — and computes
a probability that the agent can be trusted. In such a setting, a higher suggested
trust value corresponds to a higher probability that an agent can be trusted. Ex-
amples can, among others, be found in [165] in which Zaihrayeu et al. present
an extension of an inference infrastructure that takes into account the trust be-
tween users and between users and provenance elements in the system, in [125]
where the focus is on computing trust for applications containing semantic in-
formation such as a bibliography server, or in contributions like [81] in which a
trust system is designed to make community blogs more attack-resistant.
Trust is also often based on the number of positive and negative transactions
between agents in a virtual network, such as in Kamvar et al.’s Eigentrust for
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [69], or Noh’s formal model based on feedbacks
in a social network [104]. Both [65] and [115] use a subjective logic frame-
work (discussed later on in this section) to represent trust values; the former
for quantifying and reasoning about trust in IT equipment, and the latter for
determining the trustworthiness of agents in a peer-to-peer system.
On the other hand, a gradual approach is concerned with the estimation of
trust values when the outcome of an action can be positive to some extent, e.g.
when provided information can be right or wrong to some degree, as opposed
to being either right or wrong (e.g. [3, 26, 41, 53, 85, 91, 136, 170]). In a grad-
ual setting, trust values are not interpreted as probabilities: a higher trust value
corresponds to a higher trust in an agent, which makes the ordering of trust
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Table 2.1: Classification of trust models
trust only trust and distrust
probabilistic
Kamvar et al. [69]
Jøsang et al. [65]Richardson et al. [125]
Zaihrayeu et al. [165]
gradual
Abdul-Rahman et al. [3]
Falcone et al. [29] De Cock et al. [26]
Golbeck [41] Guha et al. [53]
Massa et al. [91]
values a very important factor in such scenarios. Note that in real life, too, trust
is often interpreted as a gradual phenomenon: humans do not merely reason in
terms of ‘trusting’ and ‘not trusting’, but rather trusting someone ‘very much’ or
‘more or less’. Fuzzy logic [72, 164] is very well-suited to represent such natural
language labels which represent vague intervals rather than exact values. For
instance, in [136] and [79], fuzzy linguistic terms are used to specify the trust
in agents in a P2P network, and in a social network, respectively. A classical
example of trust as a gradual notion can be found in [3], in which a four-value
scale is used to determine the trustworthiness of agents, viz. very trustworthy –
trustworthy – untrustworthy – very untrustworthy.
The last years have witnessed a rapid increase of gradual trust approaches,
ranging from socio-cognitive models (for example implemented by fuzzy cogni-
tive maps in [29]), over management mechanisms for selecting good interaction
partners on the web [136] or for open and dynamic environments (e.g. [121]
or Almena´rez et al.’s PTM [6]), to representations for use in mobile environ-
ments [85] or recommender systems [41, 89], and general models tailored to
Semantic Web applications [168].
While trust is increasingly getting established, the use and modeling of distrust
remains relatively unexplored. Although recent publications [30, 43, 131] show
an emerging interest in modeling the notion of distrust, models that take into ac-
count both trust and distrust are still scarce. Most approaches completely ignore
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distrust (see for example [79, 81, 83, 102, 125, 165]), or consider trust and dis-
trust as opposite ends of the same continuous scale (see e.g. [3, 45, 136]). How-
ever, in agent network theory there is a growing body of opinion that distrust
cannot be seen as the equivalent of lack of trust [21, 35, 88]. Moreover, work in
the psychology area has repeatedly asked for a re-examination of the assump-
tion that positive- and negative-valent feelings are not separable [18, 114, 118],
and some researchers even claim that trust and distrust are not opposite, but
related dimensions that can occur simultaneously [22, 82, 97].
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one probabilistic model that con-
siders trust and distrust simultaneously: in Jøsang’s subjective logic [63, 65],
an opinion includes a belief b that an agent is to be trusted, a disbelief d cor-
responding to a belief that an agent is not to be trusted, and an uncertainty u.
The uncertainty factor leaves room for ignorance, but the requirement that the
belief b, the disbelief d and the uncertainty u sum up to 1, rules out options
for inconsistency even though this might arise quite naturally in large networks
with contradictory sources.
Examples of gradual models that represent trust and distrust as two sepa-
rate values can be found in [26, 53, 117]. De Cock and Pinheiro Da Silva [26]
propose to model the trust network as an intuitionistic fuzzy relation [11], but
the same remark w.r.t. inconsistency applies to their model too: the sum of the
membership degree (trust t, in [0,1]) and the non-membership degree (distrust
d, in [0,1]) must be less or equal than 1. The pair can then be represented as
an interval [t, 1 − d]. This approach is somewhat similar to Prade’s work [117]
where trust evaluations are represented as an interval in a bipolar trust scale.
However, the interval is seen as an imprecise evaluation of the degree of trust
[117], rather than an evaluation of trust and distrust independently (like in
[26] and [63]). The latter is also the approach taken by Guha et al., who use a
couple (t, d) with a trust degree t and a distrust degree d, both in [0,1]. To ob-
tain the final suggested trust value, they subtract d from t [53]. As we explain
later on, potentially important information is lost when the trust and distrust
scales are merged into one.
In the next section, we point out the importance of a provenance-preserving
trust model. It will become clear that current models (only taking into account
trust or both trust and distrust) are either not capable of properly handling
inconsistency, or cannot differentiate unknown agents from malicious agents,
although these problems can possibly have a large effect on the (ranking of)
trust estimation, recommendations, etc.
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2.2 Trust Provenance
The main aim in using trust networks is to allow agents to form trust opinions
on unknown agents or sources by asking for a trust opinion from acquainted
agents. Existing trust network models usually apply suitable trust propagation
and aggregation operators to compute the resulting trust estimation. But in
passing on this trust value to the inquiring agent, often valuable information on
how this value is obtained is lost.
Agent opinions, however, may be affected by provenance information ex-
posing how trust values have been computed. For example, a trust opinion in
a source from a fully informed agent is quite different from a trust estimation
from an agent who does not know the sources too well but has no evidence to
distrust it. Unfortunately, in current models, agents cannot really exercise their
right to interpret how trust is computed since most models do not preserve trust
provenance.
Trust networks are typically challenged by two important problems influenc-
ing trust opinions. Firstly, in large networks it is likely that many agents do not
know each other, hence there is an abundance of ignorance. Secondly, because
of the lack of a central authority, different agents might provide different and
even contradictory information, hence inconsistency may occur. Below we ex-
plain how ignorance and inconsistency may affect trust estimations. The first
two examples illustrate the need for a provenance-preserving trust model in
agent networks and on the Semantic Web, while the last example focuses on its
application in the recommender system area.
Example 2.1 (Ignorance without provenance). Agent a needs to establish an
opinion about both agents c and d to find an efficient web service. To this end,
agent a calls upon agent b for trust opinions on agents c and d. Agent b completely
distrusts agent c, hence agent b trusts agent c to degree 0 in the range [0,1], where
0 is full absence of trust and 1 full presence of trust. On the other hand, agent b
does not know agent d, hence b trusts d to the degree 0. As a result, agent b returns
the same trust opinion to a for both agents c and d, namely 0, but the meaning of
this value is clearly different in both cases.
With agent c, the lack of trust is caused by a presence of distrust, while with
agent d, the absence of trust is caused by a lack of knowledge. This provenance
information is vital for agent a to make a well informed decision. For example, if
agent a has a high trust in b, a will not consider agent c anymore, but might ask
for other opinions on agent d. Models working with only one value cannot cope
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with this kind of situations. A trust model that takes into account both trust
and distrust (i.e., two values) could be a possible solution. However, as the
examples below illustrate, the existing approaches fall short in other scenarios.
Example 2.2 (Ignorance without provenance). Agent a needs to establish an
opinion about agent c in order to complete an important bank transaction. Agent
a may ask agent b for an opinion of c because agent a does not know anything
about c. In this case, b is an agent that knows how to compute a trust value of c
from its web of trust. Assume that b has evidence for both trusting and distrusting
c. For instance, let us say that b trusts c to degree 0.5 in the range [0,1] where 0 is
absence of trust and 1 is full presence of trust; and that b distrusts c to the degree
0.2 in the range [0,1] where 0 is full absence of distrust and 1 is full presence of
distrust. Another way of saying this is that b trusts c at least to the extent 0.5, but
also not more than 0.8. The length of the interval [0.5,0.8] indicates how much b
lacks information about c.
In this scenario, by getting the trust value 0.5 from b, agent a is losing informa-
tion indicating that b has some evidence to distrust c too. Models working with
only one value cannot correctly represent this kind of situations. The problem
can be solved by the models that take into account two values, and in particular
Guha et al.’s [53]. However, their approach has one main disadvantage: agent
b will pass on a value of 0.5-0.2=0.3 to a. Again, agent a is losing valuable trust
provenance information indicating, for example, how much b lacks information
about agent c.
Example 2.3 (Contradictory information). A stranger tells you that a particular
movie was very bad. Because you do not know anything about this person, you
make inquiries with two of your friends who are acquainted with him. One of
them tells you to trust him, while the other tells you to distrust that same person.
In this case, there are two equally trusted friends that tell you the exact opposite
thing. In other words, you have to deal with inconsistent information.
This example illustrates how inconsistencies may arise: when an agent in the
trust network inquires for a trust estimation about another agent, it often hap-
pens that he does not ask one agent’s opinion, but several. Then these infor-
mation pieces, coming from different sources and propagated through different
propagation chains, must be combined together into one new trust value rep-
resenting the opinion of all the agents, which is not always an easy task when
conflicting evidence has been gathered. Nevertheless, this information must
be represented unambiguously as it may indicate that it is not possible to take
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decisions based on the obtained trust value.
Note that models that work only with trust and not with distrust are again
not expressive enough to represent these cases adequately. Taking e.g. 0.5 (the
average) as an aggregated trust value is not a good solution for Example 2.3,
because then we cannot differentiate this case from the partial trust situation
in which both of your friends trust the movie recommender to the extent 0.5,
which indicates that the recommender is somewhat reliable. Furthermore, what
would you answer if someone asks you if the stranger can be trusted? A plau-
sible answer is: “I don’t really know, because I have contradictory information
about him”. Note that this is fundamentally different from “I don’t know, be-
cause I have no information about him”. Hence, an aggregated trust value of 0 is
not a suitable option either, as it could imply both inconsistency and ignorance.
Previous models considering both trust and distrust degrees do not offer the
option of representing (partial) inconsistency, even though this might arise quite
naturally in large networks with contradictory sources. Jøsang’s subjective logic
[63] for example cannot cope with this scenario because the belief and disbelief
have to sum up to 1. A similar remark applies to De Cock and Pinheiro da Silva’s
intuitionistic fuzzy model [26]. Guha et al. [53] do not impose a restriction on
the trust and distrust degrees but their approach suffers from another kind of
shortcoming, as Example 2.2 illustrated.
2.3 Trust Score Space
The examples in the previous section indicate the need for a model that pre-
serves information on whether a ‘trust problem’ is caused by presence of dis-
trust or rather by lack of knowledge, as well as whether a ‘knowledge problem’
is caused by having too little or too much, i.e. contradictory, information. In
other words, we need a model that, on one hand, is able to represent the trust
an agent may have in another agent, and on the other hand, can evaluate the
contribution of each aspect of trust to the overall trust opinion. As a result, such
a model will be able to distinguish between different cases of trust provenance.
To this end, we propose a new framework in which trust values are derived
from a bilattice [38]. Since their introduction by Ginsberg in 1988, much atten-
tion has been paid to bilattices and their applications. It has for instance been
shown that bilattices are useful for providing semantics to logic programs (see
e.g. [31]), and as underlying algebraic structures of formalisms for reasoning
with imprecise information (see e.g. [23, 36]). The use of these bilattices results
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in a gradual model for (trust,distrust)-couples. We call such couples trust scores.
Definition 2.1 (Trust Score). A trust score (t, d) is an element of [0, 1]2, in which
t is called the trust degree, and d the distrust degree.
Trust scores will be used to compare the degree of trust and distrust an agent
may have in other agents in the network, or to compare the uncertainty that
is contained in the trust scores. This information can e.g. be used in the rank-
ing mechanisms of a recommender system, a file-sharing system, and so on;
for example by giving preference to recommendations/files from sources that
are trusted more, or to opinions that are better informed. To this aim, we in-
troduce the trust score space as a model that allows to compare and preserve
information about the provenance of trust scores.
Definition 2.2 (Trust score space, Trust-Distrust and Knowledge ordering). The
trust score space
BL = ([0, 1]2,≤td, ≤k,¬)
consists of the set [0, 1]2 of trust scores, a trust-distrust ordering ≤td, a knowledge
ordering ≤k, and a negation ¬ defined by
(t1, d1) ≤td (t2, d2) iff t1 ≤ t2 and d1 ≥ d2
(t1, d1) ≤k (t2, d2) iff t1 ≤ t2 and d1 ≤ d2
¬(t1, d1) = (d1, t1)
for all (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) in [0, 1]2.
One can verify that the structure BL is a bilattice in the sense of Ginsberg
[38], that is ([0, 1]2,≤td) and ([0, 1]2,≤k) are both lattices and the negation ¬
serves to impose a relationship between them:
(t1, d1) ≤td (t2, d2)⇒ ¬(t1, d1) ≥td ¬(t2, d2)
(t1, d1) ≤k (t2, d2)⇒ ¬(t1, d1) ≤k ¬(t2, d2),
such that ¬¬(t1, d1) = (t1, d1). In other words, ¬ is an involution that reverses
the ≤td-order and preserves the ≤k-order.
Note that Ginsberg’s bilattice is a generalization of FOUR, the logic introduced
by Belnap in [12, 13], in which he advocated the use of four truth values (‘true’,
‘false’, ‘unknown’ and ‘contradiction’).
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Inconsistency (1,1)
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Figure 2.3.1: The trust score space BL, a bilattice-based trust model that en-
ables us to compare trust scores according to the available trust-distrust content
(≤td) and to evaluate the uncertainty that is involved (≤k).
Figure 2.3.1 shows BL, along with some examples of trust scores. These scores
are interpreted as epistemic values: compared to Jøsang’s subjective logic, the
trust and distrust degrees are not complementary, but they reflect the imperfect
knowledge we have about the actual trust and distrust values (which are com-
plementary). The lattice ([0, 1]2,≤td) orders the trust scores going from com-
plete distrust (0, 1) to complete trust (1, 0). The lattice ([0, 1]2,≤k) evaluates
the amount of available trust evidence, ranging from a “shortage of evidence”,
t1 + d1 < 1, to an “excess of evidence”, viz. t1 + d1 > 1.
The boundary values of the ≤k ordering, (0, 0) and (1, 1), reflect ignorance,
resp. contradiction. We call trust scores (t, d) with t + d < 1 incomplete, while
those with t+ d > 1 are called inconsistent. In both cases, there is a knowledge
defect, which can be quantified by the following [0, 1]-valued measure:
Definition 2.3 (Knowledge defect, Knowledge defective trust score). We define
the knowledge defect of a trust score (t, d) as kd(t, d) = |1−t−d|. We say that trust
scores (t, d) for which kd(t, d) = 0, i.e., t + d = 1, have perfect knowledge (i.e.,
there is no uncertainty about the trust value), while all others are called knowledge
defective.
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Definition 2.4 (Consistent, Inconsistent trust score). We call a trust score (t, d)
consistent iff t+ d ≤ 1, and inconsistent otherwise.
The bottom part of the bilattice (or lower triangle, under the kd(t, d) = 0 line)
contains the trust scores for which there is some doubt (uncertainty) about
the trust degree. The information contained in such a trust score (t, d) can be
represented as an interval [t, 1−d], denoting that the agent should be trusted at
least to the degree t, but not more than 1−d; note the similarities with De Cock
et al.’s [26] and Prade’s [117] approaches. In such an interval representation,
complete ignorance is represented as [0, 1].
We call agents that issue consistent trust scores consistent agents. In this
work, we assume that every agent is consistent. However, although we start
from consistent agents, modelling inconsistent information is still needed when
we want to accurately represent the result of a trust score aggregation process.
This is illustrated by Example 2.3; we will elaborate upon this in Chapter 4. The
upper part of the bilattice (higher triangle, above the kd(t, d) = 0 line) contains
such inconsistent trust scores denoting conflicting information, i.e., trust scores
with t + d > 1. Note that trust scores in the higher triangle cannot be repre-
sented as intervals, since they contain too much information instead of a lack.
The trust scores in BL = ([0, 1]2,≤td, ≤k,¬) can also be considered within
the alternative space ([0, 1]2,≤t, ≤d,¬), with ¬ defined in Definition 2.2, and
≤t and ≤d as in Definition 2.5. Note that ≤t and ≤d are quasi-orderings, since
they are not antisymmetric.
Definition 2.5 (Trust ordering, Distrust ordering). The trust ordering ≤t and
distrust ordering ≤d are defined by
(t1, d1) ≤t (t2, d2) iff t1 ≤ t2
(t1, d1) ≤d (t2, d2) iff d1 ≤ d2
The trust and distrust orderings can also be seen as two extra orderings on
BL, which separately evaluate the amount of trust and distrust information
respectively. The negation ¬ serves to impose a relationship between them:
(t1, d1) ≤t (t2, d2)⇔ ¬(t1, d1) ≤d ¬(t2, d2).
Proposition 2.1. The orderings from Definitions 2.2 and 2.5 are related to each
other by (t1, d1) ≤k (t2, d2) ⇔ (t1, d1) ≤t (t2, d2) ∧ (t1, d1) ≤d (t2, d2), and
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Figure 2.3.2: The four orderings on BL: trust-distrust ordering ≤td, knowl-
edge ordering ≤k, trust ≤t and distrust ≤d ordering.
(t1, d1) ≤td (t2, d2)⇔ (t1, d1) ≤t (t2, d2) ∧ (t1, d1) ≥d (t2, d2).
Proof. By definition of ≤k it holds that (t1, d1) ≤k (t2, d2) ⇔ t1 ≤ t2 ∧ d1 ≤ d2,
and hence by definition of ≤t and ≤d that t1 ≤ t2 ∧ d1 ≤ d2 ⇔ (t1, d1) ≤t
(t2, d2) ∧ (t1, d1) ≤d (t2, d2). Analogously for ≤td.
The mapping is illustrated in Figure 2.3.2. The dotted line denotes the trust
scores (t, d) with perfect knowledge, i.e., kd(t, d) = 0. The triangles underneath
(in the gray area) contain the consistent trust scores; inconsistent trust scores
reside in the upper triangles.
The trust score space allows for a widely applicable lightweight trust model
that is nevertheless able to preserve a lot of provenance information by simulta-
neously representing partial trust, partial distrust, partial ignorance and partial
inconsistency, and treating them as different, related concepts. Moreover, by
using a bilattice model the aforementioned problems disappear:
1. By using trust scores we can now distinguish full distrust (0, 1) from ig-
norance (0, 0) and analogously, full trust (1, 0) from inconsistency (1, 1).
This is an improvement of, among others, [3, 165].
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2. We can deal with both incomplete information and inconsistency (im-
provement of [26, 63]).
3. We do not lose important information (improvement of [53]), because,
as will become clear in the next chapters, we keep the trust and distrust
degree separated throughout the whole trust process (propagation and
aggregation).
2.4 Trust Networks
A trust network is a network in which every couple of agents is connected
through a trust statement. This statement can denote full trust, partial trust,
complete distrust, ..., or ignorance (when two agents do not know each other
at all). In other words, the trust relationship between every agent couple can
be represented by a trust score. Remark that trust statements are not neces-
sarily reciprocal; think e.g. of a trust network between teachers and students:
students may highly trust their math professor for statistical problems, but this
certainly does not imply that the teacher will trust every single pupil to the same
degree. It is easy to see that a trust network can be modeled as a directed, fully
connected graph. The agents in the trust network can then be represented by
nodes in the graph, the relations between the agents by directed edges, and the
corresponding levels of trust (trust scores) as weights on the edges.
As has become clear throughout this chapter, we do not work in a binary set-
ting where agents are either trusted or distrusted, but in an environment where
agents can express partial and gradual trust, distrust and ignorance. This brings
us to the domain of fuzzy set theory [72, 164], an extension of the classical set
theory. In the latter, an element either completely belongs to a set, or not at
all. Fuzzy sets, however, allow elements to partially belong to a set, and con-
sequently also to belong to several sets at the same time. As a simple example,
consider the concept of age: a baby certainly fully belongs to the set of ‘young
people’, whereas everyone will agree that an elderly man does not. We say that
the baby belongs to the young people set with a membership degree of 1 (on
a scale from 0 to 1), while the elderly man has an associated membership de-
gree of 0. On the other hand, what can we say about a teenager? Obviously, a
teenager is still a young person, but not as young as a baby; hence, the mem-
bership degree will be somewhere in between 0 and 1. Just like ‘young’ and
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‘old’, ‘trust’ and ‘distrust’ are also clearly gradual phenomena; hence, fuzzy sets
are the pre-eminent tools for modeling trust networks.
Our formal definition of a trust network relies on the notion of a fuzzy re-
lation. A fuzzy relation is characterized by the same two items as a fuzzy set,
i.e., its elements and associated membership degrees. This time however, the
elements of a fuzzy relation are couples. In our setting, the trust relation be-
tween agents in the trust network can be defined by the set of agent couples
(a, b) where a trusts b to a certain degree (which we call the ‘trust set’). E.g., if
a completely trusts b, then the membership degree of (a, b) in the trust set is 1,
and if c and d do not know each other, the membership degree of (c, d) in the
trust set is 0. Analogously, (c, d)’s membership degree in the set of agents who
distrust each other (the distrust set) is 0, and for (a, b) as well. In other words,
the trust relation is a fuzzy mapping from the set of couples of agents into [0, 1],
and the same definition holds for the distrust relation as well.
However, as we have argued in the previous sections, it is not wise to con-
sider trust and distrust as separate concepts. Hence, it is better to replace the
two fuzzy relations (denoting trust and distrust) by one bilattice-fuzzy relation,
a mapping from the set of agent into [0, 1]2. This brings us to our final definition
of a trust network:
Definition 2.6 (Trust Network). A trust network is a couple (A,R) in which A is
the set of agents and R is an A × A → [0, 1]2 mapping that associates with each
couple (a, b) of agents in A a trust score R(a, b) = (R+(a, b), R−(a, b)) in [0, 1]2,
in which R+(a, b) and R−(a, b) denote resp. the trust and distrust degree of a in b.
In other words, the available trust information is modeled as a BL-fuzzy rela-
tion in the set of agents that associates a score drawn from the trust score space
with each ordered pair of agents. It should be thought of as a snapshot taken at
a certain moment, since trust scores can be updated.
2.5 Conclusions
Seldom, very seldom, we have just enough information to make a perfect as-
sessment of someone’s character, tastes or intentions. Instead, we often have
too little information or too much information for a good estimation. This is
certainly the case in large agent networks where (partial) ignorance and con-
flicting opinions are the rule rather than the exception. The trust models that
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had been proposed so far could not cope with such knowledge defects, since
they do not preserve vital trust provenance information. Representing trust es-
timations as elements of a bilattice as we have proposed in this chapter resolves
these issues and enables agents to accurately describe their own or computed
(via propagation and aggregation) opinions, so that the requiring agents can
safely act upon them. The ability to handle ignorance and inconsistency be-
comes extremely meaningful in an agent network where the trustworthiness of
many agents is initially unknown to an agent, which does not imply that he dis-
trusts all of them, but that he may eventually gather evidence to trust or distrust
some agents and still ignore others.

Eh! madame, qui sait? reprit Athos. Il y a un proverbe
populaire qui dit qu’il n’y a que les montagnes qui ne
se rencontrent pas, et les proverbes populaires sont
quelquefois d’une justesse incroyable.
Vingt Ans apre`s, 1845. Alexandre Dumas
3 Trust Propagation
How often do you not hear someone exclaiming “it’s a small world”, astonished
at bumping into somebody he/she thought almost impossible to meet, or at dis-
covering they have a mutual acquaintance. This ‘small world’ idea dates back
ages, and has ever since found its way into our daily lives and even our popular
culture; think for example of the movies1 and the song lyrics2. And it is not
only an established expression in the English language: the Spanish compare
the world to a handkerchief3, and the Namibians have an old, even more poetic
proverb saying that it is only the mountains that never meet4. Despite their old
age, these sayings are still remarkably up-to-date and widely applicable; not
only in our everyday life, but also online.
The scientific research about small worlds started with a letter experiment in
the sixties, initiated by the American social psychologist Stanley Milgram. Al-
though he was not the first scientist investigating whether there was an element
of truth in the popular proverb, it was his experiment that became well-known
thanks to the publication in Psychology Today [100]. Milgram asked several
random people to contact (via traceable letters) other people that were selected
1See www.imdb.com/find?q=small+world for a list of movies.
2One of the most well-known examples is featured in Disney’s The Lion King.
3El mundo es un pan˜uelo, according to [2].
4See www.worldofquotes.com/author/Proverb/185 and www.proverbatim.com/namibian
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from a random set of residents from distant American cities. If the starting per-
son did not know the target person directly, he was asked to send the letter to
one of his acquaintances who he thought would be most likely to know the tar-
get person. The goal of the experiment was to find out if there truly existed such
a thing as ‘a small world’, and if so, how many links were needed to reach the
target users. His study showed that people could indeed be linked to each other
in only a few steps, yielding connection chains with a mean of somewhat more
than 5 intermediaries [100, 138]. This result gave rise to the term ‘small-world
phenomenon’, later also known as ‘six degrees of separation’, made popular by
an American play [51] and its film adaptation.
Thirty years later, the mathematicians Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz
introduced the small-network theory [155]. Traditionally, most networks are
either modeled as completely random or as completely regular (nodes are only
connected with their k nearest nodes, with k fixed). However, a great deal of
real-world networks fall somewhere in between, such as the social network in
Milgram’s experiment. Watts and Strogatz introduced a new method to model
and study this kind of intermediate networks, and focussed on two of their
statistics, namely the clustering coefficient that measures to which degree nodes
in a graph are interrelated to each other, and the average shortest path length
between any two agents in the network. They demonstrated that, starting from
a regular network, replacing a few of the edges between the nearest neighbors
by longer random edges (i.e., to nodes that are not as near) leads to a drastic
decrease in the average shortest path length (i.e., the agents in the network
are separated less far from each other), while the clustering coefficient remains
almost unchanged. The resulting networks are highly clustered (as in regu-
lar networks) and have a small shortest path length (as in random networks);
hence, in such networks, agent pairs are connected through a small number of
intermediate agents. They called the resulting networks small-world networks,
by analogy with Milgram’s small world phenomenon.
It turns out that the small-world network theory can be applied to many real-
world networks, from biological (for instance protein interaction networks or
neural networks of worms) to technological networks (w.r.t. memory storage
or power grids), the research collaboration network between mathematicians
[40], and also other social networks. A nice example of the latter category is
the Kevin Bacon Oracle5, which determines how far any actor is separated from
5See oracleofbacon.org . Even the young Belgian actor Kenneth Vanbaeden, who only played
in one movie so far according to their database, has a Bacon number of 3!
31
the American movie star Kevin Bacon, based on the social network formed by
actors and the movies they featured in (the maximum distance is 8; more than
4 hops away is considered a rarity). Another illustrations is a Facebook group6
with over five million users, which revealed that the average separation between
its users is a bit less than 6.
Watts and Strogatz’s findings can be applied to a lot of trust networks as
well, since these are a specific set of social networks, see e.g. [48]. Recently
it has been demonstrated that several real-life trust networks are indeed small-
world networks: the trust graph of Epinions is investigated in [167], while Yuan
et al. give an overview of the characteristics of the Advogato, Robots, Squeak-
Foundation, Kaitiaki and Epinions trust networks7 [163]. So now that we know
that many trust networks exhibit the small-world property, we can assume that
most of its agents can be connected to each other in only a few steps. How-
ever, the fact that agents can be connected does not mean that they should fully
trust each other automatically. Hence, the next question is how to determine
the amount of trust an agent should place in another agent. And this is where
trust metrics come into play: their task is to compute a trust estimate, based
on the existing trust relations/links between other agents in the network. The
key building blocks in this procedure are trust propagation and aggregation
mechanisms. The latter will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4; in this chapter,
trust propagation operators are at the centre stage. As will become clear in the
following sections, trust propagation operators cleverly take advantage of Mil-
gram’s and Watts & Strogatz’s small-world findings.
In agent networks, most other agents are typically unknown to a specific agent.
Still there are cases in which it is useful to be able to derive some information on
whether or not an unknown agent can be trusted, and if so, to what degree. In
the context of recommender systems e.g., this is important if none of the users
the agent knows has rated a specific item that the user is interested in, but there
are some ratings available by unknown users (who are a member of the trust
network). E.g., the number of people that users have in their personal web of
trust (i.e., the people that are directly trusted by a particular user) in Epinions is
estimated to be around 1.7 on average. The total number of users on the other
hand well exceeds 100 000 [53]. In other words, a user’s web of trust only con-
tains a very tiny fraction of the user community. Hence, it would be very useful
6See www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=14436512661
7See www.trustlet.org/wiki/Trust_network_datasets for further references and informa-
tion on these trust data sets.
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to be able to tap into the knowledge of a larger subset of the user population to
generate recommendations. A first step in that direction is propagation.
When only dealing with trust, it is reasonable to assume that, if agent a
trusts agent b and b trusts agent x, a can trust x to some degree. However,
when we also have to take into account distrust, the picture gets more com-
plicated. In Section 3.1 we describe the state of the art of trust propagation,
while in the following sections we embark upon the problem of distrust propa-
gation, a topic that has received almost no attention so far. We discuss desirable
propagation properties and possible distrust propagation strategies in Section
3.2, and propose and examine a set of propagation operators that exhibit the
intended behaviors in Section 3.3. Their applicability on real-world data sets
from Epinions and CouchSurfing is tested in Section 3.4.
3.1 Setting the Scene
Propagation operators are an important part of many trust metrics. Various
types of trust metrics exist in the literature; we refer to [170] for a good
overview. In that paper, Ziegler and Lausen classify trust metrics along three di-
mensions: group versus scalar metrics, centralized versus distributed approaches,
and global versus local metrics. The first dimension refers to the way trust rela-
tions are evaluated, while the second classification is based on the place where
the trust estimations are computed. The last dimension refers to the network
perspective: trust metrics can take into account all agents and trust relationships
between them when computing a trust estimation (see e.g. [69, 104, 125]), or
only rely on a part of the trust network, hence taking into account personal bias
(for example [41, 53, 90]). The methods that we will discuss in Section 3.3
belong to the latter type.
Trust metrics usually incorporate techniques that are based on the assumption
that trust is somehow transitive. We call these techniques trust propagation
strategies. Let us illustrate this with Figure 3.1.1: if agent a trusts agent b
(whom we call a trusted third party, or TTP for short), and TTP b trusts agent x,
then it is reasonable to assume that a should trust x to a certain degree. This ba-
sic propagation strategy is known as atomic direct propagation, atomic because
the propagation chain only contains one intermediate agent. Besides direct
propagation, also other strategies exist: one might e.g. believe that x’s trust in a
should give rise to a trusting x (transpose trust, see Figure 3.1.2). One can also
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Figure 3.1.1: Atomic propagation
a x
Figure 3.1.2: Transpose trust
a xb
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Figure 3.1.3: Cocitation
a xb
Figure 3.1.4: Trust coupling
argue that a should trust x since both b and x are trusted by the same agent c
(cocitation, see Figure 3.1.3) or because b and x share the same trust relations
(trust coupling, see Figure 3.1.4). For a discussion of the latter strategies, we
refer to [53]. In the remainder of this chapter, and throughout the thesis, we
only focus on direct propagation, the strategy which is most agreed upon.
Trust is of course not always transitive, think of our discussion in Chapter 1
about goal and context. For example, if Jane trusts Alice to give her a good-
looking haircut and Alice trusts John to fix her bicycle, this does not imply that
Jane trusts John to fix bicycles, nor to give a nice haircut. But, in the same con-
text/scope, and under certain conditions, trust can be transitive [64]. Suppose
e.g. that Jane is new in town and wants to have a haircut. Jane trusts that Alice
can find a good hairdresser, while Alice trusts Mariah to be a good hairdresser.
Hence, Jane can trust Mariah to be a good hairdresser. This example also shows
us that a distinction must be made between trust in a agent’s competence to
assess the trustworthiness of a agent (functional trust, Alice trusting Mariah),
or trust in a agent’s competence to recommend/evaluate a good recommender
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a x
Figure 3.1.5: Propagation example
agent (referral trust, Jane trusting Alice) [3, 64]. As explained in [64], it is
the referral part that allows trust to become transitive. A propagation path can
then be seen as a transitive chain of referral trust parts, which ends with one
functional trust scope.
When dealing with trust only, in a probabilistic setting, multiplication is very
often used as the standard propagation operator, see for instance [125]. This
is also the case in gradual settings [6, 41, 53], but there is a wider spectrum
of propagation operators available, dependent on the goal or the spirit of the
application, which we will further illustrate in Section 3.3. Other trust propa-
gation work includes techniques based on fuzzy if-then rules [79, 136], on the
theory of spreading activation models (Ziegler and Lausen’s Appleseed [170]),
or on the semantic distance between a trusted third party’s trust and an agent’s
perception of the TTP’s trust [3].
The small-network theory taught us that almost all agents can be reached in
only a few propagation steps, so that we do not have to propagate for all eter-
nity. But of course, not all propagation paths will have the same length. In
Figure 3.1.5 e.g., there are two paths leading from agent a to agent x. If we
suppose that all trust links in the network denote complete trust, then intu-
itively we feel that the estimated trust of the second propagation path should
be lower than that of the first path (or that the trust score should contain less
knowledge), since we are heading further away from the source user. This
idea of ‘trust decay’ [52] is often implemented in propagation strategies. For
instance, in Ziegler’s approach this is incorporated through a spreading factor
[170], Golbeck only takes into account shortest paths and ignores all others
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[41], and in applications that only work with bivalent trust (instead of grad-
ual), Massa determines the propagated trust based on an agent’s distance from
a fixed propagation horizon [91].
3.2 Propagation Properties and Strategies
The rationale behind direct trust propagation says that, if agent a trusts agent
b and b trusts agent x, a can trust x. In the same way, it is reasonable to as-
sume that, if a trusts b and b distrusts agent y, a will also distrust y. Now, let
us consider the reverse case. If a distrusts b and b trusts y, there are several
possibilities: a possible reaction for a is to do the exact opposite of what b rec-
ommends, in other words, to distrust y. But another interpretation is to ignore
everything that b says. This example reveals part of the complex problem of
choosing an appropriate propagation scheme.
Our aim in this chapter is not to provide the holy grail solution, but rather
to provide some propagation operators that can be used in different schemes
(that are applicable in several agent and social applications), as well as to dis-
cuss some of their properties. The example indicates that there are likely to be
multiple possible propagation operators for trust and distrust. We expect that
the choice will depend on the application and the context, but might also differ
from person to person. Thus, the need for provenance-preserving trust models
becomes more evident, and hence also for propagation operators that are able
to preserve the provenance information as much as possible.
In this section, we first approach the problem from a theoretical point of view
and discuss useful properties for trust score propagation operators. Subse-
quently, we will test our intuitions on a more practical basis; we describe which
recurring propagation patterns have arisen from a small user study.
3.2.1 Desirable Propagation Properties
Let BL = ([0, 1]2,≤td, ≤k,¬) be the trust score space introduced in the pre-
vious chapter. In this space, we look for a trust score propagation operator
P : [0, 1]2 × [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 satisfying as many of the following requirements
pinned down in Definitions 3.1 – 3.5 as possible.
Definition 3.1 (Knowledge monotonicity). We say that a propagation opera-
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tor P is knowledge monotonic iff for all (t1, d1), (t2, d2), (t3, d3) and (t4, d4) in
[0, 1]2, (t1, d1) ≤k (t2, d2) and (t3, d3) ≤k (t4, d4) implies P ((t1, d1), (t3, d3)) ≤k
P ((t2, d2), (t4, d4)).
We call a propagation operator P knowledge monotonic if the arguments can
be replaced by higher trust scores w.r.t. the knowledge ordering ≤k without de-
creasing the resulting propagated trust score. Knowledge monotonicity reflects
that the better agent a knows agent b with whom it is inquiring about agent
x and the better b knows x, the more informed a will be about how well to
(dis)trust agent x.
Knowledge monotonicity is not only useful to provide more insight in the
propagation operators but it can also be used to establish a lower bound w.r.t.≤k
for the actual propagated trust score without immediate recalculation. This
might be useful in a situation where one of the agents has gained more knowl-
edge about another agent and there is not enough time to recalculate the whole
propagation chain immediately, as will for instance be the case in many trust-
enhanced recommender systems.
The analogue for the trust-distrust ordering ≤td is not a useful property,
because it counteracts normal real-life behavior as we illustrate next.
Example 3.1. If a new colleague tells you to distrust someone, you might decide
not to take into account his opinion because you do not know him sufficiently. This
comes down to
P ((0, 0), (0, 1)) = (0, 0) (3.1)
However, over time this colleague might become a trusted friend, i.e. your trust
in your colleague increases, and you will start distrusting others because your col-
league tells you to (think of our example in the introduction of this section). In
this case the trust score in one of the links of the chain goes up from (0,0) to (1,0)
while the overall trust score of the chain drops from (0,0) to (0,1).
Analogously to knowledge monotonicity, we can define an extra monotonicity
condition w.r.t. ≤t for the trust score space, which ensures that the more trust is
involved in a propagation chain, the more trust the final trust estimation should
contain :
Definition 3.2 (Trust monotonicity). We say that a propagation operator P is
trust monotonic iff for all (t1, d1), (t2, d2), (t3, d3) and (t4, d4) in [0, 1]2, (t1, d1) ≤t
(t2, d2) and (t3, d3) ≤t (t4, d4) implies P ((t1, d1), (t3, d3)) ≤t P ((t2, d2), (t4, d4)).
The analogue for the distrust ordering ≤d would counteract normal behavior:
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Example 3.2. In the previous example we explained that propagation of ignorance
and distrust leads to ignorance, see (3.1). Suppose that after a while the colleague
becomes someone you trust, then
P ((1, 0), (0, 1)) = (0, 1), (3.2)
as discussed in the previous example. Note that (1, 0) in (3.2) ≤d (0, 0) in (3.1),
and trivially, (0, 1) ≤d (0, 1), but that the propagated result (0, 1) in (3.2) con-
tains more distrust than (0,0) in (3.1).
Besides atomic propagation, we need to be able to consider longer propagation
chains, so TTPs can in turn consult their own TTPs and so on. For an asso-
ciative propagation operator, this extension can be defined unambiguously. In
particular, with an associative propagation operator, the overall trust score com-
puted from a longer propagation chain is independent of the choice of which
two subsequent trust scores to combine first.
Definition 3.3 (Associativity). A propagation operator P is said to be associative
iff for all (t1, d1), (t2, d2) and (t3, d3) in [0, 1]2,
P (P ((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) , (t3, d3)) = P ((t1, d1), P ((t2, d2), (t3, d3)))
If an operator is not associative, this means that we need to fix a particular eval-
uation order to propagate trust scores over paths with more than two edges. In
a network with a central authority that maintains all trust information, one can
choose which order to use. On the other hand, if there is no central authority,
and each agent has access only to the trust scores it has issued, it is necessary
to perform the propagation in a right-to-left direction (i.e., right associative).
With this order, at each node in the propagation path, an agent combines its
trust score in its successor, with the propagated trust score it receives from this
successor. This is illustrated below for a path containing three edges, and a
propagation operator P :
P ((t1, d1), (t2, d2), (t3, d3)) = P ((t1, d1), P ((t2, d2), (t3, d3)))
The issue of central authority versus privacy-preserving environments, and their
effect on the propagation and aggregation calculations, will be discussed in
more detail in Section 4.1.
Even for non associative propagation operators, instead of calculating a whole
chain, sometimes it is sufficient to look at only one agent to determine the over-
all trust score in a longer propagation chain.
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Definition 3.4 (Knowledge absorption). We say that a propagation operator P
is knowledge absorbing iff for all (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) in [0, 1]2,
P ((0, 0), (t2, d2)) = P ((t1, d1), (0, 0)) = (0, 0)
Hence, as soon as one of the agents is ignorant, we can dismiss the entire chain.
As such, for an operator with this property, precious calculation time can possi-
bly be saved.
Since we assume all users to be consistent, i.e., to issue consistent trust scores, it
is desirable that a trust score propagation operator preserves the consistency. In
this way, we can also ensure that all inputs (either direct trust scores or the result
of propagations) for the aggregation process will be consistent (see Chapter 4).
Definition 3.5 (Consistency preserving propagation). We say that a propagation
operator P preserves the consistency iff, when all inputs are consistent, the propa-
gated result is consistent too. In other words, if for all (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) in [0, 1]2,
t1 + d1 ≤ 1 and t2 + d2 ≤ 1 implies P ((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) = (p, q), with p+ q ≤ 1.
3.2.2 Propagation Patterns in Practice
A lot of trust score operators can be found that satisfy one or more of the above
properties; however, not all of them may behave logically in real-life trust net-
works. Therefore, in this section, we investigate which propagation patterns
occur in practice. We start the discussion with some intuitive examples.
Example 3.3. If a friend (i.e., b) whom you (a) fully trust tells you to distrust
someone (x), and you have no other information about this person, you likely
will choose to distrust him. In other words, using the trust network notation from
Definition 2.6, from R(a, b) = (1, 0) and R(b, x) = (0, 1) is derived that R(a, x) =
(0, 1), or:
P ((1, 0), (0, 1)) = (0, 1) (3.3)
Example 3.4. If a colleague whom you distrust tells you to trust someone, you
might decide this is too little information to act on. Indeed, if you distrust your
colleague, it is reasonable not to take into account whatever he is telling you.
Hence, from R(a, b) = (0, 1) and R(b, x) = (1, 0) is derived that R(a, x) = (0, 0).
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This means that, if no additional information is available, x remains unknown to
you. This comes down to
P ((0, 1), (1, 0)) = (0, 0) (3.4)
On the other hand, you might think that the colleague you distrust is giving you
wrong information on purpose, or you might conclude that trusted friends of your
distrusted colleague are best also to be distrusted. In this case, fromR(a, b) = (0, 1)
and R(b, x) = (1, 0) is derived that R(a, x) = (0, 1), hence we are confronted with
a propagation operator which is clearly different from the one in (3.4) since
P ((0, 1), (1, 0)) = (0, 1) (3.5)
The examples above serve two purposes: first, (3.3) and (3.4) illustrate that a
trust score propagation operator is not necessarily commutative because the or-
dering of the arguments matters. Note how this is different from the traditional
case (i.e., only trust) where the commutative multiplication seems sufficient to
do the job. Secondly, (3.4) and (3.5) illustrate that different operators yielding
different results are possible depending on the interpretation.
To our knowledge, so far, not much practical research on real-world data
sets has been done to find out whether useful information can be derived from
propagating distrust as the first link in a propagation chain or not [53, 59, 73]
(see page 56 for more information). Therefore, we have set up a small question-
naire to gather evidence in favor of the scenarios depicted by (3.4) and (3.5),
or evidence that dismisses our arguments about multiple distrust propagation
possibilities.
In the experiment, we focus on propagation paths with one intermediate agent,
i.e., a chain in which agent a is in a trust relation with agent b, who is in a
relation with agent x. The goal is to find out how the participant (agent a) feels
about x, or, in other words, how he/she propagates trust information via agent
b. As it may be hard for the subjects to express their trust opinions explicitly, we
instead asked to which degree they would follow x’s advice. Following Jøsang’s
definition of trust (see the end of Section 1.1), this will give us an indication of
R(a, x). Since trust and the willingness to depend on someone is closely related
to context and goal, we have designed the experimental setup according to a
movie recommender context; see Figure 3.2.1.
Each subject a was asked to imagine himself in a movie theatre, having no
clue on which movie to see. A passer-by (or TTP) b tells him he knows someone
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subject passer-by recommender
Figure 3.2.1: Movie recommender scenario for the experimental setup.
(x, the recommender) who has seen movie M and liked it a lot. We distinguish
three basic types of passers-by b: someone who is completely trusted by a when
it comes to movies (1, 0), a person a fully distrusts for movie advice (0, 1), and
a stranger, someone a has never seen before (0, 0). The relation between b and
the recommender x also belongs to one of these types. The subjects were then
asked how they would handle x’s positive advice about watching movie M . We
provided six possible answers, with each of the choices/actions accompanied by
their intended meaning, in order to exclude as much misunderstanding as pos-
sible. An example of such a question is given in Figure 3.2.2. Note that, since
we also include unknown and distrusted passers-by, we are able to investigate
the role of ignorance and distrust as first link in the propagation chain.
Twenty four people took part in the experiment. Although this was a very small
user study, it did yield some interesting observations. Firstly, atomic trust prop-
agation as described in the previous pages turns out to be a recurring pattern
indeed: all subjects follow the opinion of a trusted agent. If the TTP b distrusts
the recommender x, the subjects would not see the movie, despite the fact that
x gave a positive recommendation (hence distrusting x, as R(b, x) suggested).
We call this the basic trust profile, which consists of fully relying on a completely
trusted third party.
Secondly, with regard to distrust as the first propagation link, the answers
showed that half of the subjects present a coherent behavior. Two distrust pro-
files came to the fore, each of them followed by the same amount of people. The
subjects of the first distrust profile reverse the opinion of a distrusted passer-by
b; the subject would still see the movie if b distrusts the recommender x (hence
3.2 Propagation Properties and Strategies 41
Figure 3.2.2: Example of the questionnaire about the role of ignorance and
distrust in the propagation process.
trusting x) and not see it when b trusts x (distrust). This attitude can infor-
mally be described as ‘the enemy of your enemy is your friend’ and ‘the friend
of your enemy is your enemy too’, friend and enemy denoting a person that
is trusted and distrusted respectively. Subjects with the second distrust profile
also reverse b’s opinion when R(b, x) denotes trust, but ignore the advice of the
recommender when b distrusts x (i.e., ignorance is inferred). In other words,
these people do not consider the enemy of their enemy as their friend.
A last observation that can be made is with respect to the role of ignorance.
A quarter of the subjects showed a coherent behavior when ignorance is in-
volved. They ignore everything that is coming from a stranger b: irrespective
of R(b, x), the subjects decide not to pay any attention to the recommendation
(i.e., inferring R(a, x)=ignorance). We call this the basic ignorance profile.
Obviously, this was a very small experiment, and we are well aware that no
strong conclusions can be drawn from the answers to the questionnaire; to be
able to do this, one would need to construct more well-founded questionnaires
(also with other scenarios, e.g. where more risk is involved), take more care
of the underlying sociological and psychological interpretations (e.g. the effect
of positive versus negative recommendations), and involve more participants.
However, this goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. The goal of the exper-
iment was to shed some more light on the possible role of distrust, and to give
us an indication on how trust, distrust and ignorance can be propagated. There
is no ready-made answer to this question, as the experiment clearly illustrates,
but it did give us inspiration for the creation of new trust score propagation
operators that can handle trust, distrust and ignorance (which we will discuss
in detail in Section 3.3.2).
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3.3 Trust Score Propagation Operators
In the previous section, we discussed several desirable propagation properties
and practical propagation patterns. In this section, we bring these two sides
together and create a set of propagation operators that satisfy them as much as
possible. Along the way, it will turn out that some theoretical properties have
to be sacrificed to ensure that an operator’s behavior is in accordance with the
underlying propagation profile.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
As explained in Section 3.1, when dealing with trust only, the multiplication
operator is omnipresent, for probabilistic as well as gradual settings. However,
in gradual (fuzzy) settings, where trust is a number in [0, 1], there is a wider
range of possibilities, as the following example illustrates.
Example 3.5. Suppose that, on a scale from 0 to 1, user a trusts user b to the de-
gree 0.5, and that b trusts user x to the degree 0.7. Then, in a probabilistic setting
(using standard multiplication), trust propagation yields 0.35. In a fuzzy logic
approach however, the final trust estimate depends on the choice of the operator:
for instance, the rationale that a propagation chain is only as strong as its weakest
link leads to the use of the minimum as propagation operator, hence yielding 0.5 as
the propagated trust estimate. The use of the Łukasiewicz conjunction operator on
the other hand, i.e. max(t1 + t2−1, 0), will yield 0.2. Like with multiplication, this
propagated trust value reflects the individual influences of both composing links,
as opposed to only the weakest link.
The operators in this example can be generalized by the concept of triangular
norms, or t-norms for short [71, 128], representing large families of conjunctive
operators.
Definition 3.6 (Triangular norm). A t-norm T is an increasing, commutative and
associative [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] mapping satisfying T (1, x) = x for all x in [0, 1].
Table 3.1 contains some well-known and often used t-norms. Note that the
largest t-norm is TM, and the smallest the drastic t-norm TD.
For distrust degrees too, this generalized approach might be followed. How-
ever, according to our discussion in the last pages, the picture gets more com-
plicated when we also allow distrust as the first link in a propagation chain.
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Table 3.1: Examples of dual t-norms and t-conorms w.r.t. the standard negator,
with x and y in [0, 1]].
t-norms t-conorms
TM(x, y) = min(x, y) SM(x, y) = max(x, y)
TP(x, y) = x · y SP(x, y) = x+ y − x · y
TL(x, y) = max(x+ y − 1, 0) SL(x, y) = min(x+ y, 1)
TD(x, y) =
(
min(x, y) if max(x, y) = 1
0 otherwise
SD(x, y) =
(
max(x, y) if min(x, y) = 0
1 otherwise
Agent a might e.g. follow the principle of ‘the enemy of your enemy is your
friend’, but another interpretation is to say that a should distrust x because a
thinks that someone that is distrusted by a user that he distrusts certainly must
be distrusted. Guha et al. call the latter strategy additive distrust propagation,
and the former multiplicative distrust propagation [53]. They discuss the nega-
tive side effects (for example, cycles can lead to an agent distrusting himself) of
multiplicative propagation (also see [170]), but conclude that it cannot be ig-
nored because it has some philosophical defensibility; the enemy of your enemy
may well be your friend. Besides Guha et al., other researchers also proposed
operators that adhere to the first strategy, such as Jøsang et al.’s opposite belief
favoring discount operator [67], and also some of the operators we will intro-
duce in Section 3.3.2.
Propagation operators that take into account two values (trust and distrust) are
scarce. The standard gradual example is the approach of Guha et al. [53], while
Jøsang’s subjective logic operators [65, 67] are classic probabilistic examples;
we discuss both of them in the following two examples.
Example 3.6. A trust score (0.5, 0.2) denotes partial trust 0.5, partial distrust 0.2
and partial lack of knowledge 1 − 0.5 − 0.2 = 0.3. Assume that the trust score
of user a in user b is (t1, d1) and, likewise, that the trust score of user b in user
x is (t2, d2). The trust score (t3, d3) of user a in user x can then be computed as
the minimum of the trust degrees (as in Example 3.5), and the maximum of the
distrust degrees, reflecting that any evidence of distrust should be retained (the
additive approach). Another possibility is to calculate (t3, d3) as follows:
(t3, d3) = (t1 · t2, t1 · d2)
This propagation strategy reflects the attitude of listening to whom you trust
and not deriving any knowledge through a distrusted or unknown third party.
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In [65], Jøsang uses the same propagation technique to combine pairs of beliefs
and disbeliefs. Furthermore, subtracting the distrust degree from the trust de-
gree, the propagated trust score collapses to t1 · (t2− d2), a propagation scheme
proposed by Guha et al. [53].
Example 3.7. Alternatively, the trust score (t3, d3) of a in x can be calculated as:
(t3, d3) = (t1 · t2 + d1 · d2 − t1 · t2 · d1 · d2, t1 · d2 + d1 · t2 − t1 · d2 · d1 · t2)
In this propagation strategy, t3 is computed as the probabilistic sum of t1 · t2 and
d1 · d2, while d3 is the probabilistic sum of t1 · d2 and d1 · t2.
The underlying assumption is that a distrusted user is giving the wrong infor-
mation on purpose. Hence user a trusts user x if a trusted third party tells him
to trust x, or, if a distrusted third party tells him to distrust x (i.e. the enemy
of your enemy is your friend). Subtracting the distrust degree from the trust
degree yields (t1 − d1) · (t2 − d2), a distrust propagation scheme put forward by
Guha et al. in [53].
Analogous to triangular norms, the maximum, probabilistic sum, etc. can be
generalized by triangular conorms, or t-conorms for short [71], representing
large families of disjunctive operators:
Definition 3.7 (Triangular conorm). A t-conorm S is an increasing, commutative
and associative [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] mapping satisfying S(x, 0) = x for all x in [0, 1].
In the right part of Table 3.1, we summarized some well-known and often used
t-conorms. The largest t-conorm is SD, and the smallest SM. Note that t-norms
and t-conorms often appear in pairs:
Definition 3.8 (Negator). An involutive negator N is a decreasing [0, 1] → [0, 1]
mapping satisfying N (0) = 1, N (1) = 0 and N (N (x)) = x for all x in [0, 1].
Definition 3.9 (Dual t-norm and t-conorm). The t-norm T is called the dual of
the t-conorm S w.r.t. the involutive negator N iff T (x, y) = N (S(N (x),N (y)))
for all x and y in [0, 1].
The most commonly used involutive negator is N s(x) = 1 − x, called the stan-
dard negator; the t-norms and t-conorms in Table 3.1 are duals w.r.t. the stan-
dard negator. Note that the concept of dual t-norms and t-conorms is a gener-
alization of the De Morgan’s Laws for bivalent inputs.
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3.3.2 New Trust and Distrust Propagation Families
Our questionnaire experiment revealed one basic trust propagation profile and
several distrust propagation patterns. To study these propagation schemes,
let us first consider the bivalent case, i.e. when trust and distrust degrees as-
sume only the values 0 or 1. For agents a and b, we use R+(a, b), R−(a, b),
and ∼R−(a, b) as shorthands for respectively R+(a, b) = 1, R−(a, b) = 1 and
R−(a, b) = 0. We consider the following four, different propagation schemes:
1. R+(a, x) ≡ R+(a, b) ∧R+(b, x)
R−(a, x) ≡ R+(a, b) ∧R−(b, x)
2. R+(a, x) ≡ R+(a, b) ∧R+(b, x)
R−(a, x) ≡ ∼R−(a, b) ∧R−(b, x)
3. R+(a, x) ≡ (R+(a, b) ∧R+(b, x)) ∨ (R−(a, b) ∧R−(b, x))
R−(a, x) ≡ (R+(a, b) ∧R−(b, x)) ∨ (R−(a, b) ∧R+(b, x))
4. R+(a, x) ≡ R+(a, b) ∧R+(b, x)
R−(a, x) ≡ (R+(a, b) ∧R−(b, x)) ∨ (R−(a, b) ∧R+(b, x))
In scheme (1) agent a only listens to whom he trusts, and ignores everyone else;
this behavior corresponds to a combination of the basic trust profile and the ba-
sic ignorance profile from Section 3.2.2. Scheme (2) is similar, but in addition
agent a takes over distrust information from a not distrusted (hence possibly
unknown) third party (in other words, we preserve the basic trust profile but
change the attitude towards ignorance). Scheme (3) corresponds to an inter-
pretation in which the enemy of an enemy is considered to be a friend, and the
friend of an enemy to be an enemy too (a combination of the basic trust profile
and one of the distrust patterns found in the experiment). Finally, scheme (4)
is an alteration of (3) which models the second distrust pattern in combination
with the trust propagation profile; a mitigation of scheme (3).
In the trust score space, besides 0 and 1, we also allow partial trust and dis-
trust. Hence we need suitable extensions of the logical operators that are used
in schemes (1)–(4). For conjunction, disjunction and negation, we use respec-
tively a t-norm T , a t-conorm S and a negator N . They represent large classes
of logic connectives, from which specific operators, each with their own behav-
ior, can be chosen, according to the application or context. In the remainder of
this section, we use t1 as an abbreviation for the trust degree R+(a, b) of agent
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a in agent b, and d1 for the corresponding distrust degree R−(a, b). Similarly,
we use (t2, d2) to denote the trust score from agent b in agent x. In other words
R(a, b) = (t1, d1) and R(b, x) = (t2, d2).
Definition 3.10 (Propagation operators in BL). Let T be a t-norm, S a t-
conorm andN a negator. The propagation operators P1, P2, P3 and P4 are defined
by (for (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) in [0, 1]2):
P1((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) = (T (t1, t2), T (t1, d2))
P2((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) = (T (t1, t2), T (N (d1), d2))
P3((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) = (S(T (t1, t2), T (d1, d2)),S(T (t1, d2), T (d1, t2)))
P4((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) = (T (t1, t2),S(T (t1, d2), T (d1, t2)))
People are likely to listen to whom they trust; this attitude is reflected by the
first propagation operator. An agent with this profile (P1) exhibits a skeptical
behavior in deriving no knowledge through a distrusted or unknown third party.
In the upper left corner of Table 3.2, the behavior of P1 for bivalent inputs
is shown. Note that the results for inconsistency in the last link are also in
accordance with this behavior. We do not consider results for inconsistency in
the first link, because we assume that all agents behave in a consistent way; in
fact, it is only useful to propagate inconsistency when it occurs in the last link
of the propagation chain (where information is possibly aggregated).
It follows from the monotonicity of T that P1 is knowledge and trust mono-
tonic, while associativity of the t-norm leads to P1 being associative. If there
occurs a “missing link” (0, 0) anywhere in the propagation chain, the result will
contain no useful information. In other words, P1 is knowledge absorbing. Note
that the same conclusion (i.e. ignorance) can be drawn if at any position in the
chain, except the last one, there occurs complete distrust (0, 1).
P1 neglects all information coming from an unknown agent. However, some
agents might be willing to take over some information coming from whatever
party, as long as it is not distrusted. For instance, when agent bwarns a about an
agent x that is to be distrusted, agent a might listen to the advice even when he
does not know b. In this way we arrive at a propagation operator reflecting that
a trusts x when a trusts b and b trusts x (in other words, the classical behavior),
and a distrusts x because b distrusts x and a does not distrust b. This attitude is
represented by propagation operator P2.
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Table 3.2: Propagation operators, using TTP b with R(a, b) = (t1, d1) (rows) and
R(b, x) = (t2, d2) (columns).
P1 (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
P2 (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
P3 (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
P4 (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1)
(1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
Note how P2 only differs from P1 in the computation of the propagated dis-
trust degree. Agents with this second profile display a paranoid behavior in
taking some distrust information even from an unknown third party: suppose
you meet someone that tells you a movie was dreadful. Even though you do
not know this person and whether to trust him, it may happen that you retain
some of this negative information. This paranoid behavior also occurs when the
unknown third party receives inconsistent information. The following example
illustrates that P2 is not knowledge monotonic.
Example 3.8. In this example we use the standard negator Ns and an arbitrary
t-norm. To see that P2 is not knowledge monotonic, consider
P2((0.2, 0.7), (0, 1)) = (0, 0.3)
P2((0.2, 0.8), (0, 1)) = (0, 0.2)
Going from the first to the second situation, all trust degrees remain the same but
the distrust degree of agent a in agent b has increased slightly. In other words, a
has formed a slightly more informed opinion about b:
(0.2, 0.7) ≤k (0.2, 0.8)
and trivially also (0, 1) ≤k (0, 1). However, the propagated trust score in the second
situation now contains less knowledge:
(0, 0.3) k (0, 0.2),
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since the propagated distrust degree of a in x in the second situation has dropped
slightly, while the propagated trust degree of a in x did not change.
The intuitive explanation behind the non knowledge monotonic behavior of
P2 is that, using this propagation operator, agent a takes over distrust from a
stranger b, hence giving b the benefit of the doubt, but when a starts to distrust
b (thus knowing b better), a will adopt b’s opinion to a lesser extent, or in other
words, derive less knowledge.
P2 is trust monotonic, but not knowledge absorbing (due to the role of ig-
norance in the first link), nor associative as the following example shows.
Example 3.9. Using the standard negator Ns and the product t-norm TP we ob-
tain:
P2((0.3, 0.6), P2((0.1, 0.2), (0.8, 0.1))) = (0.024, 0.032)
P2(P2((0.3, 0.6), (0.1, 0.2)), (0.8, 0.1)) = (0.024, 0.092)
The following example illustrates the effects of gradual trust and gradual dis-
trust degrees.
Example 3.10. In this example we use the product t-norm TP and the standard
negator Ns. Assume that, although agent a highly trusts b, there is also evidence
to slightly distrust b, e.g.
(t1, d1) = (0.8, 0.2)
Furthermore assume that b highly distrusts x, i.e.
(t2, d2) = (0.1, 0.9)
Then, if agent a matches the second profile, we obtain
P2((t1, d1), (t2, d2)) = (0.08, 0.72)
In other words, agent a takes over most of the information that b provides; how-
ever, the final trust score is mitigated because a also slightly distrusts b.
Unlike the first profiles, it is in fact possible that some agents will use informa-
tion coming from a distrusted agent. Propagation operator P3 is an extension
of P1 and the implementation of the third scheme on page 45.
Agents that fit this profile consider an enemy of an enemy to be a friend
and a friend of an enemy to be an enemy, i.e., P3((0, 1), (0, 1)) = (1, 0) and
P3((0, 1), (1, 0)) = (0, 1). Due to the monotonicity of T and S, P3 is knowledge
monotonic. Examples can be constructed to prove that P3 is not trust monotonic
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or associative. Knowledge absorption holds for P3, despite the fact that it is not
associative.
The last profile (P4) is a moderation of P3. While a friend of an enemy is
still considered to be an enemy, no information is derived about an enemy of
an enemy: P4((0, 1), (1, 0)) = (0, 1) and P4((0, 1), (0, 1)) = (0, 0). In a situation
in which the first agent of the chain is distrusted, the trust degree of the second
link is transferred to the distrust component of the propagated result, while the
distrust degree is ignored (i.e., P4((0, 1), (t, d)) = (0, t)). Note that this is also
the case when inconsistency is involved. The properties of the third profile ap-
ply to P4 as well. In addition, P4 is also trust monotonic.
In summary, as Proposition 3.1 shows, all the proposed propagation operators
copy information from a fully trusted TTP. All of them ignore information com-
ing from an unknown party, except P2 which takes over the distrust information
from a stranger.
Proposition 3.1. For all (t, d) in [0, 1]2 it holds that
P1((1, 0), (t, d)) = (t, d) P1((0, 0), (t, d)) = (0, 0) P1((0, 1), (t, d)) = (0, 0)
P2((1, 0), (t, d)) = (t, d) P2((0, 0), (t, d)) = (0, d) P2((0, 1), (t, d)) = (0, 0)
P3((1, 0), (t, d)) = (t, d) P3((0, 0), (t, d)) = (0, 0) P3((0, 1), (t, d)) = (d, t)
P4((1, 0), (t, d)) = (t, d) P4((0, 0), (t, d)) = (0, 0) P4((0, 1), (t, d)) = (0, t)
In these basic cases, it is clear that all propagation operators preserve the consis-
tency. In general, only P1 and P2 are consistency preserving for arbitrary choices
of the fuzzy logical operators involved; however, when using the minimum/max-
imum, product/probabilistic sum, or the Łukasiewicz duals, the property also
holds for P3 and P4.
Proposition 3.2. P1 and P2 preserve the consistency.
Proof. Assume that (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) are consistent. Due to the monotonicity
of T it holds that T (t1, t2) ≤ T (1, t2) = t2, and analogously T (t1, d2) ≤ d2,
hence T (t1, t2) + T (t1, d2) ≤ t2 + d2 ≤ 1, since (t2, d2) is consistent. This shows
that P1 is consistent. Analogously for P2.
Propagation operators P3 and P4 are not consistency preserving in general. As a
counterexample for P3 and P4, take T = TM and S= SD with (t1, d1) = (0.3, 0.6)
and (t2, d2) = (0.8, 0.1).
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Proposition 3.3. P3 and P4 preserve the consistency if T = TM and S = SM, or
T = TP and S = SP, or T = TL and S = SL.
Proof. We show that P4 preserves the consistency; proofs for P3 can be con-
structed analogously.
For TM & SM, we need to demonstrate that min(t1, t2) + max(min(t1, d2),
min(d1, t2)) [∗] ≤ 1. From the monotonicity of the minimum and maximum
and the consistent nature of the trust scores, it follows that [∗] ≤ min(t1, t2) +
max(min(t1, 1 − t2),min(1 − t1, t2)) [∗∗]. Suppose (i) t1 ≥ 1 − t2, then [∗∗] =
min(t1, t2)+max(1− t1, 1− t2) [∗∗∗]. If 1− t1 ≤ 1− t2 (and hence t1 ≥ t2), then
[∗ ∗ ∗] = t2 + 1− t2 = 1 (and analogously for the other case). Suppose that (ii)
t1 < 1− t2 (or t1 + t2 < 1), then [∗∗] = min(t1, t2) + max(t1, t2) = t1 + t2 < 1.
For TP & SP, we prove that t1t2+t1d2+d1t2 ≤ 1, and hence that t1t2+t1d2+
d1t2−t1d2d1t2 ≤ 1. Since we assume consistent trust scores, t1t2 +t1d2 +d1t2 ≤
t1t2 + t1(1 − t2) + (1 − t1)t2 = t1 + t2(1 − t1) [∗]. Since t1 and t2 in [0, 1],
[∗] = t1 + t2 − t1t2 = SP (t1, t2) ≤ 1.
Finally, for TL & SL, max(t1 + t2−1, 0) + min(max(t1 +d2−1, 0) + max(d1 +
t2 − 1, 0), 1) ≤ max(t1 + t2 − 1, 0) + min(max(t1 − t2, 0) + max(t2 − t1, 0), 1) [∗],
due to the monotonicity of min and max and the consistent trust scores. Either
t1− t2 or t2− t1 will be less than or equal to zero. Without loss of generality, let
us pick t2− t1. Then we can say that [∗] = max(t1 + t2−1, 0)+max(t1− t2, 0) ≤
2t1 − 1 ≤ 1.
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the properties in Section 3.2.1 that are fulfilled
by the propagation operators. Note that P1 satisfies all properties and is the only
operator that is associative. P2 is the only one that is not knowledge monotonic
or knowledge absorbing (due to the role of ignorance), whereas P3 is the only
operator that does not satisfy trust monotonicity (due to the role of distrust in
the first link of the propagation chain).
3.4 Experimental Results
The choice of which propagation operator and t-(co)norms are appropriate
mainly depends on the kind of application and the type of data that is avail-
able. In this section, we discuss data sets from CouchSurfing and Epinions, two
web applications with a strong social networking component. We will continue
to use these data sets throughout the dissertation. In this section, we conduct
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Table 3.3: Properties of the propagation operators in Definition 3.10.
Property P1 P2 P3 P4
Knowledge monotonicity x x x
Trust monotonicity x x x
Associativity x
Knowledge absorption x x x
Consistency perserving x x
experiments on them, illustrate that there does not exist one universal propaga-
tion operator which performs best for every application, and demonstrate that
distrust-enhanced propagation strategies can be useful to obtain accurate trust
estimations in agent networks.
3.4.1 The Epinions.com and CouchSurfing.org Data Sets
Epinions8 is a popular e-commerce site where users can evaluate products and
users, see Section 1.1. Users can include other users in their personal ‘web of
trust’ (i.e., a list of reviewers whose reviews and ratings were consistently found
to be valuable8), or put them on their ‘block list’ (a list of authors whose reviews
were consistently found to be offensive, inaccurate or low quality8, thus indi-
cating distrust). The data set we use in our experiments was collected by Guha
et al. [53] and consists of 131 829 users and 840 799 non self-referring trust
relations. Remark that the Epinions data set only contains bivalent values (i.e.,
contains only full trust and full distrust, and no gradual statements), and that
the users do not have the possibility to explicitly indicate ignorance. Also note
that the complete distrust statements constitute only a small portion of the data
set, namely about 15%; see Table 3.4.
CouchSurfing9 is a large online hospitality network. Its members use the so-
cial network to form friendships, exchange ideas and impressions, and in the
first place, to find or offer free accommodation (also see Section 1.1). Users can
indicate whether they ‘don’t trust’, ‘somewhat’, ‘generally’ or ‘highly’ trust an-
8See www.epinions.com and www.epinions.com/help/faq
9See www.couchsurfing.org
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Table 3.4: Distribution of trust statements in the Epinions-reviews data set.
Type of statement Trust score # %
all 840 799 100
full distrust (0,1) 123 670 14.71
complete trust (1,0) 717 129 85.29
other CouchSurfer, trust him/her ‘with his life’, or have no idea (‘don’t know this
person well enough to decide’). The trust field is kept private to other members
of CouchSurfing and is not mandatory. Nonetheless, these relationships consti-
tute a large trust network of 397 471 users and 2 697 705 trust statements. The
distribution of the trust statements in the network is given in Table 3.5. Fur-
thermore, the users can also indicate how well they know each other, using one
of the following options: ‘not at all’, ‘a little bit’, ‘somewhat’, ‘fairly well’, ‘very
well’, ‘extremely well’ or ‘could not know any better’.
This data set is very suitable for our purposes, since it contains gradual trust,
distrust, and gradual knowledge levels. Unfortunately, the CouchSurfing data
does not perfectly align with our trust score space setting (for instance, the
latter requires cardinal values, whereas the data set only provides ordinal ones);
hence, we need a heuristic method to map the available information into trust
scores. Such heuristics are often used in link (strength) prediction problems
where the relations (and weights) are not numerical values; see e.g. [55] or
[91] in which the trust statements from Advogato are translated to numerical
values, and the bivalent statements from Epinions to distances w.r.t. a certain
horizon (also see Chapter 6).
Our translation of the trust and knowledge statements into [0, 1] can be
found in Table 3.5. We chose to translate the three highest knowledge levels
to the maximum knowledge value 1 due to pragmatic reasons, to ensure a more
balanced distribution of the trust scores over the trust score space. We propose
to map the available trust and knowledge information to trust scores according
to the following formula: (t, d) =
(
k · t′ , k · (1− t′)
)
, with t
′
(k) the transla-
tion of the trust (knowledge) statement10. In this way, we obtain a data set
10Records that contain a ‘not at all’ knowledge statement or a ‘dont know well enough to decide’
trust statement are translated to (0, 0).
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Table 3.5: Distribution of trust and knowledge statements in the CouchSurfing
data set.
trust statements knowledge statements
type t
′
# % type k # %
all 2 697 705 100 all 2 697 705 100
don’t know 0 152 443 5.65 not at all 0 88 808 3.29
don’t trust 0 6 429 0.24 a little bit 0.25 573 517 21.26
somewhat trust 0.25 331 061 12.27 somewhat 0.5 761 085 28.21
generally trust 0.5 994 476 36.86 fairly well 0.75 658 996 24.43
highly trust 0.75 893 428 33.12 very well 1 341 529 12.66
trust with my life 1 319 868 11.86 extremely well 1 177 001 6.56
couldn’t know any better 1 96 770 3.59
with a high variety of knowledge defects and gradual trust and distrust degrees,
containing consistent trust scores with the desirable properties t + d = k and
1 − k = kd(t, d); recall that for consistent trust scores, 1 and k represent the
perfect and actual knowledge contained in a trust score, and kd the missing
information, i.e., the knowledge defect.
3.4.2 Propagation Operators for Epinions and CouchSurfing
The goal of our experiments is to find out which of the propagation behaviors
exhibited by the operators of Definition 3.10 occur in real-world data sets, and
how well the operators perform in a trust estimation problem. In this section,
we focus on propagation chains of length 2 (i.e., with one intermediate agent),
by analogy with the atomic propagation examples in the previous sections on
which we have based our propagation operators11. The propagation chains that
we consider consist of R(a, b) and R(b, x), for which the trust score R(a, x) is
also available in the data set. Like this, we are able to compare the propagated
value with the actual value.
To measure the performance of the propagation operators, we use the leave-
one-out method, which consists of hiding a trust relation and trying to predict
its hidden value (i.e., the trust score). Figure 3.4.1 depicts an example of a data
instance which contains three users with three trust relations (denoted by the
11In Chapter 6, we experiment with longer propagation paths as well.
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a xb
Figure 3.4.1: Example of a leave-one-out scenario for propagation. Solid lines
denote existing trust relations in the data set, the dotted line represents the
predicted R(a, x).
solid lines): we hide the trust relation from agent a to agent x and try to esti-
mate its trust score by propagating the opinion of a’s acquaintance b. Therefore,
we need to propagate a’s trust score in b and b’s trust score in x; this process is
represented by the dotted line. The Epinions and CouchSurfing data set contain
respectively 10 961 993 and 6 271 259 of these configurations for which we can
apply the leave-one-out method.
To measure the accuracy of the propagation operators, we work with a varia-
tion on the classical mean absolute error (MAE). The computation of the MAE is
done by determining the deviation between the hidden trust score and the pre-
dicted trust score for each leave-one-out experiment. Since the MAE is defined
for scalar values, but we work with trust scores which have two components,
we define the trust score MAE as the average of the Manhattan distances. Since
the trust and distrust degrees range between 0 and 1, the extreme values that
T-MAE can reach are 0 and 2.
Definition 3.11 (T-MAE). We define the trust score MAE in a leave-one-out exper-
iment with n trust score predictions as
T-MAE =
n∑
i=1
|tri − tpi |+ |dri − dpi |
n
with (tri , dri) the real trust score and (tpi , dpi) the predicted trust score.
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Table 3.6: T-MAE performance of the propagation operators in the Epinions data
set, values are on a scale from 0 to 2; due to the bivalent nature of the data, the
choice of T and S is irrelevant.
Operator T = TM = TP = TL
P1 0.142
P2 0.142
P3 0.136
P4 0.134
We work with T-MAE instead of two MAEs (one for the trust degree and one
for the distrust degree), since a trust score consists of two separate albeit de-
pendent components which must be considered together: a trust degree of 0.8
e.g. has a completely different meaning when combined with a distrust degree
of 0 or 0.8; in the former case this represents almost complete trust, while in
the latter it denotes highly conflicting information.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 contain the results of the propagation leave-one-out exper-
iments for P1, P2, P3 and P4 on the Epinions and CouchSurfing data set resp.
Let us first focus on the results for the Epinions application. Since this data set
contains bivalent trust and distrust degrees, we cannot distinguish between dif-
ferent T and S, as their behavior on bivalent inputs is the same. Furthermore,
P1 and P2 yield the same results because T (t1, d2) = T (N (d1), d2) due to the
fact that the data set does not take into account explicit ignorance.
Note that it is no surprise that the trust-oriented propagation operators P1
and P2 perform more or less the same as the distrust-enhanced operators P3 and
P4 due to the trust-distrust ratio in the data set (only 15% of all relations denote
distrust), and the fact that the behavior of following the opinion of a trusted
third party (which is embodied by P1 and is at the basis of all other operators as
well) is omnipresent: from all leave-one-out experiments with R(a, b) = (1, 0)
and R(b, x) = (1, 0), 98.67% results in R(a, x) = (1, 0).
The T-MAE differences in Table 3.6 are small indeed, but note that we can
nevertheless clearly make a distinction between the two approaches. P3 and P4
achieve the best T-MAEs, which indicates that distrust can be used to improve
the trust score prediction process (‘enemy of a friend is an enemy’).
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Table 3.7: T-MAE performance of the propagation operators in the CouchSurfing
data set, values are on a scale from 0 to 2; for S we choose the dual of T w.r.tNs.
Operator T = TM T = TP T = TL
P1 0.357 0.425 0.508
P2 0.364 0.405 0.496
P3 0.336 0.381 0.498
P4 0.341 0.404 0.498
Unlike Epinions, the CouchSurfing data set contains gradual trust and distrust
degrees. This enables us to investigate the usefulness of the t-norm and t-
conorm pairs. Table 3.7 contains the results of the propagation leave-one-out
experiment for P1, P2, P3 and P4, with T = TM, TP and TL. If a propagation
operator requires a t-conorm S, we chose the dual of T w.r.t. Ns. First note that
the minimum achieves the best results for all operators, and the Łukasiewicz
the worst (recall that most classical approaches use TP). This indicates that
the trust score prediction task for CouchSurfing requires a propagation opera-
tor that penalizes weak links (i.e., low trust and distrust degrees), rather than
an operator with a more compensating behavior.
We can easily observe that the best overall propagation attitude is exhibited
by P3, which considers ‘the enemy of an enemy as a friend’, and ‘a friend of an
enemy as an enemy’. This is also illustrated by the results of P4: the only dif-
ference between P3 and P4 lies in the trust propagation process (where P4 does
not consider the enemy of an enemy to be a friend), and P4 results in higher
T-MAE’s than P3. Note that the most extreme option (P3) performs best for the
CouchSurfing application.
The experiments on the two data sets with different characteristics (bivalent ver-
sus gradual data, availability of explicit ignorance or not) demonstrate that the
Epinions and CouchSurfing applications gain most by an operator that actively
incorporates distrust. Studies on other social data sets have also revealed that
several types of trust-enhanced applications may benefit from such operators.
E.g., recent publications have shown that ‘the enemy of an enemy is a friend’
propagation pattern (in line with our P3) is applicable in the technology news
website Slashdot [73] and the political forum Essembly [59]; this is the pattern
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with the best performance for the CouchSurfing experiment. The Epinions ap-
plication, too, asks for a distrust-based propagation strategy such as P3 or P4.
However, one cannot jump to conclusions, because propagation and aggre-
gation must be considered together: in large data sets, it is very likely that there
exists not one, but several paths between agents a and x (see for example Figure
4.1.1). In other words, the results in this section may give us an indication of
the best propagation method for the CouchSurfing and Epinions data set, but to
determine the most optimal prediction strategies we need to involve trust score
aggregation operators as well.
3.5 Conclusions
The need for propagation operators is becoming increasingly important, espe-
cially now that many online trust networks are very large and rarely fully con-
nected. The design of suitable trust propagation operators is not an easy task
when distrust is involved. Unlike with trust, there are several intuitive possibil-
ities to model an agent’s behavior towards distrust.
The study of distrust propagation is scarcely out of the egg, and the question
whether distrust can be propagated, and if so, how it should be, is still unan-
swered. Our goal in this chapter was to contribute to a better understanding of
the problem. Firstly, we introduced four new families of propagation operators
that can be used to model different kinds of distrust behavior: P1 which is at
the basis of all propagation strategies, and which represents the most skepti-
cal agents who only derive information coming from a trusted acquaintance,
while P2 extends this behavior by also taking over distrust information coming
from unknown parties. The other two families actively incorporate distrust by
allowing distrust to propagate throughout the propagation chain; they infer in-
formation coming from all kinds of agents, whether they are (partially) trusted,
unknown, or distrusted. Operator P4 considers a friend (trusted agent) of an
enemy (distrusted agent) to be an enemy, and P3 exhibits a somewhat more
extreme attitude by also considering an enemy of an enemy to be a friend.
Secondly, we studied their behavior on a theoretical level by focusing on useful
propagation properties such as knowledge and trust monotonicity, associativity,
knowledge absorption and consistency preservation. Associativity turns out to
be a hard condition to obtain; it is only satisfied by P1. This is also the only op-
erator that always satisfies all properties, while P2 fulfills the fewest conditions.
Finally, we also investigated their usefulness in practice by a large leave-one-
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out experiment for propagation paths of length 2 on real-world data sets from
Epinions.com and CouchSurfing.org; we showed that the distrust-oriented op-
erators P3 and P4 perform best for such social web applications, better than the
standard trust-only approaches.
In Chapter 6, we will focus on longer propagation paths (with a focus on
trust-enhanced recommendations), while the combination of propagation and
aggregation will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.1 and 4.4).
Quot homines, tot sententiae.
So many men, so many opinions.
Phormio, 161 B.C. Publius Terentius Afer
4 Trust Aggregation
In the previous chapter, we thoroughly discussed the trust propagation problem.
However, besides propagation, a trust metric must also include an aggregation
strategy. After all, in large networks it will often be the case that not one, but
several paths lead to the user for whom we want to obtain a trust estimate.
When this is the case, the trust estimates that are generated through the differ-
ent propagation paths must be combined into one aggregated estimation; see
for instance the situation depicted in Figure 4.1.1.
As was the case with propagation too, the research on aggregation of both trust
and distrust as separate concepts is almost non existent. After a review of re-
lated aggregation work and a discussion of issues related to the combination of
propagation and aggregation (Section 4.1), we embark on the trust score ag-
gregation problem. Our goal in this chapter is not only to study the problem on
a theoretical basis, but also from a practical point of view. Like this, we hope to
bridge the gap between theoretical research on aggregation operators and trust-
enhanced aggregation applications. In Section 4.2, we first postulate desirable
trust score aggregation properties, and then set out to define a number of ag-
gregation operators fulfilling these properties in Section 4.3. Subsequently, in
Section 4.4, we show that the best operators from a theoretical perspective are
not always the most suitable ones in practice, and that the sacrifice of certain
theoretical properties may lead to better performing approaches. We conclude
the chapter with a discussion of future research directions in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.1.1: Aggregation example: prediction of agent a’s trust in agent x
(dotted line) via three propagation paths; for simplicity only the trust degrees
are displayed.
4.1 Aggregation Preliminaries and Context
A whole range of aggregation operators are available when we need to model
an aggregation process with scalar values in [0,1]. For example, we can work
with a simple minimum, maximum or average, or use the more complicated
fuzzy integrals [20, 133]. For a good overview of several aggregation operator
families, we refer to [27] or [47].
One particularly interesting set of operators are the weighted aggregation opera-
tors, because they allow us to model the aggregation process more flexibly: they
give us the opportunity to consider some inputs (agents or propagation paths)
as more important than others. For example, in a weighted average, weights are
associated with an information source. Like this, we can e.g. favor values that
result from shorter propagation chains (remember our discussion on page 34).
A well-known type of weighted operators that is very often used in all kinds
of applications [159, 161] is the Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) family. The
OWA family can model a whole range of aggregation operators, among which
also the minimum, maximum and arithmetic mean. The OWA weights are not
associated to a source, but to an ordered position. This kind of aggregation is
e.g. used for the judging of several olympic sports such as gymnastics: the most
extreme scores (the lowest and highest) do not count for the final score, i.e.,
they receive weight 0 in the aggregation process.
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The standard OWA operator models an aggregation process in which a sequence
V of n scalar values are ordered decreasingly and then weighted according to
their ordered position by means of a weight vector W [157]:
Definition 4.1 (Ordered weighted averaging aggregation family). SupposeW =
〈w1, · · · , wn〉 is a weight vector for which it holds thatwi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑n
i=1 wi = 1.
The OWA operator associated with weight vector W is then defined as
OWAW (V ) =
n∑
i=1
wici,
in which ci represents the ith largest value in V .
The OWA’s main strength is its flexibility, since it enables us to model a spec-
trum of aggregation strategies: for example, if W1 = 〈0, · · · , 0, 1〉, then OWAW1
equals the minimum; the average is modeled byW2 = 〈1/n, · · · , 1/n〉, etc. OWA
operators can be analyzed by several measures, among which the orness-degree
that computes how similar its behavior is to that of the maximum:
Definition 4.2 (OWA Orness degree). The orness degree of OWAW is defined as
orness(W ) =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
((n− i) · wi)
E.g., orness(W1) = 0, while the weight vector 〈0.8, 0.1, 0.1, 0, 0〉 yields an orness-
degree of 0.925, meaning that its behavior is very maximum-like. Yager proved
that the higher the orness, the more the operator approaches the maximum
[158]. OWA operators with an orness degree less than 0.5 approach the mini-
mum operator.
Compared to classical aggregation approaches, the reordering of the arguments
in the OWA process introduces an element of non-linearity into an otherwise
linear process. However, in some cases it might not be possible to reorder the
arguments because no useful/obvious order exists. One solution to this problem
is the induced OWA operator (IOWA, [160]), in which the ordering of the argu-
ments is not based on their value, but on that of an induced ordering variable
which is associated to them:
Definition 4.3 (Induced OWA). Let V and W be defined as in Definition 4.1, and
let U be a sequence of (not necessarily scalar) values, drawn from a linearly ordered
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space (L,≤L). If ci represents the value in V associated with the ith largest value in
U , then the induced ordered weighted averaging aggregation operator is defined by
IOWAW (V,U,≤L) =
n∑
i=1
wici
Since the values of the induced ordering variable need not be scalars, IOWA
operators offer even more flexibility than their standard counterparts.
Trust metrics that only take into account trust mostly use classical aggrega-
tion operators such as the minimum, maximum, average, or weighted aver-
age [3, 6, 45, 69, 102, 104, 125]. Aggregation of both trust and distrust has
not received much attention so far. Guha et al.’s approach [53] uses matrix
multiplications to model the propagation and aggregation process, and needs
mechanisms to round to one binary value. In other words, as with propagation,
the two values are merged into one. In our trust score space setting, however,
the goal is to treat trust and distrust as two separate concepts throughout the
whole aggregation process. This strategy is also followed by Jøsang et al. for
the subjective logic framework. They proposed three probabilistic aggregation
operators, called consensus operators, for the fusion of dependent, independent
or partially dependent opinions [67]. However, these operators assume equally
important users (equal weights), and hence lack flexibility.
Note that propagation and aggregation very often need to be combined, and
that the final trust estimation might depend on the way their interaction is im-
plemented. Let us again take a look at Figure 4.1.1; for simplicity we only
include the trust values, a similar strategy can be followed to obtain a distrust
estimate. There are three propagation paths leading to agent x; the two lowest
paths have one chain in common. For these two paths, there are two scenar-
ios to combine the values on the paths to obtain a trust estimate about agent
x from agent b. The first possibility is to propagate trust to agent x, i.e., to
apply a propagation operator on the trust from b to c and from c to x, and to
apply one from b to e, from e to f , and from f to x, and then to aggregate
the two propagated trust results. In this scenario, trust is first propagated, and
afterwards aggregated (i.e., first propagate then aggregate, or FPTA). A second
possibility is to follow the opposite process, i.e., first aggregate and then prop-
agate (FATP). In this scenario, b must aggregate the estimates that he receives
via c and e, and pass on the new estimate to a. Consequently, the FATP strategy
must be implemented as a recursive process.
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Example 4.1 (FATP vs. FPTA). In Figure 4.1.1 there are three different paths from
a to x. For the upper path, the problem of FATP versus FPTA does not pose itself
since the path only consists of successive links. Assume that all trust degrees on
the upper chain (a-g-h-i-x) are 1, except for the last link which has a trust weight
of 0.9. Hence, using multiplication as propagation operator, the propagated trust
value resulting from that chain is 0.9. Now, suppose that a trusts b to degree 1, and
that b trusts c to the degree 0.5 and e to the degree 0.8. That means that the prop-
agated trust value over the two chains from a to x through b are 1×0.5×0.4 = 0.2
and 1 × 0.8 × 0.6 × 0.7 ≈ 0.34 respectively. Using the classical average as aggre-
gation operator, FPTA yields a final trust estimate of (0.9 + 0.2 + 0.34)/3 = 0.48.
On the other hand, if we would allow b to first aggregate the information coming
from his trust network, then b would pass the value (0.2 + 0.34)/2 = 0.27 on to
a. In a FATP strategy, this would then be combined with the information derived
through the upper chain in Figure 4.1.1, leading to an overall final trust estimate
of (0.9 + 0.27)/2 ≈ 0.59.
It is easy to see that in the latter case (FATP) the agents in the network re-
ceive much more responsibility than in the former scenario (FPTA), and that
the trust computation can be done in a distributed manner, without agents hav-
ing to expose their personal trust and/or distrust information. In other words,
FATP is more suitable for privacy-preserving environments. Also note that the
privacy-preserving FATP strategy implies a right-to-left direction for the propa-
gation; remember our discussion in Section 3.2.1. On the other hand, the FPTA
approach can easily be used in applications with a central authority, and one
can choose which order to use for the propagation. A last remark can be made
w.r.t. the influence of an agent’s opinion on the final trust estimate, which is
smaller in the FATP than in the FPTA approach: in FPTA, all paths count just as
much, while in FATP the paths are merged so that there is only one trust esti-
mation for every neighbor of the inquiring agent.
In the remainder of this dissertation, we assume the FPTA approach in experi-
ments where we have to combine aggregation with propagation paths of more
than one intermediate agent. In this chapter, we limit ourselves to propagation
paths of length 2 (one intermediate agent)1. Like this, we can reduce the effect
of different propagation lengths and the FPTA vs. FATP issue, and hence fully
concentrate on the performance of the aggregation techniques themselves. In
the following section, we start our search for operators that can handle both
1The effect of longer propagation paths will be studied in the context of trust-enhanced recom-
menders in Chapter 6.
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trust and distrust by investigating several useful properties for an aggregation
operator in the trust score space.
4.2 Trust Score Aggregation Properties
For a discussion of common properties for aggregation operators for scalar val-
ues, we refer to [46]. Some of the most often imposed conditions for such
operators are the boundary condition, the monotonicity property, and commu-
tativity. The boundary condition ensures that the aggregated value cannot be
higher (lower) than the maximum (minimum) among the aggregates, while
respecting the monotonicity means that the aggregated result cannot decrease
when one of the aggregates increases. In this section, we begin by investigat-
ing whether these conditions can be meaningfully extended for use in our trust
score framework, and whether they can be justified intuitively.
Let BL = ([0, 1]2,≤td, ≤k,¬) be the trust score space introduced in Section
2.3. In this space, we look for a trust score aggregation operator A : ([0, 1]2)n →
[0, 1]2 (n ≥ 1) satisfying as many of the following characteristics pinned down
in Definitions 4.4–4.15 as possible.
Since an aggregated trust score should reflect a consensus about the trust esti-
mation, it is only natural that it should not contain more trust than the max-
imum trust value among the aggregates. In the same respect, the aggregated
distrust value should not be higher than the maximum of the aggregates’ dis-
trust values. Analogously, the aggregated trust score should contain at least as
much distrust and trust as the minimum among the aggregates.
Definition 4.4 (Trust boundary preservation). We say that aggregation oper-
ator A satisfies the trust boundaries iff A((t1, d1), . . . , (tn, dn)) = (p, q), with
min(t1, . . . , tn) ≤ p ≤ max(t1, . . . , tn), ∀(t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Definition 4.5 (Distrust boundary preservation). We say that aggregation oper-
ator A satisfies the distrust boundaries iff A((t1, d1), . . . , (tn, dn)) = (p, q), with
min(d1, . . . , dn) ≤ q ≤ max(d1, . . . , dn),∀(t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Note that these conditions imply aggregation operators that cannot be used in
an additive context. For instance, in situations where risk is involved, if a lot
of the agents highly distrust x, the aggregated distrust degree about x could be
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experienced on a higher level than the maximum among the distrust degrees, to
emphasize the fact that many agents really distrust x (which cannot be modeled
due to the upper distrust boundary).
If agent a receives the same trust score (t, d) ∈ [0, 1]2 from all paths linking
it to agent x, i.e., (t1, d1) = (t, d), . . . , (tn, dn) = (t, d), then the opinion of a
about x should be that same trust score:
Definition 4.6 (Idempotency). An aggregation operatorA is idempotent iff, ∀ (t, d)
∈ [0, 1]2, A((t, d), . . . , (t, d)) = (t, d).
Proposition 4.1. If an aggregation operator A satisfies the trust and distrust
boundaries, A also fulfills the idempotency condition.
When aggregating additional trust scores, the knowledge contained in the ag-
gregated trust score should not decrease. In other words, the aggregated trust
score should contain at least as much knowledge as the most knowledgeable
aggregate:
Definition 4.7 (Knowledge boundary preservation). We say that an aggregation
operator A satisfies the knowledge boundary iff A((t1, d1), . . . , (tn, dn)) = (p, q),
with p+ q ≥ max(t1 + d1, . . . , tn + dn), ∀(t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Recall that we assume that all agents are consistent. If we use propagation
operators that preserve consistency, this means that all aggregates will also be
consistent, and can be represented as intervals. Hence, in the latter spirit, the
knowledge boundary condition implies more narrow aggregated intervals, i.e.,
the uncertainty should not increase. E.g., consider (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) with
t1 = t2 and d1 > d2, which means that [t1, 1 − d1] is included in [t2, 1 − d2]. In
other words, the latter contains more uncertainty than the former. Due to the
trust boundary condition and t1 = t2, the aggregated trust degree p must be t1.
W.r.t. the aggregated distrust degree q, from the knowledge boundary condition
(p+ q ≥ max(t1 + d1, t2 + d2)) it follows that q ≥ d1. Hence, [p, 1− q] must be
at least as narrow as [t1, 1− d1], and certainly less wide than [t2, 1− d2].
Since we are using a trust score space with two orderings, two monotonicity
conditions arise; one for the trust-distrust and one for the knowledge ordering.
Intuitively, each of these conditions makes sense, as for instance, the more in-
formation/less doubt (resp., the more trust and the less distrust) the individual
sources provide, the more information (resp., the more trust/less distrust) the
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aggregated outcome should contain. Therefore, a trust score aggregation oper-
ator A should be be monotonously increasing with respect to both ≤td and ≤k.
Definition 4.8 (Trust-Distrust monotonicity). We say that an aggregation oper-
ator A respects trust-distrust monotonicity iff ∀ (tj , dj), (t′j , d
′
j) ∈ [0, 1]2, with
j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, it holds that, if (tj , dj) ≤td (t′j , d
′
j), then
A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . , (tn, dn)) ≤td A((t1, d1), . . . , (t′j , d
′
j), . . . , (tn, dn))
Definition 4.9 (Knowledge monotonicity). We say that an aggregation opera-
tor A respects knowledge monotonicity iff ∀ (tj , dj), (t′j , d
′
j) ∈ [0, 1]2, with j ∈
{1, · · · , n}: if (tj , dj) ≤k (t′j , d
′
j), then
A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . , (tn, dn)) ≤k A((t1, d1), . . . , (t′j , d
′
j), . . . , (tn, dn))
Proposition 4.2. If A is an idempotent trust score aggregation operator that sat-
isfies the trust-distrust monotonicity, then A respects the trust and distrust bound-
aries.
Proof. Since we assume that the trust-distrust monotonicity is valid, it holds that
A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . , (tn, dn)) ≤td A((tl, dm), . . . , (tl, dm)) [*], with tl =
max(t1, . . . , tn) and dm = min(d1, . . . , dn). Since A is idempotent, [*]= (tl, dm).
From the definition of≤td it follows that ifA((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . , (tn, dn)) =
(p, q) then p ≤ tl ∧ q ≥ dm, or in other words, p ≤ max(t1, . . . , tn) and q ≥
min(d1, . . . , dn). Analogously for p ≥ min(t1, . . . , tn) and q ≤ max(d1, . . . , dn).
Definition 4.10 (Trust monotonicity). We say that an aggregation operator A
respects trust monotonicity iff, ∀ (tj , dj), (t′j , d
′
j) ∈ [0, 1]2 with j ∈ {1, · · · , n},
it holds that, if (tj , dj) ≤t (t′j , d
′
j), then A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . , (tn, dn)) ≤t
A((t1, d1), . . . , (t
′
j , d
′
j), . . . , (tn, dn)).
Definition 4.11 (Distrust monotonicity). We say that an aggregation operator A
respects distrust monotonicity iff, ∀ (tj , dj), (t′j , d
′
j) ∈ [0, 1]2 with j ∈ {1, · · · , n},
it holds that, if (tj , dj) ≤d (t′j , d
′
j), then A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . , (tn, dn)) ≤d
A((t1, d1), . . . , (t
′
j , d
′
j), . . . , (tn, dn)).
Proposition 4.3. Trust-distrust and knowledge monotonicity are fulfilled iff trust
and distrust monotonicity hold.
4.2 Trust Score Aggregation Properties 67
Proof. If trust and distrust monotonicity hold, it can easily be shown that trust-
distrust and knowledge monotonicity also hold by taking into account Proposi-
tion 2.1.
For the opposite direction, we show the connection for trust monotonicity;
the proof for distrust monotonicity can be obtained analogously. Let (tj , dj) ≤t
(t
′
j , d
′
j). Suppose now that dj ≤ d
′
j , and hence (tj , dj) ≤k (t
′
j , d
′
j). Since we as-
sume that knowledge monotonicity is valid, it holds that A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj),
. . . , (tn, dn)) ≤k A((t1, d1), . . . , (t′j , d
′
j), . . . , (tn, dn))[∗]. From [∗] and by the def-
inition of knowledge monotonicity it follows that, if A((t1, d1), . . . , (tj , dj), . . . ,
(tn, dn)) = (p, q) and A((t1, d1), . . . , (t
′
j , d
′
j), . . . , (tn, dn)) = (r, s), p ≤ r and
q ≤ s. Consequently, according to the definition of trust monotonicity, (p, q) ≤t
(r, s), which shows that A respects trust monotonicity if dj ≤ d′j (or (tj , dj) ≤k
(t
′
j , d
′
j)). In a similar way, we can prove that A also respects the trust mono-
tonicity if dj > d
′
j (or (tj , dj) ≤td (t
′
j , d
′
j)) by assuming that trust-distrust mono-
tonicity is valid.
To compute the opinion of agent a about agent x, the order of the trust scores
should not matter.
Definition 4.12 (Commutativity). An aggregation operator A is commutative iff
A((t1, d1), . . . , (tn, dn)) = A((tpi(1), dpi(1)), . . . , (tpi(n), dpi(n))), ∀ (tj , dj) ∈ [0, 1]2,
j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and pi a permutation of {1, · · · , n}.
The associativity ensures that the operator can be extended unambiguously for
more operands.
Definition 4.13 (Associativity). An aggregation operator A is associative iff
A((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) = A((t1, d1), A((t2, d2), · · · , (tn, dn))) =
· · · = A(A((t1, d1), · · · , (tn−1, dn−1)), (tn, dn)), ∀ (tj , dj) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Besides these mathematical properties that have well-known intuitive ratio-
nales, we also propose a number of additional requirements to further guar-
antee the correct/intuitive behavior of the trust score aggregation process. We
motivate these requirements by examples.
Example 4.2 (Ignorance). In the scenario in Figure 4.2.1, b and c are both fully
trusted acquaintances of a that are connected to x. Propagation with any of the
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Figure 4.2.1: Aggregation scenario
with ignorance
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(1,0)
Figure 4.2.2: Aggregation scenario
with total inconsistency
four operators from Chapter 3 results in the two trust scores (t, d) and (0, 0). How-
ever, it can be argued that c’s opinion of x (ignorance) should not contribute to the
final outcome; indeed, a (0, 0) edge can be considered as no edge at all, as it carries
no information.
In other words, (0, 0) should act as a neutral element of the aggregation:
Definition 4.14 (Neutrality). We say that an aggregation operator A satisfies the
neutrality condition iff ∀ (tj , dj) ∈ [0, 1]2 and j ∈ {1, · · · , n},
A((t1, d1), . . . , (ti−1, di−1), (0, 0), (ti+1, di+1), . . . , (tn, dn)) =
A((t1, d1), . . . , (ti−1, di−1), (ti+1, di+1), . . . , (tn, dn)).
Example 4.2 also shows why a naive average of trust and distrust degrees, lead-
ing to
(
t
2 ,
d
2
)
, would be a poor aggregation strategy in this case.
Proposition 4.4. If A is an idempotent trust score aggregation operator that satis-
fies the knowledge monotonicity and the neutral element condition, then A respects
the knowledge boundary.
Proof. Due to knowledge monotonicity, A((t1, d1), . . . , (ti, di), . . . , (tn, dn)) ≥k
A((0, 0), . . . , (ti, di), . . . , (0, 0)) [*]. Since A is idempotent and satisfies the neu-
trality condition, it holds that [*]= A((ti, di)) = (ti, di). Hence, from the def-
inition of ≤k it follows that if A((t1, d1), . . . , (ti, di), . . . , (tn, dn)) = (p, q) then
p ≥ ti and q ≥ di, hence p + q ≥ ti + di, and this for all i = 1, . . . , n. In other
words, p+q ≥ max(t1 +d1, . . . , ti+di, . . . , tn+dn) which shows that A respects
the knowledge boundary.
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Example 4.3 (Total inconsistency). In Figure 4.2.2, two fully trusted acquain-
tances of agent a express completely opposite trust opinions of agent x. Again,
a simple average of trust and distrust degrees, yielding (0.5, 0.5), is unsuitable,
since it does away with the conflicting information a receives, and cannot be dis-
tinguished from a scenario in which a receives information that x is half to be
trusted and half to be distrusted. In other words, we lose too much provenance
information. A more intuitive result seems to be (1, 1), reflecting the inconsistency
agent a faces in his assessment of agent x.
This brings us to a final requirement for trust score aggregation operators: an
equal number of (1,0) and (0,1) arguments should yield contradiction.
Definition 4.15 (Opposite arguments). We say that an aggregation operator A
fulfills the opposite arguments condition iff
A((1, 0), · · · , (1, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n/2 times
, (0, 1), · · · , (0, 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n/2 times
) = (1, 1)
Note that we have formulated the aggregation conditions for n arguments, as
opposed to the propagation properties in Section 3.2.1 where we worked with
two arguments. This is because propagation operators with two arguments
can easily be extended for more arguments by agreeing on left associativity
(central authority) or right associativity (e.g. needed in a privacy-preserving
environment, or can also be applied within a central authority context). On the
other hand, this has little use in an aggregation context since many aggregation
operators are not associative, as will also be the case with the operators in
Section 4.3.2.
4.3 Trust Score Aggregation Operators
In this section, we investigate several operators satisfying one or more of the
conditions proposed in the previous section. In particular, we start by defining
trust score aggregation operators that preserve the trust, distrust and knowl-
edge boundaries (Section 4.3.1), and then proceed by introducing more ad-
vanced techniques that are based on the OWA operator and the incorporation
of knowledge defects (Section 4.3.2).
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4.3.1 Bilattice-Based Aggregation Operators
Figure 4.3.1 depicts two possible scenarios, both for aggregating two trust scores
(denoted by dots): (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) (Example 4.4), and (t3, d3) and (t4, d2)
(Example 4.5). Note that all trust scores are consistent since they reside under
or on the kd(t, d) = 0 line (lower triangle); hence, we can also represent them
as intervals.
Example 4.4 (Aggregation with overlap). Agent a asks two of his acquintances
(whom he trusts completely) for an opinion about agent x. The first agent re-
turns the trust score (t1, d1) and the second one (t2, d2) (dots). Since agent a has
complete faith in the two trusted third parties, the propagated trust scores to be ag-
gregated remain (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) . Note that, in Figure 4.3.1, t1 < t2, d1 > d2
and t2 < 1− d1; in other words, t1 < t2 < 1− d1 < 1− d2.
Since it is desirable that a standard trust score aggregation operator should
fulfill at least Definitions 4.4 and 4.5 (trust and distrust boundaries), the ag-
gregated result must be in the area marked out by the dotted lines. Hence, the
extremes w.r.t. ≤t and ≤d for the aggregated trust score are (t2, d1) and (t1, d2)
(stars). By also imposing Definition 4.7, however, only part of the possible re-
sults remain: as can be seen in the figure, t2 + d2 > t1 + d1, and hence all
possible results should reside above or on the kd(t, d) = kd(t2, d2) line (formed
by all trust scores that have the same knowledge defect as (t2, d2)), in other
words, in the gray area. In this way, only one extreme remains, namely (t2, d1).
The same conclusion can be obtained when reasoning in the interval rep-
resentation, even without focusing on the boundary conditions. The interval
representations of (t1, d1) and (t2, d2) are [t1, 1−d1] and [t2, 1−d2] respectively.
Note that in Example 4.4 the two intervals overlap (t1 < t2 < 1− d1 < 1− d2).
As the aggregated trust interval must reflect the consensus among the two inter-
vals, it should represent the trust estimation on which both agents agree, which
is usually modeled as the intersection of the two intervals. This strategy results
in a narrower interval, or analogously, a trust score that contains less uncer-
tainty (recall our discussion about knowledge monotonicity). Hence, [t2, 1− d1]
is indeed the most logical choice for the aggregation extreme w.r.t. ≤t and ≤d.
Example 4.5 (Aggregation with no overlap). In the second scenario of Figure
4.3.1, a makes inquiries about agent z, resulting in (t3, d3) (or [t3, 1 − d3]) and
(t4, d2) (or [t4, 1−d2]). Note that t3 = 1−d3 < t4 < 1−d2. This time, a’s acquain-
tances do not agree at all: there is no overlap between the two trust intervals.
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t1 t2 t3 t4
d2
d1
d3=t3
!d
!t
kd=0
(0,1) (1,1)
(0,0) (1,0)
Figure 4.3.1: Possible aggregation results of (t1, d1) and (t2, d2), and (t3, d3)
and (t4, d2), for operators satisfying the trust and distrust boundaries (within
the dotted lines) and the knowledge boundary (gray area).
D
A
B
C
kd=0
E
F
!t
!d
(0,1) (1,1)
(0,0) (1,0)
Figure 4.3.2: Possible aggregation results of several trust scores, for operators
fulfilling the trust, distrust and knowledge boundary conditions.
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The example illustrates how inconsistent trust scores can arise, even when the
agents are consistent. In this case, the extreme aggregated trust score is (t4, d3),
reflecting the disagreement that exists between the aggregates.
These two-points-examples can be generalized to scenarios with more inputs;
see Figure 4.3.2 for an example with eight aggregates, represented by dots. Im-
posing trust, distrust and knowledge boundary conditions yields a limited num-
ber of possible aggregation results, depicted in the figure by the gray area. Each
of the trust scores marked by stars makes sense as aggregated score: A is the
most optimistic choice (maximum trust degree for the lowest possible knowl-
edge level), B the most pessimistic one (maximum distrust), C the moderating
approach (average of the most knowledgeable trust scores; only trust scores
that have the highest amount of knowledge, or the smallest knowledge defect,
take part) and D the most extreme, knowledge maximizing, option: maximum
trust and distrust degree, often resulting in an inconsistent trust estimation.
We call A the trust maximizing and B the distrust maximizing operator, C
the knowledge preference averaging operator andD the knowledge maximizing
trust score aggregation operator.
Definition 4.16 (TMAX). We define the trust maximizing trust score aggregation
operator TMAX as
TMAX ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) =
(max (t1, · · · , tn) ,max (t1 + d1, · · · , tn + dn)−max (t1, · · · , tn))
Definition 4.17 (DMAX). We define the distrust maximizing trust score aggrega-
tion operator DMAX as
DMAX ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) =
(max (t1 + d1, · · · , tn + dn)−max (d1, · · · , dn) ,max (d1, · · · , dn))
Definition 4.18 (KAV). We define the knowledge preference averaging trust score
aggregation operator KAV as
KAV ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) = (p, q)
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with (p, q) such that
p =
n∑
i=1
wi · ti
n∑
i=1
wi
, q =
n∑
i=1
wi · di
n∑
i=1
wi
wi =
{
1 if ti + di = max (t1 + d1, · · · , tn + dn)
0 otherwise
Definition 4.19 (KMAX). We define the knowledge maximizing trust score aggre-
gation operator KMAX as
KMAX ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) = (max (t1, · · · , tn) ,max (d1, · · · , dn))
Note that this operator corresponds to ⊕, the join of the information lattice
([0, 1]2,≤k) in the trust score space.
The following proposition shows how the four operators perform w.r.t. the cri-
teria set out in the previous section:
Proposition 4.5. TMAX, DMAX, KAV and KMAX fulfill Definitions 4.4-4.7 and
4.12-4.14. Furthermore, KMAX also satisfies Definitions 4.8-4.11 and 4.15, while
TMAX and DMAX fulfill Definition 4.10, 4.11 respectively.
4.3.2 Advanced Trust Score Aggregation Operators
Although the four operators from the previous section are perfectly justifiable, it
will often be the case that they are too extreme. For example, in some situations,
agents might prefer also to take into account the opinions from agents who have
more doubt about their opinions, while in other scenarios they might prefer to
listen to less marked opinions instead of only retaining the ‘best’ and the ‘worst’
among the opinions.
In this section, we will present several families of aggregation operators
which mitigate the behavior of KMAX and KAV. This can be achieved by in-
troducing maximum-like weights, or through the incorporation of knowledge
defects. Along the way, it will turn out that some of the postulated properties
need to be sacrificed, or at least adjusted.
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4.3.2.1 Fixed Weight OWA Trust Score Aggregation
A straightforward solution for mitigating KMAX’s behavior is to introduce weights
in the aggregation process. The weights can then be chosen in such a way that
KMAX’s behavior is alleviated, but without harming the underlying maximum
thought. The ordered weighted averaging aggregation family (Definition 4.1)
is one of the best-known weighted aggregation strategies. However, the appli-
cation of an OWA operator requires scalar values as arguments. As such, OWA
operators are not directly applicable to aggregate trust scores. Therefore, we
propose to perform trust aggregation by means of two separate OWA operators,
one for the trust and one for the distrust degrees.
Below, we describe a generic procedure for applying (standard) OWA opera-
tors to the trust score aggregation problem:
1. Determine n, the number of trust score arguments distinct from (0, 0).
Trust scores that represent complete ignorance do not take part in the
aggregation process2 to preserve their role as neutral element.
2. Construct sequences T and D, containing the n trust values (resp., the n
distrust values) of the trust score arguments.
3. Construct n-dimensional weight vectors WT and WD.
4. Compute the aggregated trust score as (OWAWT (T ),OWAWD (D)).
If we add an extra restriction to the construction of WT and WD which ensures
that the orness degree of both weight vectors is at least 0.5 (so that they exhibit
a maximum-like behavior), the above procedure can be generalized into a class
of trust score aggregation operators that can be seen as alternate, mitigated,
versions of KMAX.
Definition 4.20 (K-OWA). We define the trust score OWA operatorK-OWAWT ,WD
associated with the trust weight vector WT and distrust weight vector WD as
K−OWAWT ,WD ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) =
(OWAWT (t1, · · · , tn) ,OWAWD (d1, · · · , dn)) ,
2If all trust scores equal (0, 0), the final result is also set to (0, 0) and the aggregation process
terminates at this step.
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with WT = 〈wT1 , · · · , wTn〉 and WD = 〈wD1 , · · · , wDn〉 such that
orness(WT ) ≥ 0.5 and orness(WD) ≥ 0.5
n∑
i=1
wTi = 1 and
n∑
i=1
wDi = 1
with (tj , dj) 6= (0, 0) for all j ∈ {1, · · · , n}; trust scores (tj , dj) = (0, 0) do not
take part in the aggregation process.
Proposition 4.6. K-OWA always fulfills Definitions 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.12 and 4.14
(regardless of the weight choice). In order for Definition 4.15 to hold, it suffices
that wTi = 0 and wDi = 0 as soon as i >
n
2 . If we add the restriction to Definitions
4.8 and 4.9 that (tj , dj) 6= (0, 0) and (t′j , d′j) 6= (0, 0), the property holds, regard-
less of the weight vectors WT and WD. Analogously for Definitions 4.10 and 4.11.
This can be verified by construction and by the properties of an OWA operator.
The reason for the failure of the monotonicity properties for K-OWA is due to
the presence (and subsequent alteration) of (0, 0) trust score arguments, which
causes the application of the OWA operators to a different number of arguments.
This is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 4.6. If the trust scores to aggregate are (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0) and (0, 0),
then the outcome by the K-OWA procedure is (1, 0) (regardless of the choice of
weights vectors, because n = 1). If we change these trust scores to (1, 0), (0.1, 0),
(0.1, 0) and (0.1, 0), the number of arguments that take part in the OWA aggre-
gation equals 4. If we compute the weights for instance as WT = 〈 23 , 13 , 0, 0〉 and
WD = 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉, the final result of the aggregation equals (0.7, 0). So, although
(0, 0) ≤t (0.1, 0) and (0, 0) ≤k (0.1, 0), (1, 0) 6≤t (0.7, 0) and (1, 0) 6≤k (0.7, 0).
Note that the associativity condition 4.13 will not always be fulfilled, since this
depends on the weighting scheme (see Example 4.7). Because of the averaging
nature of K-OWA, the knowledge boundary condition 4.7 does not always hold
either: take e.g. (1, 0), (0.5, 0) and (0.6, 0) and WT = 〈1/3, 1/3, 1/3〉, which
yields (0.7, 0) as aggregated result, and 0.7 + 0 < 1 + 0. In other words, the
result of the aggregation will not always reside in the gray triangle of Figure
4.3.2. However, it will remain in the area that is marked out by the minimum
and maximum among the trust and distrust degrees (since the trust and distrust
boundaries are always satisfied).
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As is clear from the above, the actual way of aggregating the trust scores is
determined by the choice of the weight vectors. One strategy is to construct WT
and WD beforehand. For instance, the final trust (resp., distrust) value can be
evaluated as the extent to which a predefined fraction (at least one, all of them,
a majority, . . . ) of the trust score arguments exhibits trust (resp., distrust).
Example 4.7 (Fixed weights). Given n trust score arguments to aggregate (all
distinct from (0, 0)), the trust and distrust weights can be computed by
wTi =
2 ·max(0, dn2 e − i+ 1)
dn2 e(dn2 e+ 1)
, wDi =
2 ·max(0, dn4 e − i+ 1)
dn4 e(dn4 e+ 1)
The disparity between trust and distrust weights can be motivated by the observa-
tion that a few distrust statements about x (in particular, a quarter of them) may
suffice to reach a final conclusion of distrust, while the evaluation of trust depends
on the majority of the arguments; distrust is easier established than trust. Note
that weights are decreasing, in the sense that the higher trust/distrust values have
a stronger impact than the lower ones.
This example also illustrates why K-OWA does not always satisfy the associa-
tivity condition: let n = 3, if we aggregate all three trust scores at once, two of
them will take part in the trust degree computation; however, when we perform
the aggregation in two phases, only one trust score will take part in each trust
degree computation. For example, K−OWA((1, 0), (0.5, 0), (0.3, 0)) = 5/6, while
K−OWA(K−OWA((1, 0), (0.5, 0)), (0.3, 0)) = K−OWA((1, 0), (0.3, 0)) = (1, 0).
The above example can be generalized into an implementation of the K-OWA
family, where the weight vectors are determined by two parameters α and β:
Example 4.8 (Fixed weights family). Let α and β in [1,∞]. The weights can then
be computed as (with i ∈ {1, · · · , n}):
wTi =
2 ·max(0, dnαe − i+ 1)
dnαe(dnαe+ 1)
wDi =
2 ·max(0, dnβ e − i+ 1)
dnβ e(dnβ e+ 1)
Remark that KMAX is a special case of this particular implementation of K-OWA,
with α = β = n.
Proposition 4.7. The weights from Example 4.8 sum up to 1, regardless of the
choice for α and β.
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Proof. We show that
∑n
i=1 max(0, dnαe − i + 1) =
(dnαe(dnαe+ 1)) /2. The same
rationale can be followed for wDi .
n∑
i=1
max(0,
⌈n
α
⌉
− i+ 1) =
dnα e∑
i=1
(⌈n
α
⌉
− i+ 1
)
=
⌈n
α
⌉
·
(⌈n
α
⌉
+ 1
)
−
dnα e∑
i=1
i
=
(⌈n
α
⌉
·
(⌈n
α
⌉
+ 1
))
/2.
Proposition 4.8. The trust score aggregation operators from Example 4.8 always
exhibit a maximum-like behavior, regardless of the choice for α and β.
Proof. We show that the orness degree of WD and WT will never be lower than
2/3: the lowest possible orness for WT and WD will be achieved when all ar-
guments take part in the aggregation process, i.e., when α = β = 1. This yields
weights WTi = WDi =
2(n−i+1)
n(n+1) . Consequently,
orness(WT ) = orness(WD) =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(
(n− i)
(
2(n− i+ 1)
n(n+ 1)
))
=
2
(
n∑
i=1
(n− i)2 + (n− i)
)
n(n− 1)(n+ 1)
=
2
(
n∑
i=1
(n2 + n) +
n∑
i=1
(i2 − i)− 2n
n∑
i=1
i
)
n(n− 1)(n+ 1)
=
2
(
n3 + n2 + n
3
3 +
n2
2 +
n
6 − n
2
2 − n2 − n2 − n3
)
n(n− 1)(n+ 1)
=
2
(
n3
3 − n3
)
n3 − n
= 2/3
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4.3.2.2 Knowledge-Enhanced KAV Trust Score Aggregation
In Section 4.3.1 we explained that the KAV trust score aggregation operator ex-
hibits the most moderating behavior among the bilattice-based strategies. How-
ever, one can argue that, for some applications/situations, even KAV might be
too extreme, since it only takes into account the opinions of the most knowl-
edgeable agents. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.9. Assume that the trust scores to aggregate are (1, 0), (1, 0), (0.7, 0.29)
and (0.7, 0.29). In other words, two of the trust score arguments have perfect
knowledge (kd(1, 0) = 0), while the others only show a very small knowledge
defect (kd(0.7, 0.29) ≈ 0). Intuitively, one would expect their contribution to be
almost equally important, and hence that the final trust degree lies somewhere in
the middle between 0.7 and 1, and the distrust degree between 0 and 0.29. How-
ever, the KAV aggregated trust score equals (1, 0).
In a way, the determination of the weights for the KAV aggregation can be seen
as a binary process, because only the users with the most perfect knowledge (in
other words, with the lowest knowledge defect) take part in the aggregation,
even if the difference with some of the other arguments is almost negligible.
A possible solution to this problem is the following new family of trust score
aggregation operators; they mitigate the behavior of KAV, but without harming
the underlying thought of trust score discrimination w.r.t. knowledge defect.
Definition 4.21 (KAAV). We define the knowledge awarding averaging trust score
aggregation operator KAAVγ associated with knowledge reward γ ∈ [0,∞] as
KAAVγ ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) = (p, q)
with (p, q) such that
p =
n∑
i=1
wi · ti and q =
n∑
i=1
wi · di
wi =
(1− kd(ti, di))γ
n∑
i=1
(1− kd(ti, di))γ
If all trust scores have kd(t, d) = 1 and at least one trust score equals (1, 1), then
the aggregated result is (1, 1); when all trust scores equal (0, 0) then the aggregated
result is (0, 0).
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If the knowledge reward γ equals 0, then we obtain the arithmetic mean. When
γ = 1, each trust score is weighted inversely proportional to its knowledge
defect: the lower kd(t, d), the higher the associated weight. Note that the ag-
gregated trust score will approximate KAV’s result for γ →∞.
Example 4.10 (Knowledge-dependent weights). In the case of Example 4.9,
with γ = 1, W = 〈 13.98 , 13.98 , 0.993.98 , 0.993.98 〉. Then the aggregated trust score (p, q) ≈
(0.85, 0.15), a much more intuitive result.
Proposition 4.9. KAAV fulfills Definitions 4.4 and 4.5, 4.6, 4.12, 4.14 and 4.15.
The following counterexample demonstrates that the associativity condition
4.13 does not hold in general: KAAV1 ((1, 0), (0.5, 0), (0.2, 0.8)) = (0.58, 0.32) 6=
KAAV1 (KAAV1 ((1, 0), (0.5, 0)) , (0.2, 0.8)) ≈ (0.49, 044). Note that, as was the
case with K-OWA too, mitigating the behavior implies we have to sacrifice the
knowledge boundary condition.
Trust, distrust, trust-distrust and knowledge monotonicity do not hold in
general because of the way the weights are generated. Let us illustrate this
with distrust monotonicity. Even if dj > d
′
j and hence 1 − kd(tj , dj) > 1 −
kd(tj , d
′
j) since we assume consistent agents, this does not imply that the final
aggregated trust score (p, q) will contain at least as much distrust as (p, q
′
),
since the other weights are also affected by the change in the jth weight. E.g.,
(0.5, 0.3) ≥d (0, 0.3), but KAAV1 ((1, 0), (1, 0), (0.5, 0.3)) ≈ (0.870, 0.039) <d
KAAV1 ((1, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0.3)) ≈ (0.857, 0.086).
Similar examples can be constructed to show that trust, trust-distrust and
knowledge monotonicity do not always hold. In fact, any attempt to award/ pe-
nalize trust scores according to their knowledge defects is incompatible with
maintaining monotonicity because a knowledge-based weight may decrease
even if the corresponding aggregate increases.
4.3.2.3 Knowledge-Enhanced OWA Trust Score Aggregation
According to the analysis in Section 4.3.2.1, fixed-weight OWA approaches per-
form well w.r.t. the criteria set out in Section 4.2. However, they also exhibit
certain drawbacks, as the following example illustrates.
Example 4.11. Assume the trust scores to aggregate are (1, 0), (δ, 0), (δ, 0) and
(δ, 0), with δ a value close to 0. In other words, three of the trust score arguments
are very close to ignorance. Intuitively, one would expect their contribution to the
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final result to be very small. However, using the same weight vector as in Example
4.7, the aggregated value will be ( 23 +
1
3δ, 0) ≈ ( 23 , 0), which differs significantly
from (1, 0), the result obtained if the (δ, 0) values are replaced by (0, 0).
In fact, the above kind of problem occurs with any fixed-weight approach3; it is
due to the fact that in this approach, trust scores are not discriminated w.r.t. the
amount of knowledge they contain. Recall that we followed a similar rationale
for Example 4.9. Hence, analogous to the knowledge-enhanced procedure of
the last section, we can alter the weights based on the knowledge defect ex-
hibited by the individual trust score arguments: given n trust score arguments
(ti, di), we can associate with them a weight vector W kd that represents each
trust score’s degree of knowledge defect relative to the remaining trust scores.
We cannot use W kd directly as a weight vector inside the OWA operators, since
the knowledge defect weights are not associated to ordered positions, but rather
to the arguments themselves. We can however use them to modify existing
OWA weight vectors WT and WD (which can be chosen as in the fixed weight
approach). This leads to a new class of trust score aggregation operators:
Definition 4.22 (KK-OWA). We define the knowledge-based trust score OWA op-
erator KK-OWAγ,WT ,WD associated with knowledge reward γ, the trust weight
vector WT and distrust weight vector WD as
KK−OWAγ,WT ,WD ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) =
(OWAWT (t1, · · · , tn) ,OWAWD (d1, · · · , dn)) ,
with WT = 〈wT1 , · · · , wTn〉 and WD = 〈wD1 , · · · , wDn〉 such that
WTi =
WTi W
kd
pi(i)
n∑
j=1
WTj W
kd
pi(j)
, WDi =
WDi W
kd
pi′(i)
n∑
j=1
WDj W
kd
pi′(j)
in which i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, WTi and WDi denote the weights obtained according
to the K-OWAWT ,WD strategy, pi and pi
′ represent the permutations that map an
ordered position i to the index of the trust score that appears at that position, and
W kdi =
(1− kd(ti, di))γ
n∑
j=1
(1− kd(tj , dj))γ
.
3The only exception is when Wt1 =Wd1 = 1, i.e., only the highest trust and distrust values are
taken into account.
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If all trust scores have kd(t, d) = 1 and at least one trust score equals (1, 1), then
the aggregated result is (1, 1); when all trust scores equal (0, 0) then the aggregated
result is (0, 0).
The following example illustrates the knowledge-based approach:
Example 4.12 (Knowledge-dependent weights). In the case of Example 4.11
with knowledge reward 1,
W kd =
(
1
1 + 3δ
,
δ
1 + 3δ
,
δ
1 + 3δ
,
δ
1 + 3δ
)
WT =
(
2
2 + δ
,
δ
2 + δ
, 0, 0
)
The final aggregation result will be
(
2+δ2
2+δ , 0
)
≈ (1, 0), which corresponds to our
intuition.
Note that the procedure for obtaining the weights does not only differ from the
fixed weight approach in Definition 4.20 because of the inclusion of knowledge
defects, but also because of the treatment of the neutral elements: for K-OWA
the (0, 0) trust scores are left out of the computation, while this is no longer the
case for KK-OWA (they are taken into account, but receive weight 0), leading
to a more elegant approach. Hence (0, 0) scores influence the construction of
the K-OWA weight vector, whereas the length of the weight vector in KK-OWA is
independent of the aggregates. In a way, one can say that the neutral elements
for KK-OWA are more neutral than for K-OWA.
Proposition 4.10. KK-OWA fulfills definitions 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.12, and 4.14. Def-
inition 4.15 holds whenever wTi = 0 and wDi = 0 as soon as i >
n
2 .
The application of knowledge-dependent OWA weights does not affect the con-
ditions that do not pertain to monotonicity, but Definitions 4.8–4.11 cannot be
maintained, not even in the weakened version which holds for fixed weights.
Example 4.13. Consider the following trust score sequences:
A = 〈(1, 0), (0.9, 0.2), (0, 1)〉
B = 〈(1, 0), (0.9, 0.1), (0, 1)〉
C = 〈(1, 0.9), (0.9, 0.2), (0, 1)〉
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Constructing the weight vectors as in Example 4.12, we obtain the aggregated
trust scores
(
281
290 , 1
)
for A,
(
29
30 , 1
)
for B and
(
101
110 , 1
)
for C. However, while
(0.9, 0.2) ≤td (0.9, 0.1),
(
281
290 , 1
) 6≤td ( 2930 , 1) (comparing sequence A with B).
Similarly, while (1, 0) ≤k (1, 0.9),
(
281
290 , 1
) 6≤k ( 101110 , 1) (comparing sequence A
with C). Analogous for ≤t and ≤d.
In this case, the failure of monotonicity is due to the change of the knowledge-
dependent weight vector W kd. Again, it can be argued that any attempt to
penalize trust scores for their knowledge defects is incompatible with maintain-
ing monotonicity. In fact, this is already evident in the fixed-weight approach of
Section 4.3.2.1: to guarantee that (0, 0) can play its role as neutral element, it
needs to be handled separately.
4.3.2.4 IOWA Trust Score Aggregation
An alternative knowledge-enhanced OWA strategy can be obtained by using
IOWA operators (Definition 4.3). In order to use the IOWA approach, we re-
quire an order inducing variable that takes values drawn from a linearly ordered
space. Since the bilattice orderings ≤td and ≤k are only partial rather than lin-
ear, they do not qualify to construct the required linearly ordered space. How-
ever, meaningful linear orderings over trust scores do exist; we will consider
a combination of trust/distrust degrees and knowledge defect for this purpose.
In particular, for the trust degrees vector T = 〈ti〉 and distrust degrees vector
D = 〈di〉, we define the value of the order inducing variables U = 〈ui〉 and
U ′ = 〈u′i〉 respectively as
ui = (kd(ti, di), ti) and u′i = (kd(ti, di), di) (4.1)
and order these values decreasingly according to the linear order ≤kd on [0, 1]2
defined by, for (k1, r1), (k2, r2) in [0, 1]2,
(k1, r1) ≤kd (k2, r2)⇔ (k1 > k2) ∨ (k1 = k2 ∧ r1 ≤ r2) (4.2)
In other words, trust scores with lower knowledge defects are ordered first, and
in case of equal knowledge defect, the higher trust (resp., distrust) value pre-
vails. It can be verified that ([0, 1]2,≤kd) is a linearly ordered space.
The corresponding IOWA aggregation procedure is largely analogous to that
for standard OWA:
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1. Determine n, the number of trust score arguments distinct from (0, 0).
Trust scores that represent complete ignorance do not take part in the
aggregation process4.
2. Construct the sequences T , D; U and U ′; T andD contain the correspond-
ing n trust values (resp., the n distrust values), while U and U ′ contain
the order inducing values as in (4.1).
3. Construct n-dimensional weight vectors WT and WD.
4. Compute the aggregated trust score as
(IOWAWT (T,U,≤kd), IOWAWD (D,U ′,≤kd)).
This procedure gives rise to a second aggregation operator family that combines
the OWA strategy with knowledge incorporation:
Definition 4.23 (K-IOWA). We define the induced trust score OWA operator K-
IOWAWT ,WD associated with the trust weight vector WT and distrust weight vector
WD as
K−IOWAWT ,WD ((t1, d1), · · · , (tn, dn)) =
(IOWAWT (〈t1, · · · , tn〉, U,≤kd) , IOWAWD (〈d1, · · · , dn〉, U ′,≤kd)) ,
with WT and WD denoting the weight vectors obtained according to Definition
4.20. The order inducing variables for IOWAWT and IOWAWD are constructed ac-
cording to Equation (4.1), with associated ordering ≤kd as in Equation (4.2).
Note that while the K-IOWA approach allows to take into account knowledge
defects by using ≤kd, it still makes sense to use knowledge-dependent weights.
This becomes evident when we apply the approach to the data in Example 4.11,
which gives the same outcome as in the standard OWA case. On the other hand,
the monotonicity properties are not guaranteed for the K-IOWA approach, even
if fixed weights are used. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4.14. Consider the following trust score sequences:
A = 〈(0.95, 0.05), (0.8, 0.2), (0, 0.5)〉
B = 〈(1, 0.05), (0.8, 0.2), (0, 0.5)〉,
4If all trust scores equal (0, 0), the final result is also set to (0, 0) and the aggregation process
terminates at this step.
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with associated induced ordering vectors
UA = 〈(0, 0.95), (0, 0.8), (0.5, 0)〉
U ′A = 〈(0, 0.05), (0, 0.2), (0.5, 0.5)〉
UB = 〈(0.05, 1), (0, 0.8), (0.5, 0)〉
U ′B = 〈(0.05, 0.05), (0, 0.2), (0.5, 0.5)〉
For sequence UA it holds that (0, 0.95) ≥kd (0, 0.8) ≥kd (0.5, 0), and for U ′A
(0, 0.2) ≥kd (0, 0.05) ≥kd (0.5, 0.5), while for sequence UB , (0, 0.8) ≥kd (0.05, 1)
≥kd (0.5, 0) and for U ′B (0, 0.2) ≥kd (0.05, 0.05) ≥kd (0.5, 0.5). Constructing the
weight vectors as in Example 4.7, we obtain the aggregated trust scores (0.9, 0.8)
forA and
(
13
15 , 0.8
)
forB. However, while (0.95, 0.05) ≤td (1, 0.05) and (0.95, 0.05)
≤k (1, 0.05), (0.9, 0.8) 6≤td
(
13
15 , 0.8
)
and (0.9, 0.8) 6≤k
(
13
15 , 0.8
)
.
Proposition 4.11. The K-IOWA approach satisfies Definitions 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.12,
4.14, 4.15 (if wTi = 0 and wDi = 0 as soon as i >
n
2 ), and this regardless of
whether fixed or variable weight vectors are used.
4.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we will investigate the performance in practice of the aggrega-
tion operators introduced in the previous section. For our experiments, we use
the same data sets and methodology as in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. To mea-
sure the accuracy of the predictions, besides T-MAE, we also take into account
a variation of the classical root mean squared error:
Definition 4.24 (T-RMSE). We define the trust score RMSE in a leave-one-out
experiment with n trust score predictions as
T-RMSE =
√√√√( n∑
i=1
(tri − tpi)2 + (dri − dpi)2
)
/n
with (tri , dri) the real trust trust score and (tpi , dpi) the predicted trust score.
Note that the T-RMSE, like the classical RMSE, emphasizes larger errors. The
extreme values that T-RMSE can reach are 0 and
√
2.
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In the following experiments, we take into account propagation paths of exactly
length 2 and use the P1 propagation operator of Definition 3.10 (because it is
at the basis of all other propagation operators) with T = min. In this way, we
can ensure that every aggregate is the result of the same propagation process
and that there is no variable path length which might introduce extra errors,
making it harder to study the actual impact of the aggregation operators. In this
configuration, the CouchSurfing data set consists of 1 298 170 distinct a-x trust
scores with at least one a-b-x trust path between them (see Figure 3.4.1). In
the Epinions data set, we can perform 589 689 such leave-one-out experiments.
Note that we do not include (0, 0) values in the data set, since we interpret them
as no link. We do retain (0, 0) values which are the result of propagation.
In Sections 4.4.1–4.4.4, we only consider results for the CouchSurfing data
since we focus on the mutual relations between the operators. In Section 4.4.5,
we then investigate the adaptability of the operators by comparing the Couch-
Surfing results with their performance on the Epinions data. The impact of the
propagation operator choice is discussed in Section 4.4.6, including a compari-
son between P1 and the distrust-enhanced P3.
4.4.1 Comparative Analysis of the Bilattice-Based Approaches
In this section, we will discuss the performance of the aggregation operators
introduced in Section 4.3.1, and compare them with two additional baseline
strategies (the squares E and F in Figure 4.3.2): KMIN (E) computes the ag-
gregated trust score as (t, d) = (min(t1, · · · , tn),min(d1, · · · , dn)), and ‘Fixed
values’ (F) is a strategy that always yields (0.431, 0.206), which represents the
average trust and distrust degree in the translated data set. Remark that, unlike
TMAX, DMAX, KMAX and KAV, the results of the last two operators do not al-
ways reside in the gray area of Figure 4.3.2. Table 4.1 contains the results.
The trust score aggregation operators (upper part of the table) perform more or
less the same when considering T-RMSE; however, an inspection of the T-MAE
values shows that TMAX and KAV achieve slightly better results than DMAX and
KMAX. The baselines (lower part of the table) clearly produce the highest MAE
errors, but the RMSE’s are the opposite way round for the fixed values baseline,
which means that it makes less large prediction errors than the others. At first
glance, it looks as if there is no clear winner among TMAX, DMAX, KMAX and
KAV. In the remainder of the discussion, we will show that overall T-MAE’s and
T-RMSE’s do not give a complete picture of an operator’s performance, and that
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Table 4.1: Overall performance of bilattice-based aggregation strategies on the
CouchSurfing data set, with propagation operator P1 and T = min for paths of
length 2; T-MAE ∈ [0, 2] and T-RMSE ∈ [0,√2].
Aggregation operator Figure 4.3.2 T-MAE T-RMSE
Trust maximizing TMAX A 0.316 0.321
Distrust maximizing DMAX B 0.325 0.324
Knowledge preference averaging KAV C 0.318 0.321
Knowledge maximizing KMAX D 0.322 0.324
Knowledge minimizing KMIN E 0.389 0.389
Fixed values FIX F 0.340 0.311
sacrificing the knowledge condition allows for other operators that can produce
more accurate trust estimations.
Figure 4.4.1 shows the evolution of T-MAE over the number n of trust scores
that need to be aggregated. The split-up of the results gives us a clearer image
than overall MAE errors. Notice that all operators perform more or less equally
for small n, but that these classes are exactly the ones that are overrepresented
in our experiment. The latter is depicted by the bars, their scale can be found
on the right side of the graph. The bars illustrate for example that in more than
500 000 leave-one-out experiments there was only one propagation path and
in almost 300 000 cases exactly two, as opposed to about 1000 leave-one-out
experiments which have to aggregate between 50 and 75 trust scores. These
numbers explain why we get very similar average errors in Table 4.1.
On average, one can see that it becomes more difficult to produce accurate
predictions as the number of inputs starts to increase, and that there is clearly a
performance difference between the operators: DMAX and KMAX make a very
bad showing from the moment they have to deal with more than 20 inputs; their
T-MAE is often almost twice as high as TMAX’s. Obviously, these two operators
are too extreme for the CouchSurfing application. This tells us that distrust, as
opposed to trust, is not easily established in CouchSurfing: one, or a few agents
telling that another one should be distrusted is not sufficient for the inquiring
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agent to conclude that the agent should be distrusted, whereas the decision will
be made much quicker if those agents indicate to trust him.
TMAX and KAV adapt themselves much better to changing aggregation con-
ditions. Note that TMAX achieves somewhat lower errors in cases with more
than 75 inputs, which can be explained by the fact that the average trust degree
tri for n > 75 is significantly higher than for n ≤ 75 (viz. 0.594 vs. 0.423).
Figure 4.4.2 shows the evolution of the T-RMSE. Remark that the operators
more or less relate to each other to the same extent. The reason for the lower
global T-RMSE for the fixed values baseline can mainly be found in the good
performance for the leave-one-out experiments that only contain one path (the
largest class): FIX yields the average trust and distrust degree in the data set,
whereas the other algorithms just copy the input. Note again that KAV and
TMAX are well matched. This time, however, KAV is the winner in many sce-
narios; the moderating KAV producessmaller prediction errors (T-RMSE) than
the more extreme TMAX: while no distinction could be made w.r.t. T-MAE for
n ≤ 75, for T-RMSE we can now clearly see that KAV achieves better results.
Furthermore, the headstart of TMAX for higher n has melted away, and in some
cases KAV even wins the battle.
4.4.2 Effect of Orness Weights
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4.1 demonstrated that KMAX’s attitude is too explicit. As
we discussed in Section 4.3.2.1, a possible solution is the introduction of or-like
weights. We will illustrate the effect of tuning the weight vectors for K-OWA
and show that they can indeed have a positive impact on the T-MAE. The goal
of this experiment is to illustrate the importance of choosing the right trust and
distrust weights, and not to compute the ideal weighting strategy (the latter
can for instance be achieved by automatic methods such as machine learning
techniques). To this aim, we use the proposals in Example 4.8.
In Figure 4.4.3, we compare KMAX’s performance with some of the operators
of the K-OWA family. KMAX is represented by the circles, while the mitigation
on the trust and distrust side (tuning of α and β resp.) is represented by the tri-
angles and the inverse triangles respectively. The line with the squares depicts
the course of a K-OWA operator with α 6= n 6= β.
Only introducing weights on the trust side does not have the effect we wished
for: there is a small positive impact for aggregation conditions with less than 50
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inputs, but for higher numbers the situation is perceptibly deteriorating. Note
that the results are worse the further away from the maximum behavior: tak-
ing into account the first three quarters of the ordered arguments (α = 4/3)
yields worse results than only taking into account a quarter (α = 4), which
is worse than only taking into account the first ordered argument (maximum,
KMAX, α = n). The more sources to aggregate, the larger the possible effect
of orderings and weight vectors; the effect of maximizing knowledge becomes
more important when we have to deal with many inputs. This finding is also
confirmed by the good results of TMAX (which maximizes the trust degree) for
aggregation conditions with a high number of inputs.
It is clear that changing the orness-weights on the distrust side has an over-
all positive effect, and that better results are achieved when taking into account
opinions from many sources, for conditions for both low and high n values. Re-
call that DMAX (maximizing the distrust degree) performed very bad for high n
(see Figure 4.4.1); the inverse triangle results in Figure 4.4.3 show the benefits
of making DMAX’s conduct less explicit.
Obviously, the optimal weighting scheme for K-OWA lies somewhere in between
the extremes TMAX and DMAX. This is illustrated by the squares, which embody
the behavior of K-OWA with α = 4 and β = 4/3, i.e., using the first quarter of the
highest trust estimations and three quarters of the highest distrust estimations.
This means that, in the context of CouchSurfing, trust is easier established than
distrust; it is an open, voluntary, community of users who want to (and have
to) rely on each other. Note in particular that the benefit of using K-OWA with
α = 4 and β = 4/3 to determine the trust and distrust level is especially high for
intermediate aggregation conditions (> 10 and ≤ 50), with T-MAE decreases of
25% compared to KMAX.
4.4.3 Impact of Knowledge Incorporation
The knowledge preference averaging operator KAV only takes into account the
opinions of the most knowledgeable users. In Section 4.3.2.2 we conjectured
that its performance might be improved if we incorporate additional opinions,
by rewarding those that are more certain (the KAAV operator). In this section,
we show that this is indeed the case. Again, the goal of the experiment is not to
compute the most optimal implementation of KAAV, but to illustrate its advan-
tages over the KAV operator. In Figure 4.4.4 we compare the results achieved for
the arithmetic mean (all opinions are equally important, KAAV with γ = 0, solid
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Figure 4.4.3: Tuning the weights for K-OWA according to Example 4.8 for the
CouchSurfing data set; α = β = n yields KMAX.
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Figure 4.4.4: Tuning the knowledge reward γ for KAAV for the CouchSurfing
data set; γ = 0 results in the arithmetic mean, and γ →∞ yields KAV.
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line), three implementations of KAAV with increasing knowledge reward γ, and
KAV (only the most knowledgeable opinions matter, diamonds). Note that for a
very large γ, KAAV reduces to KAV. In other words, the line that is determined
by the knowledge defect of the trust score resulting from the KAAV aggregation
will approximate the corresponding KAV line for increasing knowledge rewards.
First note that this graph again illustrates that it becomes more difficult to ac-
curately predict a trust score when a lot of opinions are available. Let us now
compare the classical average with the knowledge preference average KAV. For
only few inputs, the average performs better than KAV. However, for larger num-
bers n of aggregates, the average fails completely, with T-MAE increases up to
50% compared to KAV. This demonstrates that knowledge-enhanced aggrega-
tion strategies become more useful when many inputs have to be aggregated.
The trend is also apparent when focusing on the KAAV implementations, with
γ = 1, . . . , 4: as the number of inputs increases, KAAV’s with larger knowledge
rewards achieve better results and come closer to KAV’s trust score MAE. On the
other hand, remark that mitigating KAV’s behavior produces better results for
smaller n’s, even lower than those of the arithmetic mean.
The results show that, when choosing between the average, KAV and KAAV,
a trade-off should be made between lower errors for lower n and lower T-MAE’s
for aggregation conditions with many inputs; an application with a well con-
nected trust network (many available opinions) may benefit the most from KAV,
while the average or KAAV might be more suited for applications for which not
much trust scores are available. Another option is a combination of different
aggregation operators depending on the number of inputs that need to be ag-
gregated. The best configuration (combination, parameters) for a particular
application can then for example be estimated during a training phase.
4.4.4 Combining Orness Weights and Knowledge Information
In Sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4, we presented the knowledge-based OWA oper-
ator and the induced OWA operator, two trust score aggregation operators that
combine the orness weight strategy (as in K-OWA) with the incorporation of
knowledge defects (as in KAAV). Figures 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 depict the results for
KK-OWA and K-IOWA respectively.
Let us first focus on the combination by altering the weights in the K-OWA strat-
egy, i.e., the introduction of an extra weight vector which reflects the knowledge
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Figure 4.4.5: Knowledge-enhanced OWA trust score aggregation for the Couch-
Surfing data set: K-OWA versus KK-OWA; according to Example 4.8.
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Figure 4.4.6: Knowledge-enhanced OWA trust score aggregation for the Couch-
Surfing data set: K-OWA versus K-IOWA, according to Example 4.8.
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defect of each input. In Figure 4.4.5, we include the best overall performing
K-OWA strategy and two corresponding KK-OWA operators with knowledge re-
ward 1 and 4. It is immediately clear that these particular weight combinations
do not produce the desired effect; it is only for a large number n of inputs
(n ≥ 75) that the benefit starts to reveal itself (albeit a low positive impact).
Note that this observation does support the claim we made in our discussion
about KAAV and KAV, namely that the incorporation of knowledge defects be-
comes more important as the number of inputs grows: Figure 4.4.4 showed
that for small n, the average (which does not take into account knowledge)
performs better than KAAV, and that KAV (large knowledge reward) achieves
the best accuracy among the KAAV’s for large n. The results for KK-OWA also
show that the incorporation of knowledge defects is beneficial for large n com-
pared to the K-OWA operator (which does not take into account any knowledge
information), and that the latter scores better for small n.
In Figure 4.4.6 we present the results of the second combination strategy, viz. K-
IOWA. The difference with KK-OWA is that the knowledge information is not re-
flected in the weight vectors, but in the ordering of the inputs. We include two
of the best performing K-OWA implementations and their induced counterparts.
Remark that the induced operators achieve lower T-MAE’s on every occasion
but one. Notice that this is a small improvement, in general they are closely
matched with the original results. The reason can partially be found in the def-
inition of the induced variables (4.1) and ordering (4.2): a lot of the inputs
that are first in the row for K-IOWAWT and K-IOWAWD will also be ordered first
for K-OWAWT and K-OWAWD , since inputs with a high trust (distrust) degree
will often contain more perfect information (recall that we assume consistent
agents). Furthermore, the inputs for which the induced and regular OWA order-
ing might differ the most are very often at the end of the order, thus receiving
low weights (or even 0), which reduces the impact on the final aggregated
trust score. Hence, for different weight strategies and/or different knowledge-
enhanced orderings, the effect of K-IOWA can possibly be more significant.
4.4.5 Adaptability of the Operators
In the previous sections, we discussed the performance of the operators on one
particular data set. However, practical trust score aggregation operators should
also achieve good accuracy on other types of data. Hence, in this section, we
focus on the adaptability of the operators by testing them on the Epinions data
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set. Note that its characteristics are very different than those of CouchSurfing: it
contains bivalent data and no knowledge information (hence only full trust and
full distrust statements are available), and consists of about 85% trust relations.
Consequently, each trust score in the data set has perfect knowledge, and hence
K-OWA, K-IOWA and KK-OWA will yield the same results. Analogously, KAV and
KAAV coincide with the arithmetic mean. This means that we cannot discuss the
performance of knowledge-enhanced strategies, but we can investigate whether
the observations for the CouchSurfing application are also valid for Epinions, or,
in other words, whether the operators can adjust themselves to changing data
types.
Figure 4.4.7 depicts the situation for the bilattice-based approaches on the Epin-
ions data set. Note that there is much more variation in the T-MAE’s compared
to those in Figure 4.4.1. This is due to the average trust and distrust degrees
in the data sets: for CouchSurfing they were resp. 0.431 and 0.206, while for
Epinions 0.853 and 0.147. Hence, it is only natural that TMAX will achieve
lower errors, and DMAX higher T-MAE’s. Remark that KMAX and DMAX are
again too extreme to be used in trust-enhanced applications; TMAX and KAV
achieve much better results. As the average trust degree in the data set is very
high, TMAX is the logical winner.
The ‘peaks’ of KMAX and DMAX can be explained by the nature of the data
in the separate classes: of all leave-one-out experiments where the real value
is full trust but the predicted value is complete distrust, the highest number is
reached in the 35-50 group, secondly in the 50-75 group, and so on. DMAX
maximizes distrust and hence minimizes trust, or, in other words, full distrust
(zero trust) is predicted from the moment that one of the inputs is full distrust.
However, most of the values in the data set denote full trust (zero distrust);
hence, the T-MAE will be higher in the aforementioned classes. A similar effect
is visible for KMAX, but in a somewhat mitigated form because KMAX maxi-
mizes the trust value too.
Similar to the CouchSurfing experiment, K-OWA can also be used to improve
KMAX’s behavior for the Epinions application. The results of tuning K-OWA can
be found in Figure 4.4.8. First of all, the graph shows us that tuning on the trust
side has no visible effect, which again can be explained by the omnipresence of
trust in the data set. However, changing the orness weights on the distrust side
does have a major positive impact on the T-MAE (as was the case for Couch-
Surfing too). Remark that the tuned versions adapt themselves much better to
changing aggregation conditions; the peaks have almost disappeared.
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Figure 4.4.7: T-MAE for the bilattice-based trust score aggregation operators on
the Epinions data set. Split-up according to the number n of aggregates; the
bars depict the number of leave-one-out experiments in each class.
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Figure 4.4.8: Tuning the weights for K-OWA according to Example 4.8 for the
Epinions data set; α = β = n yields KMAX.
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Although the Epinions and CouchSurfing applications clearly have different
characteristics, the performance of the operators on both data sets supports our
claim that approaches which focus on maximizing distrust are not very suitable
for social web applications, that TMAX, KAV and T-OWA adapt themselves much
better to changing aggregation conditions, and that the tuning of the (distrust)
weight vectors in maximum-like operators can have a significant positive impact
on the accuracy of the aggregation process.
4.4.6 Discussion
Although from a theoretical perspective, not satisfying the knowledge boundary
can be regarded as a serious drawback for any trust score aggregation opera-
tor, our experiments demonstrate that dropping this condition opens the door
for new, more practical, aggregation operators. The results on large real-world
data sets from CouchSurfing and Epinions showed that this kind of operators
can significantly improve the performance of the less sophisticated bilattice-
based aggregation operators.
These findings may be explained by the imperfect, noisy nature of the data,
a problem inherent in the larger part of social network applications. Some
users might not fully understand the meaning of each trust/knowledge state-
ment, others make an unintentional mistake (for example checked the wrong
trust box, forgot to indicate the knowledge level, ...), and so on. Furthermore,
the data in trust-enhanced applications must be mapped to a practical model,
and the trust estimation mechanisms must be captured as precisely as possible.
However, the resulting trust model and propagation operators remain approxi-
mations, and hence will always introduce some extra noise.
One way of reducing the noise in the data is by making the aggregation
operators less extreme, e.g. by using knowledge-enhanced strategies that give
priority to better informed opinions, or by introducing weights that soften the
standard behavior of the operators. This explains the good performance of the
KAAV and K-OWA families, compared to the classical operators.
Moreover, one might also argue that the bilattice-based operators perform
less well because the properties we enforced do not align well with the Couch-
Surfing data. It turns out that the knowledge boundary is not as vital as we
thought, compared to the trust and distrust boundaries, the neutrality and op-
posite arguments condition. The former property is exactly the one that is only
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Table 4.2: Overall performance of bilattice-based aggregation strategies on the
CouchSurfing data set, propagation operator P3 versus P1 with T = min for
paths of length 2; T-MAE ∈ [0, 2] and T-RMSE ∈ [0,√2].
Aggregation operator Propagation P3 Propagation P1
T-MAE T-RMSE T-MAE T-RMSE
TMAX 0.298 0.309 0.316 0.321
DMAX 0.312 0.314 0.325 0.324
KAV 0.301 0.309 0.318 0.321
KMAX 0.313 0.318 0.322 0.324
K-OWA with α = 4 and β = 4/3 0.293 0.301 0.308 0.311
KAAV with γ = 2 0.289 0.297 0.310 0.311
KK-OWA with α = 4, β = 4/3 and γ = 1 0.354 0.343 0.310 0.312
K-IOWA with α = 4 and β = 4/3 0.359 0.345 0.308 0.311
KMIN 0.333 0.356 0.389 0.389
FIX 0.340 0.311 0.340 0.311
fulfilled for the bilattice-based approaches, whereas the KAAV and K-OWA fam-
ilies do satisfy the latter.
The choice as to which approach (TMAX, KAV, KAAV, K-OWA, ...) is most
suitable also depends on the application at hand. In applications where pru-
dence is in order, one can e.g. opt for a K-OWA operator with a large β-parameter
(which results in a higher orness degree and hence will sooner yield a high ag-
gregated distrust degree). Or, in large user networks where (partial) ignorance
is the rule rather than the exception, KMAX or KAAV might be preferred over
TMAX or K-OWA.
Obviously, the reported performances do not only depend on the choice of ag-
gregation operator, but also on the combination with propagation, which inher-
ently introduces errors in the computation too. Hence, the synergy between the
two operator types and their separate influence on the accuracy are two factors
that should also be taken into account. As an illustration, consider Table 4.2
which contains the results for the aggregation operators with P1 and P3; recall
that the latter is the operator that achieved the best propagation results for the
CouchSurfing data (see Section 3.4.2). As can be seen from the T-MAE and T-
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RMSE, all bilattice-based approaches and K-OWA and KAAV perform better with
the distrust-enhanced propagation strategy. Hence, one could say that a more
accurate propagation operator also yields more accurate aggregation results.
However, the comparisons for KK-OWA and K-IOWA show that this will not al-
ways be the case, and that it is necessary to define the most optimal combination
of the aggregation operator, the aggregation weights, and the propagation op-
erator.
An important goal of our aggregation operators is to accurately represent a
consensus about the trust estimation, which implies a good representation of
the degree of inconsistency and neutrality in the final aggregated trust score
(e.g. reflected in Definitions 4.14 and 4.15). Consequently, the operators that
we have proposed are more suitable for environments with a central authority,
in which aggregation is applied at the end of the process (first propagate then
aggregate, FPTA). On the other hand, in a privacy-preserving setting (FATP),
the aggregated scores are used as intermediate estimations in a propagation
chain, and hence the focus is not necessarily on representation of the consen-
sus. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the latter environments require
an adapted set of aggregation conditions (more or less, or other properties) and
corresponding trust score aggregation operators.
4.5 Conclusions and Future Work
Research in trust networks is still in its infancy, in particular when it comes down
to the representation, propagation and aggregation of distrust. In this chap-
ter, we focused on the trust and distrust aggregation problem, and investigated
which requirements a good trust score aggregator should fulfill. Based on these
aggregation conditions, we proposed four trust score aggregation strategies,
each with their own distinct behavior: the trust maximizing operator TMAX
which is the most optimistic choice (maximum trust degree for the lowest possi-
ble knowledge level), distrust maximizing DMAX which is the most pessimistic
one (maximum distrust degree), knowledge preference averaging KAV which
is the most moderating approach (average of the most knowledgeable trust
scores), and the knowledge maximizing operator KMAX (maximum trust and
distrust degree), the boldest aggregation option.
Besides, we also introduced several other families of operators: the (in-
duced) OWA-based K-OWA and K-IOWA operators, the knowledge awarding
averaging trust score operator KAAV and the knowledge-based trust score OWA
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operator, mitigating the behavior of KMAX, KAV and their combination respec-
tively. Although these families have less desirable properties from a theoretical
perspective, our experiments on large data sets from CouchSurfing and Epin-
ions demonstrated that they achieve more accurate results in real-world social
applications, which are inherently noisy.
A lot of interesting research directions remain unexplored so far, e.g. the de-
termination of the most suitable propagation/aggregation combination for a
particular application at hand, the study of aggregation conditions and cor-
responding operators for privacy-preserving environments, the investigation of
the best performing aggregation and propagation order (i.e., FPTA versus FATP),
etc. Another research area involves the further exploration of the role of knowl-
edge defects, e.g. by extending well-known other weighted strategies such as
the Choquet Integral [20] or the weighted ordered weighted averaging opera-
tor [137]. Finally, one can also take into account certain aspects of the virtual
trust network’s topology. In particular, the current approaches are indifferent as
to the length of the paths that generated the individual trust scores, and also do
not consider how many times the same user appears on a path; see e.g. [141].
Information networks straddle the world. Nothing remains con-
cealed. But the sheer volume of information dissolves the infor-
mation. We are unable to take it all in.
New Statesman and Society, June 1990. Gu¨nter Grass
5 Social RecommenderSystems
The wealth of information available on the web has made it increasingly difficult
to find what one is really looking for. This is particularly true for exploratory
queries where one is searching for opinions and views. Think e.g. of the many
information channels you can try to find out whether you will love or hate the
first Harry Potter movie: you may read the user opinions on Epinions.com or
Amazon.com, investigate the Internet Movie Database1, check the opinion of
your favorite reviewers on Rotten Tomatoes1, read the discussions on a Science
Fiction & Fantasy forum2, and you can probably add some more possibilities to
the list yourself. Although today it has become very easy to look up informa-
tion, at the same time we experience more and more difficulties coping with
this information overload. Hence, it comes as no surprise that personalization
applications to guide the search process are gaining tremendous importance.
One particular interesting set of applications that address this problem are on-
line recommender sytems [4, 17, 123, 127, 139].
In this chapter, we deal with the basics of recommender systems, so that we
can lay the foundation for an easy understanding of the motives and techniques
for trust-enhanced recommendation in Chapters 6 and 7. While the first part
of this thesis focused on the modeling and processing of computational trust
1See www.imdb.com and www.rottentomatoes.com
2Such as www.sf-fandom.com
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and distrust, this part is all about their practical use in recommender systems.
Such trust-based recommenders are a specific type of social recommendation
systems, which generate predictions (recommendations) that are based on in-
formation about their users’ profiles and relationships between the users.
Social recommenders can come in many flavors and can be classified in several
ways, depending on the type of information that is used [17], the way the rec-
ommendations are computed [4], how automated the process is [127], etc. In
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we give a global overview of the recommender research
area and position the trust-enhanced approaches. In Section 5.3 we zoom in
on the shortcomings of classical recommendation approaches, and in particular
collaborative filtering. In Section 5.4, we concentrate on evaluation methods
and measures we will need for the reported experiments in the next chapters.
5.1 Classification of Recommendation Methods
Recommender systems can be used for several purposes, such as generating a
ranking of items, recommending a sequence of items (think e.g. of the person-
alized radio stations on Last.fm), or predicting the score of an item [57]. In
this dissertation, we focus on the latter type of systems, i.e., recommenders
that are used to accurately estimate the degree to which a particular user (the
target user) will like a particular item (the target item). In [17], Burke clas-
sified recommender approaches based on the kind of data that is needed to
generate recommendations. Given a set of users U and a set of items I, he dis-
tinguished five basic types, viz. demographic, utility-based, knowledge-based,
content-based and collaborative recommender systems.
Demographic systems gather personal data such as age, gender, residence, pro-
fession, etc., and try to categorize a target user a ∈ U based on this information.
Recommendations for a are then generated based on the items i ∈ I that de-
mographically similar users like (i.e., i’s they have rated highly). Examples of
this approach can be found in, among others, [112, 124] in which respectively
a web page and book recommendation algorithm is presented.
Utility-based recommenders do not ask for ratings of items, but need a de-
scription of the features of the items in I, apply a utility function to the items,
and determine their rank (and hence are more suitable for ranking problems
than for predicting accurate scores). Their chief benefit is that they allow to
take into account factors that are not related to the description of i, such as
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the availability of the item, its delivery schedule, etc., but their main difficulty
is how to create a utility function for each target user a. Several utility-based
recommenders are presented in [54].
Knowledge-based systems are similar to utility-based recommenders in the
sense that they also require features of the items and do not need ratings. In-
stead of a utility function however, their recommendations are inferred from
the users’ needs and preferences; knowledge-based recommenders can reason
about the relationship between a need and the target item i. For example, the
restaurant recommender application Entree [17] knows that the Pacific New
Wave cuisine consists of a French and an Asian component (and that Chinese is
a subtype of Asian); hence, when a user asks for a recommendation in the style
of a particular Chinese restaurant, Entree might suggest the Pacific one.
The two most mature and most often used recommendation types are content-
based and collaborative, or a combination of two or more types (the so-called
hybrid recommenders [15, 17, 23, 78]). A content-based system generates rec-
ommendations based on the ratings of the target user; it suggests items that are
similar to the ones that the user has liked in the past. To this aim, content-based
recommenders require a feature description of the items, for example actors,
genre, director and language in the case of a movie recommender. Examples can
be found in [101, 113]; more details and further references on content-based
recommender systems can be found in the overview paper of Adomavicius and
Tuzhilin [4].
Content-based systems have their roots in information retrieval and infor-
mation filtering research, which manifests itself in the determination of similar
items. E.g., the term frequency/inverse document frequency (TF/IDF) measure
is a well-known method in information retrieval to compute the weights of key-
words in a document. As another example, the cosine similarity is often used
to measure the distance between two feature vectors. For more information on
TF/IDF and cosine similarity, we refer to [87]. These techniques can not only be
used to determine the similarity between web pages or documents, but also for
other item types (such as movies), as long as feature descriptions are available.
At the same time, however, this is also one of the main weaknesses of
content-based systems: items for which no description is available cannot be
recommended, and the accuracy of the recommendations heavily relies on the
quality of the annotations. Furthermore, these systems tend not to explore in-
terests of the user besides those expressed in his rating record. In this sense,
they can be improved significantly by (additionally) using collaborative meth-
ods, which do not require annotated items. In essence, collaborative (filtering)
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systems suggest items i to target user a that are liked by users that are similar
to a. Note the difference with content-based systems which suggest items simi-
lar to items that a liked. Well-known collaborative examples are the Grouplens
recommender for news articles [122] and the music recommendation system
Ringo [129].
In the following section, we go more deeply into collaborative recommenders,
since the the trust-enhanced techniques that we will discuss in the following
chapters are based on the same rationale; they do not need any description of
the data, but rely on the ratings of other users in the system.
5.2 Collaborative Filtering Algorithms
Collaborative filtering (CF) recommenders can be classified as either memory-
based (heuristic-based) or model-based. The former generate recommendations
that are based on the entire set of ratings that is available, from the target user
but also from all other users in U . On the other hand, the latter only use the rat-
ings to learn a model and then suggest items based on that model; think e.g. of
clustering or matrix reconstruction techniques. For a discussion on model-based
approaches, we refer to [4]; in this chapter we focus on memory-based ap-
proaches, since they are more relevant to the trust-enhanced algorithms in the
following chapters.
In a memory-based setting, the unknown rating pa,i for target item i and
target user a can be predicted by using a combination of the ratings of neighbors
(similar users) u ∈ U that are already familiar with item i, i.e., who rated i as
ru,i. We denote the set of users who have evaluated the target item by R. In
Definitions 5.1 and 5.2, we show two possibilities for combining the ratings [4].
The first formula represents the classical weighted average, in which the ratings
of neighbors that are more similar to the target user receive larger weights wa,u.
Definition 5.1 (Weighted sum). The unknown rating for target item i and target
user a can be computed as
pa,i =
∑
u∈R
wa,uru,i∑
u∈R
wa,u
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However, this approach does not take into account the fact that not every user
exhibits the same rating behavior; e.g., user x might be easy to please and
hence regularly issues high ratings, while user y has a more pronounced taste,
revealing itself in lower ratings. As a consequence, the average rating by x will
be much higher than the average rating by y. This limitation can be overcome
by the following approach:
Definition 5.2 (Classic collaborative filtering). The unknown rating for target
item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈R
wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈R
wa,u
The unknown rating pa,i is predicted based on the mean ra of ratings by target
user a for other items than the target item i, as well as on the ratings ru,i by
a’s neighbors u for the target item. The deviation between the ratings for a par-
ticular neighbor u (ru,i − ru) measures how much u likes or dislikes the target
item: a large positive deviation means the user really enjoyed the item, whereas
a negative deviation tells us that the target item was not (at all) to his taste.
Both formulas take into account the similarity wa,u between the target user
a and a neighbor u. Several methods exist to compute similarity, one of the
most popular being the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (PCC) [57]:
Definition 5.3 (Pearson’s correlation coefficient). The PCC of users a and u is
computed as (with n the number of items j rated in common)
wa,u =
n∑
j=1
(ru,j − ru) · (ra,j − ra)√√√√√
 n∑
j=1
(ru,j − ru)2
 ·
 n∑
j=1
(ra,j − ra)2

The PCC measures the extent to which there is a linear relationship between
the rating behaviors of the two users, the extreme values being −1 and 1. A
positive correlation coefficient reflects the fact that both users have similar taste
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in the sense that, when one of them rates an item above/below average, the
other one does so too. The more negative the coefficient, the more the rating
behaviors are opposites; e.g., wa,u = −1 means that whenever user a rates an
item highly, u does the exact reverse, and vice versa. Analogously, wa,u = 1 de-
notes identical rating behavior. A correlation coefficient of 0 means that there
is no relationship between the two sets of ratings. In practice, most often only
users with a positive correlation (> 0) are considered in the recommendation
process. We denote this set by R+.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the trust-enhanced recommendation techniques of
the following chapters adhere most closely to the collaborative filtering paradigm,
since they also rely on the ratings of the other users. The neighbors (resp. the
corresponding weights) will be defined as similar users (resp. the PCC), as
trusted users (resp. propagated and aggregated trust scores), or as a combi-
nation of both.
5.3 Limitations of Recommender Systems
As discussed in the previous section, one of the strengths of collaborative filter-
ing is that it does not require any description about the data, and hence can deal
with any kind of items; it is sufficient to have enough ratings from users in the
system to make good recommendations. Obviously, the more ratings become
available, the more recommendations can be generated and the more accurate
they become. Hence, another advantage of using such an approach is that it is
adaptive, i.e., the quality of the system improves over time (which is also the
case with content-based systems). Since collaborative filtering takes into ac-
count the opinion of neighbors that are selected based on their similarity with
the target user (and not items that are based on their similarity with the target
item), it can add a serendipitous factor into the recommendation process, which
content-based systems cannot. E.g., suppose that you have never seen a western
before, but that it turns out that all your neighbors really liked ‘Once Upon a
Time in the West’, then there is a good chance that you will also enjoy the movie,
even though you would never have thought of choosing a western yourself.
However, despite significant improvements on recommendation approaches,
some important problems still remain. In this section, we briefly discuss the
main drawbacks and take collaborative filtering as a particular example. We
will explain in Section 6.1, on a global level, how the incorporation of trust and
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distrust can alleviate these weaknesses, and address them in detail in further
sections of Chapters 6 and 7.
A first problem is that users typically rate or experience only a small frac-
tion of the available items, which makes the rating matrix (the matrix which
consists of rows for each user and columns for each item) very sparse, since
a recommender system often deals with millions of items. For instance, Guha
et al.’s data set from Epinions contains over 1 500 000 reviews that received
about 25 000 000 ratings by more than 160 000 different users (also see Section
5.4.1). Due to this data sparsity, a collaborative filtering algorithm experiences
a lot of difficulties when trying to identify good neighbors in the system: it is
hard to find users that have rated enough items in common, let alone to find
those that also have a similar rating behavior. Consequently, the quality of the
generated recommendations might suffer from this.
Moreover, it is also very challenging to generate good recommendations for
users that are new to the system, as they have not rated a significant number
of items and hence cannot properly be linked with similar users. This is the
so-called user cold start problem, a major issue that is high on the agenda, espe-
cially in e-commerce environments, because it is important that new users are
satisfied with the system so that they keep coming back (continue purchasing).
A related drawback is the item cold start problem: new items have only been
rated by a few users, which makes it hard to find similar users that rated such
an item (due to the sparsity of the rating matrix). Another issue with respect
to target items are the controversial items. These are very challenging items
for a recommender system, since it is much harder to predict a score for an
item that has received a variety of high and low ratings, than for an all-time
favorite. More than in any other case, a recommendation for a user needs to
be truly personalized when the target item under consideration is controversial;
i.e., when an item has both ‘ardent supporters’ and ‘motivated adversaries’, with
no clear majority in either group.
Fourthly, recommendation systems have to cope with malicious users. As
recommenders are widely used in the realm of e-commerce, there is a natural
motivation for producers of items (manufacturers, publishers, etc.) to abuse
them so that their items are recommended to users more often (see e.g. [74,
108, 166]). For example, a common ‘copy-profile’ attack consists in copying the
ratings of the target user, which results in the system thinking that the adversary
is most similar to the target.
Finally, one of the main reasons why recommender systems are only being
used in low risk domains (think of a buying a book vs. a car) is that most users
still perceive a recommender as a ‘black box’, meaning that they lack trans-
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parency. Sinha and Swearingen [130, 135] have shown that users prefer more
transparent systems, and that people tend to rely more on recommendations
from people they trust (‘friends’) than on online recommender systems which
generate recommendations based on anonymous people similar to them.
5.4 Evaluation of Recommender Systems
Recommender systems can be evaluated in several ways, depending on the type
of data at hand, the goal of the system, etc. A comprehensive overview of
collaborative filtering evaluation issues can be found in [57]. In this section,
we focus on the problem of selecting and finding suitable data sets, and explain
which methods we will use to evaluate the trust-enhanced techniques in the
next chapters.
5.4.1 Obtaining Data
Evaluating the performance of recommendation systems can be done live (which
involves user studies), offline (i.e., automated experiments) or by a combination
of both. The advantage of offline analyses is that they are quick and economical
for large evaluations, they can be conducted on several data sets or algorithms
at once and they are repeatable. The downside is that, due to the sparsity of
most applications and data sets, only a limited set of items can be evaluated,
and not in a subjective way. Live user experiments, on the other hand, are ca-
pable of measuring subjective matters such as participation, user satisfaction,
or perceived transparency. The latter issues are out of the scope of this dis-
sertation; instead, we focus on offline experiments and objective performance
measures (see Section 5.4.2).
Two options arise when choosing offline evaluations, namely to evaluate on
synthesized or natural data sets. Using synthesized data is an easy way to test
for obvious flaws, but can only be used in the early steps, because it does not
accurately model the nature of real users and real data. Besides, one must be
careful not to fit the data too well to the algorithm to be tested. Hence, it is
fairer and more objective to use natural data sets in the evaluation, but these
are also more difficult to obtain; the task that the algorithm is designed for
must correspond to the tasks supported by the system of the data set. E.g.,
if an algorithm is designed to accurately predict ratings for movies on a scale
from 1 to 5, then a data set with only bivalent ratings is far from ideal. As
another example, the data set of an application in which ratings are gathered
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implicitly (e.g. by keeping track of how many times a user clicked a particular
topic, how long a user listened to a particular song, ...) does not align well
with an algorithm that requires explicit input from its users, for example in the
form of a continuous rating scale. In this work, we focus on recommendation
algorithms that need the latter type of data, i.e., applications that gather explicit
ratings and explicitly stated trust and distrust statements.
In the recommendation research area, several data sets are publicly available
for testing purposes. Most often used are the MovieLens3 data sets which con-
tain annotations about movies, demographic information about the users, time
stamps, and explicit ratings on a 5 star scale. The largest Movielens data set con-
tains 10 million ratings for around 10 000 movies and 71 500 users. Other pos-
sibilities that are available for the recommender community are e.g. the Book-
Crossing data set [171], the Jester Joke data set4, and more recently the Netflix
data set from the competition. A few other data sets have also been used, but
the majority of them are not publicly available.
Social network data sets are not very hard to find, think e.g. of the Enron
email data set5, the scrapes of Twitter’s API5, the many studies using Facebook
data (among others [68, 134]), the research on links between blogs [50], ...
However, it becomes more difficult if one needs weighted relational data, i.e.,
data sets that do not just consist of ‘friend’ or ‘fan’ links, but distinguish be-
tween different levels or tie strengths. There are even fewer data sets available
with explicit trust statements. An important example is the CouchSurfing data
set containing gradual trust and distrust levels (see Section 3.4.1), or Golbeck’s
FilmTrust data set with trust statements on a scale from 1 to 10 [44].
If we want to evaluate the performance of trust-enhanced recommenders which
aim to accurately estimate the degree to which a target user will like a target
item based on ratings of users in their trust network, we need data sets that
consist of a significant number of item ratings and trust statements. However,
the lack of such data sets remains a significant challenge in the trust-based rec-
ommendation domain: most data sets contain either only ratings or only trust
statements; there exist a few containing both, but not all of them can be ob-
tained for research purposes6, and the ones that are available have other short-
3Available at www.grouplens.org/taxonomy/term/14
4See www.ieor.berkeley.edu/~goldberg/jester-data/ for more information.
5See blog.infochimps.org/2009/11/11/twitter-census-publishing-the-first-of-many-
datasets and www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron
6As an example, the trust network of Golbeck’s FilmTrust application cannot be released because
of privacy concerns.
110 5 Social Recommender Systems
comings. E.g., the CouchSurfing data set consists of a large collection of gradual
trust statements, but the ratings (‘experiences’) are either ‘positive’, ‘negative’
or ‘neutral’, and merely 0.03% of them are negative. Hence, this is more of
a classification problem, while our focus is on algorithms to accurately predict
ratings on a (continuous) scale. On the other hand, the Epinions data from
Guha et al. [53] (Section 3.4.1) contains a variety of ratings (helpfulness scores
for reviews) on a scale from 1 to 5, but only has bivalent trust and distrust state-
ments. Yet another Epinions data set, crawled by Massa et al. [94], consists of
consumer product ratings (also on a scale from 1 to 5) and only trust relations
(no distrust statements).
In the remainder of this dissertation, we call Guha et al.’s and Massa et
al.’s data sets respectively the Epinions-reviews and Epinions-products data sets.
The large Epinions-reviews data set contains 1 560 144 reviews that received
25 170 637 ratings by 163 634 different users. The reviews are evaluated by
assigning a helpfulness rating which ranges from ‘not helpful’ (1/5) to ‘most
helpful’ (5/5). The trust evaluations make up a web of trust graph consisting
of 131 829 users and 840 799 non self-referring trust or distrust relations. The
Epinions-products data set was collected by Massa and Bhattacharjee in a 5-
week crawl and contains 139 738 products that are rated (on a scale from 1
to 5) by 49 290 users in total; the users issued or received 487 003 trust state-
ments in total. Hence, an item (rating) denotes a review (helpfulness score) in
the context of the Epinions-reviews data set and a consumer product (product
rating) in the context of the Epinions-products data set.
Despite their shortcomings, a big benefit of the Epinions data sets is that they
are extensive. Hence, they can give us a good realistic image of their users’ rat-
ing behavior and the way trust networks are formed, and enable us to safely in-
terpret the results of our trust-enhanced experiments. In the following chapters,
we will use one or both of the data sets to evaluate our approaches, depend-
ing on the problem at hand. For example, both data sets are suitable to discuss
the role of controversial items in trust-enhanced recommender systems (Section
6.2), whereas the role of distrust can only be analyzed on the Epinions-reviews
data set (Section 6.3). The cold start issue in Chapter 7 is analyzed by means of
the largest of the Epinions data sets, namely Epinions-reviews (Section 7.4).
5.4.2 Evaluation Measures for Rating Prediction
Recall that we will not perform live user experiments, and are hence not able
to measure e.g. user satisfaction. Offline experiments, however, do give us the
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opportunity to focus on the quality of the recommendations. There exist several
ways to measure the accuracy of a particular recommendation algorithm, a nice
overview is given in [57]. Since we concentrate on recommender systems that
are designed to accurately predict the rating for a (target user, target item) pair,
we do not consider precision/recall, ROC-curves, or other measures related to
binary classification problems [57], and also no correlations such as Spearman’s
ρ and Kendall’s τ which are used in ranking problems [57]. Instead, we use the
leave-one-out method in combination with the mean absolute error (MAE) and
root mean squared error (RMSE) [57]:
Definition 5.4 (Mean absolute error, Root mean squared error). The MAE and
RMSE in a leave-one-out setting with n leave-one-out experiments is defined as
MAE =
n∑
i=1
|ri − pi|
n
RMSE =
√√√√( n∑
i=1
(ri − pi)2
)
/n,
with ri the real rating and pi the predicted rating for a particular (target user,
target item) pair.
Remark that the leave-one-out setting for item recommendations is different
than the one in Section 3.4.2: instead of hiding a trust relation, we now hide a
rating and try to predict its value based on other ratings and trust relations in
the system. The MAE and RMSE are classical accuracy measures that are often
used in the recommender area; MAE considers every error of equal value, while
the RMSE emphasizes larger errors. Note that the MAE and RMSE are on the
same scale, which depends on the rating scale in the system. Suppose e.g. that
the items are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 (as is the case for both Epinions data
sets), then the extreme values that MAE and RMSE can reach are 0 and 4.
Of course, accuracy is not the only factor that makes a good recommendation.
We may also take into account the novelty, serendipity, learning rate of the sys-
tem, and so on; [57] contains an overview of such measures that go beyond
accuracy. We are particularly interested in one of these measures, a factor that
can easily be evaluated in offline experiments, namely coverage. The coverage
of a recommender system refers to the number of (target user, target item) pairs
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for which a prediction can be generated; it may not always be possible to pre-
dict a rating w.r.t. a user or an item, e.g. when a user has no neighbors or the
item has not been evaluated.
A classical way to measure the coverage is by using the leave-one-out method.
The coverage of a specific algorithm then refers to the amount of computable
predictions pi versus the number of leave-one-out experiments to perform (i.e.,
the number of ratings available in the data set). For Definitions 5.1 and 5.2
we call pa,i computable if there is at least one user u for whom wa,u can be
calculated and who rated item i.
Definition 5.5 (Coverage). The coverage in a leave-one-out setting with n leave-
one-out experiments are defined as(
n∑
i=1
comp(pi)
)
/n,
with comp(pi) = 1 if pi is computable, and 0 otherwise.
Accuracy and coverage are two measures that must be considered together; a
recommender system can only be useful if both accuracy and coverage are high.
As a simple example, consider a system with 1000 ratings for 1000 items which
can perfectly predict the score of 10 items (yielding a very good accuracy of
MAE=RMSE=0), but nothing else (yielding a coverage of 1%). Analogously,
one can create a recommender that always generates the maximum score for
an item; hence, coverage will be 100%, but possibly with a very high MAE
and RMSE. Obviously, in the design phase of a recommendation algorithm, one
should always consider the trade-off between the quality and the amount of the
recommendations, or, in other words, between the desired level of accuracy and
coverage for the application.
5.4.3 Evaluation Measures for Item Controversiality
When evaluating the accuracy of a recommendation algorithm, the MAE and
RMSE are often computed on the entire data set, but this does not always give
us a complete picture of its performance. For example, a recommender sys-
tem may produce very different results for cold start users compared to regular
users (see Chapter 7). In a similar way, one can also focus on different kinds
of items, e.g. controversial items compared to favorites which score well for al-
most all users. Obviously, ratings for the former will be much harder to predict
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(see Chapter 6). In this section, we propose a new technique to appropriately
identify whether a target item is controversial or not, leading to an operational
definition of the concept of controversial items that is applicable to a wide vari-
ety of recommender systems.
Throughout the section, we will use the Epinions-reviews data set (see Sec-
tions 3.4.1 and 5.4.1) to illustrate the rationale that will lead to our definition
of a controversial item; a similar argumentation can be obtained when using the
Epinions-products data set (see page 118). Most items in the Epinions-reviews
data set receive very high scores, in fact, over 75% of all reviews received the
highest possible evaluation. This means that a trivial algorithm that always pre-
dicts 5, or that uses the average score for the item as its prediction, can achieve
high accuracy. However, such recommendation strategies have difficulties cop-
ing with controversial items.
A straightforward way to detect a controversial item in a data set is to in-
spect the standard deviation of the ratings for each item i (see e.g. [89]). The
higher the standard deviation of the ratings for an item, the more controversial
the item is. We denote this by σ(i). The standard deviation of the ratings of
items in the Epinions data sets ranges between 0 (full agreement on the score
for an item) and 2 (the maximum standard deviation given the score range from
1 to 5). Figure 5.4.1 depicts the cumulative distribution function of σ over all
the items in the Epinions-reviews data set. A little under 10% of the items have
a σ of at least 0.9; there are 103 495 such items in total. About 70% of all items
have a σ that is lower than 0.5. This comes as no surprise, since the low values
are due to the abundance of 5-ratings. Hence, it is only natural that the more
times an item is evaluated, the more 5-ratings it receives, and hence the lower
the standard deviation will be. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4.2.
Another possibility for estimating the controversiality of an item is by comput-
ing the entropy of its ratings (see e.g. [74]). However, for our purposes, this
measure has certain drawbacks; for example, let fk(i) denote the number of
times item i received rating k. The entropy of an item i with f1(i) = 10 and
f5(i) = 15 will be the same as an item with f2(i) = 15 and f3(i) = 10, although
it is clear that the former is more controversial than the latter. This is due to the
fact that the entropy considers every rating individually. The entropy measure
tries to determine how difficult it is to exactly predict the real score, while the
standard deviation tries to assess how difficult it is to estimate the real score as
closely as possible. Since we will evaluate the recommendation algorithms with
MAE and RMSE (which do not merely measure whether a prediction is good or
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Figure 5.4.1: Cumulative distribution function for σ in the Epinions-reviews
data set.
Figure 5.4.2: The standard deviation σ(i) vs. number of received ratings for
item i in the Epinions-reviews data set.
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Table 5.1: Example of three items and their ratings; fk(i) denotes the number
of times item i received rating k, σ(i) the standard deviation and (α@2)(i) the
2-level of disagreement of item i.
f1(i) f2(i) f3(i) f4(i) f5(i) σ(i) (α@2)(i)
i1 1 1 0 3 5 1.34 0.20
i2 1 2 3 2 1 1.15 0.44
i3 1 0 0 4 4 1.20 0.11
bad, but also take into account the deviation from the actual rating), it is more
appropriate to use standard deviation for this type of problem.
However, standard deviation does not convey the full picture of controver-
siality. As an example, consider the ratings for items i1, i2 and i3 in Table 5.1.
Intuitively, item i2 seems the most controversial since it received ratings all over
the range, while there is more agreement on i1 and i3 that are liked by a ma-
jority of the users. Still, in this example the most controversial item according
to intuition has the lowest σ, which illustrates that by itself standard deviation
does not always reflect the controversiality of an item adequately.
Important characteristics of a suitable measure to detect controversal items are
(1) that it is mathematically precise, allowing for an implementation, (2) that it
appeals to intuition, and even more important, (3) that it allows to improve the
accuracy of personalized recommendations by singling out those items that call
for a more sophisticated recommender strategy than a default (trivial) strategy.
We propose a new measure, called level of disagreement, that considers the
likelihood that an item receives adjacent ratings, i.e., for which the difference
does not exceed a predetermined window size ∆. The underlying intuition
is that different scores that are close to each other reflect less disagreement
than different scores that are on opposite ends of the scale. In a system with
discrete ratings on a scale from 1 toM , the size of the window in which adjacent
scores are being considered can vary from 1 to M . In the definition below, the
granularity of the window is controlled by a parameter ∆.
Definition 5.6 (Level of disagreement). For a system with discrete ratings on a
scale from 1 to M , let ∆ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. We define the ∆-level of disagreement for
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an item i as
(α@∆)(i) = 1− max
a∈{1,...,M−∆+1}
(∑a+∆−1
k=a fk(i)∑M
k=1 fk(i)
)
with fk(i) the number of times that item i received rating k.
A window size of ∆ = 1 means that scores are considered in isolation. A
window size of ∆ = 2 means each score is considered with a neighboring score,
i.e. scores are considered in groups of 2. If ∆ = M , then (α@∆) = 0, since
there can be no disagreement when all ratings are considered together. The last
column of Table 5.1 displays the 2-level of disagreement for items i1, i2 and i3,
indicating that there is more disagreement on i2 than on i1 and i3.
Figure 5.4.3 depicts the standard deviation (horizontal axis) and the 2-level
of disagreement (vertical axis) of items in the Epinions-reviews data set. While
a small standard deviation typically entails a small level of disagreement, there
is considerable variation for high values of σ (and vice versa). This highlights
that σ and α@∆ are significantly different measures that can be used together
to define the concept of a controversial item.
In systems with a large item set, typically a lot of the items will receive few
ratings. Figure 5.4.4 shows the situation for controversial items in the Epinions-
reviews data set: of all items with a standard deviation of at least 0.9 and a
2-level of disagreement of at least 0.4 (yielding a set of 28 710 items), about
57% has only been evaluated 5 times or less, and an additional 25% maximum
10 times. Since an item can appear to be controversial because it only received
a few ratings so far (the so-called cold start items) and those ratings happen to
be different, we include a popularity threshold in our definition to ensure real
controversiality:
Definition 5.7 ((σ?, α?, β?)-controversial item). For a system with discrete rat-
ings on a scale from 1 to M , we call item i (σ?, α?, β?)-controversial iff σ(i) ≥ σ?,
(α@2)(i) ≥ α? and f(i) ≥ β?, in which f(i) denotes the number of times item i
has been evaluated, i.e., f(i) =
∑M
k=1 fk(i).
Applying this definition to the Epinions-reviews data set requires a parameter
selection that is adapted to its characteristics, e.g., the predominance of rating
value 5. To ensure this, we choose a σ? value of 0.9 and an α? value of 0.4,
obtaining a subset of 28 710 items for which a recommendation algorithm might
experience high prediction difficulties. For the level of disagreement, we choose
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Figure 5.4.3: α@2(i) vs. σ(i) in the Epinions-reviews data set.
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Figure 5.4.4: Number of received ratings per controversial item in the Epinions-
reviews data set.
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∆ = 2 because this window yields a sufficiently refined item set (of course, other
windows can be used for other kinds of data/applications). We can further
restrict the item set to contain only the 1 416 controversial reviews that have
been rated at least β? = 20 times. The same rationale can be followed for the
Epinions-products data set. For this data set, we impose σ? = 1.4 (yielding
about 10% of all items, as was also the case for the Epinions-reviews data set),
α? = 0.4 and β? = 20, yielding 266 controversial products that have been rated
at least 20 times. Note that the σ-threshold is higher than for the other data
set, which is due to the higher inherent controversiality level of the Epinions-
products data set.
In the following chapter, whenever we focus on controversial items, we will
use subsets from the Epinions-reviews and Epinions-products data sets that are
obtained by applying the above procedure.
5.5 Conclusions
Systems that guide users through the vast amounts of online information are
gaining tremendous importance. In this dissertation, we focus on one partic-
ular set of such applications, namely recommender systems. In this chapter,
we discussed several types of existing recommendation algorithms and focused
specifically on collaborative filtering, the technique that is most closely related
to the trust-enhanced approaches of the following chapters. We explained that
collaborative filtering has some interesting benefits, but also some weaknesses,
such as sparsity or susceptibility to attacks.
Throughout the following chapters, it will become clear how the incorporation
of trust and distrust can alleviate these shortcomings. Two of the most signif-
icant problems are the controversial items and cold start users, which will be
addressed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. The corresponding exper-
iments will be conducted on two data sets from Epinions.com. In this chapter,
we investigated the controversiality level of items in Epinions, illustrated that
classical controversiality measures are not sufficient, and proposed a new tech-
nique to detect Epinions’ true controversial items.
Thrust ivrybody — but cut th’ ca-ards.
Mr. Dooley’s Philosophy, 1900. Finley Peter Dunne
6 Trust & Distrust-BasedRecommendations
When a web application with a built-in recommender offers a social network-
ing component which enables its users to form a trust network, it can generate
more personalized recommendations by combining content from the user pro-
files (ratings) with direct and/or propagated and aggregated information from
the trust network. These are the so-called trust-enhanced recommendation sys-
tems. As we will explain later on, to be able to provide the users with enough
accurate recommendations, the system requires a trust network that consists of
a large number of users: the more connections a user has in the trust network,
the more recommendations can be generated. Furthermore, more trust con-
nections create more opportunity for qualitative or accurate recommendations.
Hence, it is important to trust as many users as possible. However, at the same
time, the trust connections you make should reflect your real opinion, other-
wise the recommendations will become less accurate. In other words, on the
one hand it is advisable to make many trust connections, but on the other hand
you need to pay enough attention to which people you really want to trust; in
some cases, even distrust can be beneficial for the quality of the recommenda-
tions you receive. Consequently, every user needs to find the right balance to
get the best out of a trust-based recommendation system.
In the following section, we explain in an informal way how the incorpora-
tion of trust and distrust can alleviate some of the major issues in recommender
systems. After our motivation, we continue the discussion in two parts: the first
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part covers the state of the art on trust-enhanced recommenders, a discussion of
our new algorithm, and a head-to-head comparison of their performance (Sec-
tions 6.2.1–6.2.4). In the second part, we explore the distrust-enhanced domain
just out of the cradle; we experimentally investigate several possibilities for in-
cluding distrust in the recommendation process (Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). We
conclude the chapter with a discussion of related issues (Section 6.4).
6.1 Motivation
In real life, a person who wants to avoid a bad deal may ask a friend (i.e., some-
one he trusts) what he thinks about a certain item i. If this friend does not
have an opinion about i, he can ask a friend of his, and so on until someone
with an opinion about i (i.e., a recommender) has been found. Trust-enhanced
recommender systems try to simulate this behavior, as depicted in Figure 6.1.1:
once a path to a recommender is found, the system can combine that recom-
mender’s judgment with available trust information (through trust propagation
and aggregation) to obtain a personalized recommendation. In this way, a trust
network allows to reach more users and more items.
In the collaborative filtering setting in Figure 6.1.2, users a and b will be linked
together because they have given similar ratings to certain items (among which
i1), and analogously, b and c can be linked together. Consequently, a prediction
of a’s interest in i2 can be made. But in this scenario there is no link between
a and i3 or, in other words, there is no way to find out whether i3 would be
a good recommendation for agent a. This situation might change when a trust
network has been established among the users of the recommender system. The
solid lines in Figure 6.1.2 denote trust relations between user a and user b, and
between b and user c. While in a scenario without a trust network a collabora-
tive filtering system is not able to generate a prediction about i3 for user a, this
could be solved in the trust-enhanced situation: if a expresses a certain level
of trust in b, and b in c, by propagation an indication of a’s trust in c can be
obtained. If the outcome indicates that agent a should highly trust c, then i3
might be a good recommendation for a, and will be highly ranked among the
other recommended items.
This simple example illustrates that augmenting a recommender system by
including trust relations can help in solving the sparsity problem. A trust-
enhanced system also alleviates the cold start problem: it has been shown that
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Figure 6.1.1: Recommending target
item i for target user a.
Figure 6.1.2: Recommendation of
items through trust relations.
by issuing a few trust statements, compared to a similar amount of rating infor-
mation, the system can generate more, and more accurate, recommendations
[91] (more on this topic in Chapter 7). Moreover, a web of trust can be used to
produce an indication about the trustworthiness of users and as such make the
system less vulnerable to malicious insiders: a simple copy-profile attack will
only be possible when the target user, or someone who is trusted by the target
user, has explicitly indicated that he trusts the adversary to a certain degree.
Finally, the functioning of a trust-enhanced system (e.g. the concept of trust
propagation) is intuitively more understandable for the users than the classi-
cal ‘black box’ approaches. A nice example is Golbeck’s FilmTrust system [42]
which asks its users to evaluate their acquaintances based on their movie taste,
and accordingly uses that information to generate personalized predictions.
The reason why trust-based recommendations work can partially be explained
by the effect of social influence and selection in social networks. The theory of
social influence states that users will behave more alike to users they interact
with (i.e., become more similar), while selection (or homophily) denotes the
process of forming relationships to people who are already similar. In other
words, there is an interaction between similarity and social (hence also trust)
relations. The two factors have been widely studied in sociology; nice literature
overviews can be found in, among others, [98] and [132].
Since nowadays more and more online social network data becomes avail-
able to researchers, also the web intelligence domain has started to investigate
this phenomenon; e.g., Ziegler and Golbeck used data sets from a movie and
book recommender system to show that there exists a positive correlation be-
tween trust relations and similarity [169]. However, they also claimed that trust
and similarity are not the same, and can be used complementary. This is also
illustrated by the study of Crandall et al. on data sets from Wikipedia and Live-
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Journal1: they showed that the similarity and social graphs often have not much
overlap (and hence cannot be regarded as similar concepts), and that both types
of data can be used as predictors of future behavior of a particular user [25];
in our context this means that both computed similarity and social ties can be
used in the recommendation process, each adding a different dimension to the
recommendation.
The trust- and distrust-enhanced algorithms that we will discuss in this chapter
work in a personalized, or ‘local’ way. Instead of taking into account all avail-
able trust connections in the network when estimating the trust in a particular
recommender (the ‘global’ way), they only rely on the part of the network that
is formed by putting the target user at the centre (also see Section 3.1). Let
us explain this with an analogy from a classical movie recommender system;
in a collaborative filtering algorithm the target user is also at the centre of the
network, since only the users that are similar to him take part in the recommen-
dation process. If you want to find out if you will like ‘The Godfather’ (one of
the best movies ever according to the users of the Internet Movie Database2),
then the predicted score probably will be the same whether the system just uses
an average of all scores for that movie, or a collaborative filtering algorithm
where only the scores of users similar to you are taken into account. However,
for more controversial movies such as ‘A Clockwork Orange’ or ‘Titanic’, collab-
orative filtering will be able to give you a much more accurate estimation than
a global average, because it is more tailored to your tastes.
Trust-enhanced recommenders work in a similar way as collaborative filter-
ing, only this time it is not the ratings from users that are close to the target user
in the similarity network that are used, but the ratings from the users that are in
the neighborhood of the target user according to the trust network. This local
and personalized approach is one of the main strengths of many trust-enhanced
recommender applications.
In this chapter, we will evaluate the performance of the recommendation algo-
rithms on both data sets from Epinions. A thorough description of the features of
the Epinions-products data set can be found in [94], for more information also
see Section 5.4.1. We refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 5.4.1, or [53], for a discussion
of the Epinions-reviews data set. Hence, besides a classical consumer goods
recommender system, we will also evaluate a review recommender system.
1A social network community with a focus on blogging, see www.livejournal.com
2See www.imdb.com/chart/top
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The research on review recommender systems attracts increasing attention,
since nowadays reviews are not only written by a select group of experts any-
more, but also by the customers themselves, think of Epinions, Amazon, or the
Internet Movie Database. A lot of applications try to help the users in finding the
best reviews by computing one global score for the review, for example Ama-
zon’s ‘x out of y people found the following review helpful’. Other applications
generate the global score by combining techniques from the text classification
area and opinion/sentiment analysis, see [37, 84] for some recent examples.
All of them illustrate that review recommendation is becoming an important
topic. However, a review that is helpful for one user is not necessarily equally
useful for another user; recall our rationale from the last paragraph. In other
words, trust-enhanced recommendation techniques can also be very useful in
the domain of review recommendation.
6.2 Trust-Enhanced Recommendations
All the aforementioned examples illustrate that establishing a trust network
among the users of a recommender system may contribute to its success. Hence,
unsurprisingly, some attempts in this direction have already been made, see for
example [41, 58, 77, 93, 106, 110, 115]. Trust-enhanced recommender sys-
tems can roughly be divided into two classes, according to the way the trust
values are obtained. In the following section, we give an overview of the state
of the art in trust-based systems, while in Section 6.2.2 we investigate their
applicability on real-world data sets. In Section 6.2.3 we compare them with
a new approach that combines aspects of collaborative filtering and its trust-
based variants, while in Section 6.2.4 we go more deeply into the effect of trust
propagation. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the notations we will use in the
remainder of this chapter.
6.2.1 State of the Art
The first group of trust-enhanced recommendation approaches uses information
coming from a trust network that is generated by the direct input of the users,
i.e., by explicitly issuing trust statements. Examples can be found in, among
others, [42, 58, 93]. Such a strategy allows to use trust propagation and ag-
gregation in the network to infer the final trust values that are needed in the
recommender algorithm. On the other hand, the second group does not require
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the users to estimate the trust in their acquaintances. Instead, trust values are
computed automatically. If no explicit trust information is given, one must rely
on other information that is available, which are most often the ratings. Con-
sequently similarity will usually play a role in the trust computation, but not
completely determine the trust estimation process (other non-similarity factors
also play a role). E.g., trust can be based on a user’s history of making reli-
able recommendations [77], in which an extra dimension is added to the trust
computation by taking into account the interpretation of a rating by the target
user, or based on transitivity rules for user-to-user similarity (adding an extra
dimension by including transitivity) [110].
In the behavioral literature, the concept of trust is well defined; see for example
Mayer et al.’s framework in which ability, benevolence, integrity and propensity
to trust are determined as its key factors [95], or McAllister’s work that distin-
guishes between cognition-based and affect-based trust [96]. However, in the
recommendation research area, trust is often used as an umbrella term for a
wide range of relationships between people, especially when dealing with auto-
matic computation of trust values. In these cases, trust is being used to denote a
variety of concepts, ranging from perceived similarity of tastes, over reputation,
to the assessment of a user’s competence. In Section 6.4 we discuss this in more
detail; in this section, we focus on the basics of both strategies (i.e., mining
a trust network and automatic computation of trust values), and illustrate the
techniques with representative work in each class.
6.2.1.1 Mining a Trust Network
The most common trust-enhanced recommender strategies ask their users to
explicitly issue trust statements about other users. Take for instance Moleskiing
[90], a ski mountaineering community site which uses Friend Of A Friend-files3
that contain trust information on a scale from 1 to 9 [45], or the e-commerce site
Epinions.com which ranks reviews based on a trust network that it maintains
by asking its users to indicate which members they trust (i.e., their personal
web of trust) or distrust (block list). Another well-known example is Golbeck’s
FilmTrust [42], an online social network combined with a movie rating and
review system in which users are asked to evaluate their acquaintances’ movie
tastes on a scale from 1 to 10.
3FOAF-files are machine readable documents describing basic properties of a person, including
links between the person and objects/people they interact with.
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All these systems exploit the relations in the trust network to determine which
opinions or ratings should weigh more or less in the recommendation process.
In other words, this group of algorithms uses the trust estimates (obtained by
propagation and aggregation) as weights in the decision process. This weight-
ing can be done in several ways. In this section, we focus on the two most
commonly used strategies, namely classical weighted average and adaptations
of the collaborative filtering mechanism, and illustrate each of them with one
well-known state of the art implementation.
In a recommender system without a trust network, a simple recommendation
algorithm that needs to estimate how well a target user will like a target item
i can compute the average rating for i by taking into account the ratings ru,i
from all the system’s users u who are already familiar with i; see Definition 5.1.
This baseline recommendation strategy can be refined by computing a trust-
based weighted mean. In particular, by including trust values ta,u that reflect the
degree to which the raters u are trusted, the algorithm allows to differentiate
between the sources. In fact, it is only natural to assign more weight to ratings
of highly trusted users; the formula is given in Definition 6.1.
Definition 6.1 (Trust-based weighted mean). The unknown rating for target
item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i =
∑
u∈RT
ta,uru,i∑
u∈RT
ta,u
,
with RT the set of users who evaluated i and for whom the trust value ta,u is
greater than or equal to α.
Since there is not always direct trust information available for a particular cou-
ple of agents, we need trust metrics to compute a trust estimate for them.
The formula in Definition 6.1 is at the heart of Golbeck et al.’s recommenda-
tion algorithm [41]. The novelty of this algorithm mainly lies in the way the
trust estimates ta,u are inferred, by means of a trust metric that they have called
TidalTrust. In [44], the authors give an overview of the observations that have
lead to the development of TidalTrust. In each experiment, they ignored an
existing trust relation from a user a to a user u, and focused on all paths that
connect a to u. In short, by comparing the propagated trust results from these
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paths with the original, hidden, trust value, they noticed that (1) shorter propa-
gation paths yield more accurate trust estimates, and that (2) paths containing
higher trust values yield better results too.
Hence, taking into account the first observation, only allowing shorter paths
should yield the best results. However, in some cases only a few users will
be reachable if a limit is set on the path length. This trade-off is incorporated
through a variable path length limit: the shortest path length that is needed to
connect the target user a with a user u that has rated the target item i (i.e.,
a rater) becomes the path depth of the algorithm. This can be achieved by
performing a breadth-first search from a until the level is reached on which
at least one user can be found who has rated i; the algorithm then knows all
the shortest paths from a to users on that level who have rated i. Note that
this process requires a central authority and that the depth of the breadth-first
search varies from one computation to another.
One way of addressing the second observation (higher trust values on the
path yield better trust estimates) is to limit the information such that only the
most trusted users are taken into account. However, every user has his own
behavior for issuing trust values (one user may give the maximum value quite
often while another one never does), and in addition, it will often be the case
that only a few paths contain the same high trust value. This is why it is dif-
ficult in practice to set a static threshold, so instead, thresholds are chosen dy-
namically: Golbeck et al. opted to incorporate a value that represents the path
strength (i.e., the minimum trust rating on a path leading to the user who is
connected with u), and to compute the maximum path strength over all paths
leading to the raters. This maximum (max) is then chosen as the minimum
trust threshold for participation in the process. In other words, TidalTrust only
takes into account the shortest, strongest paths.
Definition 6.2 (TidalTrust). The trust value from target user a in user u is esti-
mated recursively as
ta,u =
∑
v∈WOT+(a)
ta,v · tv,u∑
v∈WOT+(a)
ta,v
,
with WOT+(a) the set of users in WOT (a) for whom a’s trust statement is greater
than or equal to the given threshold max. If WOT+(a) is empty, then ta,u = 0.
TidalTrust consists of two phases; the pseudocode is given in Algorithm 6.1. In
the first phase (lines 1 to 20), as explained above, the central authority performs
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Algorithm 6.1 TidalTrust for trust prediction from user a to user u.
1: for each user u do PathStrength[u] = −1, PathStrength[a]=1;
2: maxDepth =∞, depth=1, add a to queue
3: while queue not empty and depth ≤ maxDepth do
4: x=queue.dequeue, push x on stack
5: if x and u are not adjacent then
6: for each user i adjacent to x do
7: add i to next level queue if i is not yet visited
8: if next level queue contains i then
9: strength = min(PathStrength[x], tx,i)
10: PathStrength[i] = max(PathStrength[i], strength)
11: end if
12: end for
13: else
14: maxDepth = depth, strength = PathStrength[x]
15: PathStrength[u] = max(PathStrength[u], strength)
16: end if
17: if queue is empty then
18: queue = next level queue, next level queue=new queue, depth++
19: end if
20: end while
21:
22: for each user u do trust to sink[u] = −1
23: while maxDepth!=MAX and stack is not empty do
24: v=stack.pop . if maxDepth =∞ then ta,u = 0
25: if v is adjacent to u then
26: trust to sink[v] = tv,u
27: else
28: numerator=denominator=0
29: for each user i adjacent to v do
30: if tv,i ≥ PathStrength[u] and trust to sink[i]! = −1 then
31: numerator+ = tv,i ∗ trust to sink[i], denumerator+ = tv,i
32: end if
33: end for
34: if denumerator > 0 then
35: trust to sink[v] = numerator/denumerator
36: end if
37: end if
38: end while
39: ta,u = trust to sink[a] . if trust to sink[a] = −1 then ta,u = 0
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a breadth-first search to find all users v on the shortest paths leading to i; as
it is breadth-first, the algorithm uses a queue (first in first out). During the
search, the central authority computes the max threshold (represented in the
code by PathStrength[u]; all other entries of the array contain intermediate
results). In the second phase (lines 22-39), the actual trust estimate ta,u is
computed recursively as the weighted mean of trust values tv,u for all users v
that are a first link on a shortest path from a (the ‘source’) to u (the ‘sink’),
as in the formula in Definition 6.2. An additional restriction is that only trust
information that is at least as high as max is taken into account. Remark that
the algorithm uses a stack for the second algorithm (last in first out structure)
to implement the linking from the sink back to the source.
Note that the first phase is a forward movement (‘wave’) which requires a
central authority, while the second phase is implemented as a backward FATP
(see Section 4.1) wave in which agents can have more autonomy. The name
TidalTrust was chosen because calculations sweep forward from a to u in the
trust network, and then pull back from u to return the final trust value to a [41].
Example 6.1. Figure 6.2.1 depicts an example of a trust network, in which one
needs to compute a recommendation for target user a and target item i. The upper
path will not take part in the computation because it is longer than the shortest
path to item i (of length 3); consequently, ta,u need not be computed. Among the
other three paths, only the two lowest will contribute to the final recommenda-
tion, because max = max(min(0.8, 0.2), min(0.5, 0.8),min(0.5, 0.7)) = 0.5 and
the path strength of the second path is merely 0.2. The trust value ta,w is hence
computed as
ta,h · th,w + ta,j · tj,w
ta,h + ta,j
=
0.5 ·
(
0.8·ty,w
0.8
)
+ 0.5 ·
(
0.7·tk,w
0.7
)
0.5 + 0.5
=
0.5 · 0.5 + 0.5 · 0.9
1.0
= 0.7
TidalTrust belongs to the class of gradual trust approaches and is an example of
a local trust metric. Golbeck et al. have shown that using trust-based weighted
mean in combination with TidalTrust does not necessarily offer a general benefit
over computing the average or applying collaborative filtering, but that it does
yield significantly more accurate recommendations for users who disagree with
the average rating for a specific item (see for example [41, 44]).
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Figure 6.2.1: Example of a trust network for generating a recommendation for
target user a w.r.t. target item i.
Whereas Golbeck et al.’s approach is an example of a weighted average im-
plementation, another class of trust-enhanced systems is tied more closely to
the collaborative filtering algorithm; see Section 5.2 for the details of collabo-
rative filtering. As in Definition 5.2, the weights for the neighbors are most
often determined by Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. However, instead of a
correlation-based computation of the weights, one can also infer the weights
through the relations of the target user in the trust network (again through
propagation and aggregation); see the formula in Definition 6.3 which adapts
Definition 5.2 by replacing the similarity correlation weights wa,u by the trust
values ta,u. This strategy is also supported by the fact that trust and similarity
are correlated, as shown in [169].
Definition 6.3 (Trust-based collaborative filtering). The unknown rating for tar-
get item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT
ta,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT
ta,u
We call this alternative trust-based collaborative filtering. Note that, because the
weights are not equal to the PCC, this procedure can produce out of bounds
results. When this is the case, pa,i is rounded to the nearest possible rating.
Definition 6.3 is at the basis of Massa et al.’s recommendation algorithm which
incorporates a new trust metric, called MoleTrust [92]; see Algorithm 6.2 for its
pseudocode. The trust metric consists of two phases. In the first stage (lines
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Algorithm 6.2 MoleTrust for target user a, horizon d and trust threshold α;
adapted from [92].
1: dist=0, users[dist] = a
2: add a to modified trust network
3: while dist < d do
4: dist++
5: users[dist]=users adjacent to users[dist− 1] and not yet visited
6: for each user b from users[dist] do
7: add b to modified trust network
8: add all edges from users[dist− 1] to b to modified trust network
9: end for
10: end while
11:
12: dist = 1, ta,a = 1, ∀u ∈ users[1]: ta,u = trust statement issued by a
13: while dist < d do
14: dist++
15: for each user u in users[dist] do
16: predecessors=users v for whom tv,u ≥ α inmodified trust network
17: ta,u =
∑
v∈predecessors ta,v · tv,u∑
v∈predecessors ta,v
18: end for
19: end while
1 to 10), cycles in the trust network are removed during a search in which all
users are stored (in the array users) according to their distance dist from user a,
while the second stage includes the actual trust computation (propagation and
aggregation) based on the cycle free modified trust network (lines 12 to 19).
An example of a cycle is ta,b, tb,c and tc,a. In this case, the last trust state-
ment should be removed, since the problem created by cycles is that, during a
search in the network, a would be visited over and over again until the prop-
agation horizon is reached, see below. Massa et al. acknowledge that this step
removes trust statements that can be informative, but claim that the technique
is acceptable because of time-efficiency. After the removal of the cycles, the
prediction for a particular ta,u can then be obtained by performing a simple
breadth-first search: first the users at distance 1 (i.e., users who are directly
trusted by a) are looked up (see users[1] in the pseudocode), while their trust
value is fetched (i.e., direct trust information), then the users at distance 2
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(users who are trusted by users who a trusts) who are not at distance 1 are
looked up (in users[2]), etcetera. Note that like this, MoleTrust ensures that
only the shortest paths from a to another user are taken into account.
While the first phase consists of the search and storage of the users, the
second phase deals with the computation of the trust estimates in users on dis-
tances m > 1. The trust in the users at distance 2 or more is calculated in a
way similar to TidalTrust, in the sense that it is also a weighted mean-based
algorithm. However, the details of the implementation differ significantly. In
TidalTrust, a user v is added to WOT+(a) only if he is on a shortest path from
target user a to target item i. On the other hand, in MoleTrust, WOT+(a) in-
cludes all users who have rated the target item and who can be reached through
a direct or propagated trust relation. But trust is not computed for all eternity:
before the computation begins, one must assign a value d to the ‘propagation
horizon’ parameter. Like this, only users who are reachable within distance d
are taken into account (i.e., are stored and their trust estimate is computed).
Another important input parameter of MoleTrust is the trust threshold α for par-
ticipation in the process (unlike the dynamic max value in TidalTrust), which
is e.g. set to 0.6 (on a scale from 0 to 1) in the experiments reported in [92].
These parameters lead to the following formula [90]:
Definition 6.4 (MoleTrust). The trust value from target user a in user u is esti-
mated as
ta,u =
∑
v∈WOT+(a)
ta,v · tv,u∑
v∈WOT+(a)
ta,v
,
with WOT+(a) the set of users for whom a’s trust statement or previously com-
puted trust estimate is greater than or equal to a given threshold α and who are
within distance of trust horizon d. If there is no such path, then ta,u = 0.
As explained above, MoleTrust works with a central authority and starts with a
breadth-first search phase to find all shortest paths for every user u within the
trust horizon d who has rated i. In the second phase, the trust values ta,u are
computed as the weighted mean of trust values tv,u for all users v for whom the
trust value ta,v is directly available, or, if not, the trust estimate ta,v has already
been computed; only trust information that is at least as high as α is taken into
account. In other words, the second phase in MoleTrust is implemented as a for-
ward movement (as opposed to the backward, recursive, wave in TidalTrust):
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a trust estimation in a particular user on distance m > 1 must only be com-
puted (and stored) once; this estimate is then used for the computation of trust
estimations in users on distance m+ 1.
Example 6.2. Let us again take a look at Figure 6.2.1, and suppose that the trust
horizon d is set to 5 and α = 0.5. Then u is just within distance of the propagation
horizon d, and hence ta,u will be computed: ta,u = (ta,e · 0.8)/ta,e = · · · = 0.8.
Of the three paths leading to w, only the bottom two will take part in the actual
computation because on the upper path one of the trust relations is lower than α
(0.2 < 0.5). The trust estimation ta,w is then computed as (assuming that ta,h,
ta,j , ta,y and ta,k have already been computed) ta,w = 0.8·0.5+0.7·0.91.5 ≈ 0.69.
For environments where only bivalent trust ratings are available, Definition 6.4
always yields ta,u = 1 if there is a path within distance of the trust horizon.
Therefore, instead of the original MoleTrust implementation, Massa et al. pro-
pose to use a horizon-based technique to introduce gradual trust values into the
algorithm [91]:
Definition 6.5 (Horizon-based MoleTrust). The trust value from target user a in
user u at distance n is estimated as
ta,u =
d− n+ 1
d
,
if n ≤ d. If u is not reachable within distance d from a, then ta,u = 0.
Note that, analogous to TidalTrust, MoleTrust and horizon-based MoleTrust be-
long to the class of gradual local trust metrics. In their experiments, Massa
and Avesani have illustrated that MoleTrust provides better trust estimates than
global trust metrics such as eBay’s4, especially when it comes down to estimat-
ing the trust in controversial users (who are trusted by one group and distrusted
by another) [92]. They also showed that MoleTrust yields more accurate predic-
tions for cold start users, compared to a classical collaborative filtering system
[89, 91].
Golbeck et al.’s and Massa et al.’s approach are two typical examples of trust-
enhanced recommender techniques that use explicit trust information. Table
6.2 summarizes their most prominent characteristics. Another recommenda-
tion approach that also mines a trust network can be found e.g. in [58] which
4www.ebay.com
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presents a recommender system for research papers; it is similar to Golbeck et
al.’s approach, but also takes into account a document reference network.
6.2.1.2 Automatic Trust Generation
The algorithms discussed in the previous section require explicit trust input
from the users. As a consequence, the applications that use such an algorithm
must provide a means to obtain the necessary information; think for example of
FilmTrust or Moleskiing. However, this might not always be possible or feasible.
In such cases, methods that automatically infer trust estimates, without need-
ing explicit trust information, might be a better solution. An example of such a
system can be found in [107].
Most commonly, these approaches base their trust generation mechanism on
the past rating behavior of the users in the system. More specifically, deciding
to what degree a particular user should participate in the recommendation pro-
cess is influenced by his history of delivering accurate recommendations. Let us
exemplify this with the well-known approach of O’Donovan et al. [106].
Our intuition tells us that a user who has made a lot of good recommenda-
tions in the past can be viewed as more trustworthy than other users who per-
formed less well. To be able to select the most trustworthy users in the system,
O’Donovan et al. introduced two trust metrics, viz. profile-level and item-level
trust, reflecting the general trustworthiness of a particular user u, and the trust-
worthiness of a user u with respect to a particular item i, respectively. Both trust
metrics consist of a computation of the correctness of u’s recommendations. In
particular, a prediction pa,i that is generated only by information coming from
u (hence u is the sole recommender) is considered correct if pa,i is within  of
a’s actual rating ra,i.
The profile-level trust tPu for u is then defined as the percentage of correct
recommendations that u contributed. Remark that this is a very general trust
measure; in practice it will often occur that u performs better in recommending
a set of specific items. To this aim, O’Donovan et al. also proposed the more fine-
grained item-level trust tiu, which measures the percentage of recommendations
for item i that were correct. Hence, in such automated approaches, trust values
are not generated via trust propagation and aggregation, but are based on the
ratings that were given in the past. Remark that O’Donovan et al.’s methods are
global trust metrics; there is no personal bias w.r.t. target user a involved. The
way the values are obtained can be seen as probabilistic, i.e., the trust value
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represents the probability that the recommendation will be correct (within ).
Similar to other trust-enhanced techniques, the values that are obtained through
the trust metric are used as weights in the recommendation process. Just like
Massa et al., O’Donovan et al. focus on trust-based adaptations of collaborative
filtering. An alternative to Massa et al.’s scheme is to use trust values as a filter,
so that only the most trustworthy neighbors participate in the recommendation
process. This strategy is called trust-based filtering [106]:
Definition 6.6 (Trust-based filtering). The unknown rating for target item i and
target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT+
wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT+
wa,u
,
in which wa,u denotes the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient and RT+ = RT ∩ R+,
with R+ the set of neighbors of a with a positive correlation coefficient, and RT
the set of users whose item/profile-level trust is greater than or equal to a given
threshold α.
Note that this algorithm does not involve trust propagation or aggregation due
to the global way of computing the trust values. In the next section, we will use
the trust-based filtering framework (i.e., the formula in Definition 6.6), but ex-
periment with another trust metric (i.e., another, local, implementation of RT ).
In [106], O’Donovan and Smyth showed that trust-based filtering achieves bet-
ter accuracy than collaborative filtering in terms of average errors. The algo-
rithm based on profile-level trust yields lower errors than collaborative filtering
in nearly 70% of all prediction cases. O’Donovan et al’s method is a represen-
tative example in the group of strategies that use automatic trust generation. A
related approach can be found in [77], which works with an utilitarian measure
instead of a binary correctness function.
6.2.2 Empirical Comparison
One question that stands out is which of the state of the art approaches dis-
cussed above performs best in practice. Basically, so far, researchers in the trust-
based recommender field introduced their own new algorithms and evaluated
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these on their own applications and/or data sets, without including a compari-
son of other trust-enhanced approaches based on the same data set/application.
Therefore, we provide a head-to-head comparison of the performance that the
previously discussed trust-enhanced techniques can achieve on one and the
same data set.
We focus on Golbeck et al.’s trust-based weighted mean with TidalTrust (Def-
initions 6.1 and 6.2), Massa’s trust-based collaborative filtering with horizon-
based MoleTrust (Definitions 6.3 and 6.5), and O’Donovan et al.’s trust-based fil-
tering (Definition 6.6). Since our goal is to compare all techniques on the same
data sets and to investigate the influence of trust propagation, we have chosen
not to implement O’Donovan et al.’s automatic trust generation strategy, but to
mine the same trust network as the other two strategies. Although O’Donovan
et al. do not use trust propagation and aggregation in their experiments [106],
it is of course possible to do so. Since there is no explicit use of trust values in
Definition 6.6, we only need to specify how propagation and aggregation en-
large RT+ = RT ∩ R+: we choose to add a user u to RT if ta,u is greater than
or equal to the threshold α, with ta,u computed as in Definition 6.4.
As discussed in Section 6.1, the data sets we use in our experiments are ob-
tained from Epinions.com; in the context of the Epinions-reviews data set, an
item denotes a review of consumer goods, whereas for the Epinons-products
data set an item denotes a consumer product. Both reviews and products are
rated on a scale from 1 to 5. We focus on the coverage and accuracy of the
algorithms for controversial items, which are the most challenging for a recom-
mender system. To this aim, we use the methodology described in Section 5.4.3.
To compare the performance achieved for controversial items (CIs) with the per-
formance that can be obtained in general, we also present the average coverage
and accuracy for 1 416 and 266 randomly selected ‘popular’ items (RIs) (that
have been evaluated at least 20 times, analogous to the controversial items).
Epinions also allows users to evaluate other users based on the quality of
their reviews, and to provide trust and distrust evaluations in addition to rat-
ings. The fact that both data sets contain explicit trust information from the
users makes them very appropriate to study issues in trust-enhanced recom-
mender systems. Users can evaluate other users by including them in their
WOT (i.e. a list of reviewers whose reviews and ratings were consistently found
to be valuable5), or by putting them in their block list (a list of authors whose
reviews were consistently found to be offensive, inaccurate or low quality5, thus
5See www.epinions.com/help/faq/
138 6 Trust & Distrust-Based Recommendations
indicating distrust). In the Epinions-reviews data set, the trust evaluations make
up an Epinions WOT graph consisting of 114 222 users and 717 129 non self-
referring trust relations6. The Epinions-products data set contains information
on 49 288 users who issued or received 487 003 trust statements in total.
Note that the data sets only contain bivalent trust values, hence in our ex-
periments ta,u in Definitions 6.1, 6.3 and 6.6 can take on the values 0 (absence
of trust) and 1 (full presence) only. This limitation leads to alterations of some
of the trust-based algorithms; e.g., the choice for the threshold α in Definitions
6.1, 6.3 and 6.6 is irrelevant, and the formula in Definition 6.1 reduces to the
classical average. Furthermore, in practice, for the Epinions data sets, Defini-
tion 6.2 and 6.4 become binary propagation strategies: if a user appears directly
in the web of trust of target user a, or if he can be reached from a by a trust
propagation path, then trust weight ta,u = 1 is assigned to that user.
6.2.2.1 Coverage
Coverage refers to the number of (target user,target item) pairs for which a pre-
diction can be generated, see Definition 5.5 for its implementation in a leave-
one-out experiment. For Definition 5.2 we call pa,i computable if there is at least
one user u who rated i and for whom the Pearson’s correlation coefficient wa,u
can be calculated, while for Definitions 6.1 and 6.3 a computable pa,i means
that there is at least one user u who has rated i and for whom the (propagated
and aggregated) trust estimate ta,u can be calculated. Finally, for Definition 6.6,
predictions are possible when at least one user u is found who has rated i, and
for whom both ta,u and wa,u can be computed.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the coverage (% COV) for controversial items and
randomly selected items in the Epinions-reviews and -products data sets. The
first four rows cover baseline strategies (B1)–(B4). The first baseline strategy
is a system that always predicts 5/5 (B1), since this is the predominant score
for items in Epinions. The second system computes the average received rating
for the target item (B2), while the third one yields the average rating given by
target user a (B3). The latter method will score well in a system where the users
have a rating behavior with little variation. Finally, the last baseline returns a
random score between 1 and 5 (B4).
In general, baselines (B1), (B2) and (B4) achieve maximal coverage for both
6The data set also contains 15% distrust relations. In this section we focus on the trust relations;
we deal with the distrust part in Section 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Performance of trust-based recommender algorithms on the Epinions-
reviews data set; MAE and RMSE ∈ [0, 4].
Controversial items (CIs) Randomly selected items (RIs)
ALGORITHM % COV MAE RMSE % COV MAE RMSE
(B1) Base: score 5 100 1.45 1.96 100 0.16 0.51
(B2) Base: average score for item 100 1.25 1.34 100 0.18 0.40
(B3) Base: average score of user 99 1.23 1.58 100 0.36 0.50
(B4) Base: random score 100 1.61 2.02 100 1.92 2.37
(5.2) Collaborative filtering with R+ 94 0.96 1.13 98 0.19 0.38
(6.1) Trust-based weighted mean 63 0.86 1.20 89 0.13 0.35
(6.3) Trust-based collaborative filtering 63 0.87 1.16 89 0.17 0.35
(6.6) Trust-based filtering 60 0.86 1.16 86 0.16 0.36
(6.7) EnsembleTrustCF 94 0.94 1.11 99 0.19 0.38
(P1) Propagated trust-based weighted mean 88 0.91 1.22 97 0.15 0.38
(P3) Propagated trust-based CF 88 0.99 1.16 97 0.19 0.37
(P66) Propagated trust-based filtering 84 0.94 1.13 96 0.18 0.36
(P7a) Prop. 1 EnsembleTrustCF 96 1.00 1.16 99 0.20 0.38
(P7b) Prop. 2 EnsembleTrustCF 94 0.96 1.12 99 0.19 0.38
Table 6.4: Performance of trust-based recommender algorithms on the Epinions-
products data set; MAE and RMSE ∈ [0, 4].
Controversial items (CIs) Randomly selected items (RIs)
ALGORITHM % COV MAE RMSE % COV MAE RMSE
(B1) Base: score 5 100 1.94 2.46 100 1.05 1.62
(B2) Base: average score for item 100 1.35 1.51 100 0.82 1.06
(B3) Base: average score of user 98 1.43 1.78 99 0.95 1.22
(B4) Base: random score 100 1.66 2.08 100 1.68 2.10
(5.2) Collaborative filtering with R+ 81 1.34 1.58 79 0.84 1.12
(6.1) Trust-based weighted mean 41 1.33 1.70 34 0.87 1.24
(6.3) Trust-based collaborative filtering 40 1.32 1.65 34 0.86 1.19
(6.6) Trust-based filtering 25 1.35 1.71 22 0.85 1.18
(6.7) EnsembleTrustCF 84 1.32 1.57 81 0.83 1.11
(P1) Propagated trust-based weighted mean 76 1.37 1.69 72 0.90 1.23
(P3) Propagated trust-based CF 76 1.32 1.56 72 0.84 1.12
(P6) Propagated trust-based filtering 57 1.36 1.64 53 0.86 1.16
(P7a) Prop. 1 EnsembleTrustCF 90 1.32 1.55 88 0.82 1.09
(P7b) Prop. 2 EnsembleTrustCF 84 1.32 1.57 81 0.83 1.11
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controversial and randomly selected items: (B1) and (B4) do not rely on any
additional (trust or correlation) information, and since the items in our exper-
iments are evaluated at least 20 times, it is always possible to compute (B2).
With (B3), in those cases in which the target user rated only one item, his aver-
age rating is lacking, so a prediction cannot be generated.
For the other algorithms in the tables, the numbers in the first column refer to
the corresponding recommendation formulas and definitions. For collaborative
filtering, we take into account neighbors which have a positive correlation coef-
ficient (i.e., the users that belong to the R+ set7), since this is the most often ap-
plied (and most agreed upon) approach in practice. For the trust-enhanced ap-
proaches, we distinguish between experiments that do not use propagated trust
information (higher rows) and those that do (bottom rows). We only consider
one-step propagation; we focus on longer paths in Section 6.2.4. The Ensem-
bleTrustCF algorithm and its results will be discussed in detail in Section 6.2.3.
Without trust propagation (and consequently also aggregation), it is clear
that the coverage of the CF algorithm is superior to that of the others, and ap-
proaches the maximal value. This is due to the fact that correlation information
is, in general, more readily available than direct trust information: there are
normally more users for whom a positive correlation with the target user a can
be computed than users in a’s web of trust. On the other hand, trust-based fil-
tering (6.6), which also uses correlation-based weights, is the most demanding
strategy because it requires users in a’s web of trust who have already rated two
other items in common with a (otherwise the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
can not be computed). In between these extremes, the coverage for Golbeck et
al.’s approach (6.1) is a bit higher than that of Massa et al.’s (6.3) because the
latter can only generate predictions for target users who have rated at least two
items, otherwise the average rating for the target user cannot be computed).
This ranking of approaches in terms of coverage still applies when prop-
agated/aggregated trust information is taken into account, but note that the
difference with collaborative filtering has shrunk considerably. In particular,
thanks to trust propagation, the coverage increases with about 25% (10%) for
controversial (randomly selected) items in the Epinions-reviews data set, and
more than 30% in the Epinions-products data set.
For the Epinions-reviews data set, the coverage results for controversial items
are significantly lower than those for randomly selected items. This is due to
7Results for R are discussed in Section 6.3.2.
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the fact that, on average, controversial items in this data set receive less ratings
than randomly selected items, which yields less leave-one-out experiments per
item, but also a smaller chance that such an item was rated by a user with whom
the target user a has a positive correlation, or by a user that a trusts. This also
explains the lower coverage results for the nontrivial recommendation strate-
gies. The same observations cannot be made for the Epinions-products data
set : on average, the CIs receive more ratings than the RIs (21 131 vs. 12 741
vs. experiments). This explains the somewhat lower coverage performance of
the algorithms for the random items.
Also remark that the coverage results for the Epinions-products data set are
significantly lower in general than those for the reviews data set; the three trust-
enhanced algorithms only achieve a coverage that is at least 20% worse. Users
in the reviews data set rate much more items than users in the products data set,
which yields less users who have rated the same items, i.e., neighbors (through
trust or correlation) that are needed in the computation.
6.2.2.2 Accuracy
As with coverage, the accuracy of a recommender system is typically assessed
by using the leave-one-out method, more in particular by determining the de-
viation between the hidden ratings and the predicted ratings. In particular, we
use the mean absolute error (MAE) and root mean squared error (RMSE) as in
Definition 5.4. Since reviews and products are rated on a scale from 1 to 5, the
extreme values that MAE and RMSE can reach are 0 and 4. Even small improve-
ments in RMSE are considered valuable in the context of recommender systems.
For example, the Netflix prize competition8 offered a $1 000 000 reward for a
reduction of the RMSE by 10%.
The MAE and RMSE reported in Table 6.3 are overall higher for the contro-
versial items than for the randomly selected items. In other words, generating
good predictions for controversial items is much harder than for randomly cho-
sen items. This applies to all the algorithms, but most clearly to the baseline
strategies (except (B4)). While in the Epinions-products data set all algorithms
adjust themselves in more or less the same way, in the reviews data set (B1) and
(B2) clearly experience more difficulties when generating predictions for con-
troversial items: whereas for random items they are competitive with collabo-
rative filtering and the trust-enhanced approaches, their MAE and RMSE on the
controversial item set increase with more than 1 on the rating scale from 1 to 5.
8See www.netflixprize.com/
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Also note that it is more difficult to generate good recommendations in the
products data set than in the reviews data set, for controversial as well as RIs.
This is due to the higher inherent controversiality level of the former data set.
When focusing on the MAE of the nontrivial approaches for controversial items,
we notice that, without propagation and aggregation, trust-enhanced approaches
all yield better results than collaborative filtering (with one exception for trust-
based filtering on the product controversial items), which is in accordance with
the observations made in [41, 89]. This can be attributed to the accuracy/cov-
erage trade-off: a coverage increase is usually at the expense of accuracy, and
vice versa. It also becomes clear when taking into account trust propagation
and aggregation: as the coverage of the trust-enhanced algorithms nears that of
the collaborative filtering algorithm, so do the MAEs.
However, the RMSEs give us a different picture. On the controversial item
sets, the RMSE of the trust-enhanced approaches is generally higher than that of
collaborative filtering, which does not always occur on the random sets; recall
that a higher RMSE means that more large prediction errors occur. One possible
explanation for this is the fact that, for controversial items, the set RT of trusted
acquaintances that have rated the target item is too small (e.g., contains only 1
user), and in particular smaller than R+. This hypothesis is also supported by
the fact that with trust propagation (which enlarges RT ) RMSEs rise at a slower
rate than the corresponding MAEs. Moreover, it is often the case that the prop-
agated algorithms achieve lower RMSEs than their unpropagated counterparts,
see e.g. the results on controversial items in the Epinions-products data set.
The experiments on both Epinions data sets, each with their own character-
istics, endorse the same conclusions. For random items, intelligent strategies
such as collaborative filtering and trust-based algorithms barely outperform the
baselines. However, the baselines fall short in generating good recommenda-
tions for controversial items. Trust-enhanced systems perform better in this
respect, although there is certainly still room for improvement; remember the
higher RMSEs and the fact that trust-based approaches on product CIs yield no
visible improvements over collaborative filtering. These findings call for further
research on improving the algorithms and identifying specific cases where trust
approaches are effective (think e.g. of Massa et al.’s results for cold start users).
The coverage and accuracy results show no clear winner among the three
state of the art trust-enhanced strategies proposed by Golbeck et al., Massa et
al., and O’Donovan et al. Trust-based collaborative filtering seems to score best
on the Epinions-products data set, while trust-based weighted mean and trust-
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based filtering achieve the best accuracy on the Epinions-reviews data set; this
trend is also confirmed by the results obtained by propagation.
6.2.3 Combining Trust- and Collaborative-Based Recommen-
dations
It has been demonstrated that including trust in the recommendation process
can significantly improve the accuracy, see for example [41, 89]; this is illus-
trated by the second part of Table 6.3 (only direct information, no propagation).
On the other hand, the coverage of the trust-enhanced algorithms remains lower
than the collaborative filtering algorithm. One way of mending this is by using
trust propagation, but we have seen that then also the accuracy errors increase.
Another way is to maximize the synergy between collaborative filtering and its
trust-based variants; to this aim, we propose the following new algorithm. Note
that it is a recommendation framework (just as Definitions 6.1, 6.3 and 6.6),
and no trust metric (as Definitions 6.2 and 6.4); possible implementations for
the trust metric are discussed later on in this section.
Definition 6.7 (EnsembleTrustCF). The unknown rating for target item i and
target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT ta,u(ru,i − ru) +
∑
u∈R+\RT wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT ta,u +
∑
u∈R+\RT wa,u
,
with ta,u and wa,u denoting resp. the trust and correlation between users a and u.
The rationale behind this strategy, which combines the classic and the trust-
based9 collaborative filtering approach, is that users should not necessarily be
excluded from the recommendation process just because no positive correlation
can be computed. They may very well have valuable information that can con-
tribute to the recommendation; recall our discussion about similarity and trust
being two different sources of useful information. To this aim, we take into ac-
count all possible ways to obtain a positive weight for a user who has rated the
target item, favoring a trust relation over a correlation-based one. In particular,
if a user can be reached by a direct or indirect trust relation, we use this value in-
stead of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient to obtain the user’s weight. In this
way, we retain the accuracy benefit by first looking at the trusted users, while
9Hence, this method can also produce out of bounds results.
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on the other hand the coverage can increase by taking into account neighbors
for whom no trust information is available. This new strategy is guaranteed to
perform as least as well as collaborative filtering and trust-based collaborative
filtering in terms of coverage, and in many cases will outperform both.
The results for EnsembleTrustCF can be found in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. The middle
parts contain the results for direct trust information. Of all algorithms, Ensem-
bleTrustCF is the most flexible when it comes down to coverage, since having
either some trust or a positive correlation is sufficient to make a prediction; it
matches or outperforms the other algorithms, for controversial as well as ran-
dom items. In particular, note that it achieves at least as much coverage as col-
laborative filtering, while the accuracy even increases a little bit (MAE as well
as RMSE decrease); favoring trust over computed similarity has a positive effect
on the quality of the recommendations, although the approaches that only take
into account trust (trust-based CF and weighted mean) still perform better in
the case of the reviews data set in terms of accuracy; their coverage, however, is
a lot worse. Also note that the coverage of the unpropagated EnsembleTrustCF
remains higher than the coverage of the propagated trust-enhanced strategies.
With respect to trust propagation and aggregation, there are several possibilities
to extend EnsembleTrustCF. The first approach is to use a weighted mean-based
algorithm as in Definition 6.4. Recall that for the Epinions data sets, this leads
to ta,u = 1 if u is directly or indirectly trusted. In other words, all members
of the propagated WOT of a are ‘boosted’ in comparison to the other users for
whom the correlation coefficient (normally lower than 1) is used.
The second method assigns gradual propagated trust weights as in Definition
6.8. Like this, users u who cannot be reached through a direct trust relation are
still rewarded for their presence in a’s propagated web of trust.
Definition 6.8 (PCC-based trust propagation for bivalent settings). Let u be
reachable by a trust path from a in a bivalent trust setting. The trust value from
target user a in user u is estimated as ta,u = (PCC + 1)/2.
Note that this assignment requires that the trusted user has a positive correla-
tion with the target user, since EnsembleTrustCF only works with positive trust
weights.
The results for the propagated/aggregated versions can be found in the lower
part of the tables. They indicate that different data sets may require different
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propagation strategies: when considering accuracy, the more extreme first op-
tion is slightly better for the consumer products data set, while it is the other
way round for the reviews data set. Also note that the first strategy may achieve
higher coverage because of the assignment of the weights; in the second strat-
egy no additional users are included since the ones that are newly reached by
propagation must also be positively correlated with the target user (and hence
are already included in the unpropagated version).
When we compare EnsembleTrustCF’s results with those of the other trust-
enhanced algorithms, we observe that, similarly to the unpropagated results for
the reviews data set, our new algorithm is on par with the other trust-based
techniques w.r.t. accuracy. EnsembleTrustCF can certainly rival with them, since
it achieves the lowest RMSEs, for direct as well as propagated information, on
every occasion but one (Epinions-reviews’ random items). Furthermore, it is the
real winner on the Epinions-products data set, as the basic and propagated ver-
sions achieve the best MAEs and RMSEs, and also the highest coverage; for un-
propagated approaches it even at least doubles that of the other trust-enhanced
strategies.
6.2.4 The Impact of Propagation
So far, we have only considered trust-enhanced recommendations by using di-
rect trust information or trust information coming from trusted acquaintances,
i.e., trust paths of length 1 and 2. In this section, we focus on the effect of
including longer chains: Figure 6.2.2 depicts the results for the trust-based ap-
proaches for paths of up to length 1, 2, 3, and 4. In each graph, the bars repre-
sent the absolute coverage (the number of predictions that can be generated),
the diamonds denote the MAE, and the circles the RMSE. The accuracy scale can
be found at the left side of the graphs, and the scale for coverage on the right
side. The experiments are conducted on the CI sets from the Epinions-reviews
and Epinions-products data sets; similar patterns are obtained for the random
items, but with lower accuracy errors (as indicated by the results for propaga-
tion paths of length 1 and 2 in Tables 6.3 and 6.4). For EnsembleTrustCF, we in-
cluded the best scoring trust prediction strategy w.r.t. accuracy; in other words,
the binary propagation and aggregation method for the Epinions-products data
set and the PCC-weighted method for the Epinions-reviews data set.
Let us first concentrate on the coverage benefit that is gained by propagating
trust information more than one step. Note that the maximal coverage that
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can be achieved by the algorithms is 44 969 for the reviews and 21 131 for the
products data set. Hence, it is clear that all algorithms achieve high overall
coverage when using longer propagation chains. The profit is especially high
for the transition from level 1 (direct information) to level 2, afterwards the
bonuses become less high, with only marginal increases from level 3 to level
4. For the Epinions-reviews data set’s controversial items, there are coverage
increases up to 28% for level 4 compared to level 1, and on the products data
set even till 47 %; e.g., on the fourth level, trust-based filtering can generate
three times as many predictions as on the first level.
Compared to the results for level 1 and 2 in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, trust-based
filtering continues to achieve the lowest coverage when taking into account
more propagation steps, but the difference with the other trust-enhanced ap-
proaches diminishes. On the other end of the scale, EnsembleTrustCF remains
the winner. Remark that the propagation algorithms on the reviews data set
almost achieve the maximal coverage, while this is less so for the Epinions’
products; the Epinions-products user network is less connected (compared to
the reviews data set), hence more users remain outside the propagated trust
network, and consequently less items can be reached, resulting in a lower cov-
erage.
Let us now turn to the accuracy results. An investigation of the MAEs tells us
that, as was the case with coverage too, the largest differences (if any) occur for
the level 1-2 switch; for longer propagation the MAEs become more stable; for
the product controversial items, the MAEs of all trust-enhanced methods even
remain more or less the same for all path lengths (including level 1). There
is one notable exception, namely the strongly increasing MAEs of trust-based
collaborative filtering for the CIs in the Epinions-reviews data set.
The trust-based weighted mean only takes into account shortest paths, while
trust-based CF incorporates paths with a length up to a particular horizon (in
our experiments 1, 2, 3 or 4). Since the former algorithm produces smaller
MAEs, this might indicate that longer (than shortest) paths contain noisier, less
accurate trust information (recall Golbeck et al.’s observations that lead to Tidal-
Trust). This hypothesis is also reinforced by the results that are obtained when
using binary trust assignments instead of Massa et al.’s horizon-based method,
where every neighbor that can be reached within the horizon receives respec-
tively a trust weight of 1, or a trust weight inversely proportional to his distance
according to the horizon: the former considers every path of equal importance,
and results in higher MAEs indeed: for level 2, 3 and 4 the MAEs are respectively
1.018, 1.113 and 1.139, while the RMSEs are resp. 1.189, 1.249 and 1.264. In
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other words, the reason for the worse results of trust-based CF can be found
in the fact that it takes into account more (longer) paths, which interfere with
the computation of accurate neighbor weights. The problem is less visible for
trust-based filtering and EnsembleTrustCF (which both work with longer paths)
because the former does not use the trust estimations as weights. The latter al-
gorithm, on the other hand, does incorporate trust information in the weights,
but also the PCC is a decisive weight factor, hence mitigating the impact of trust
on the neighbor weights for users on longer paths.
The discussion in the above paragraph also explains why there is more varia-
tion in the MAEs on the review controversial items than on the products data set.
Users in the Epinions-reviews data set are more connected than in the Epinions-
products data set; consequently, in the former data set more trust paths to the
same target item can be generated. The more (longer) paths are included, the
more of them will contain noisy information, leading to less accurate item pre-
dictions.
Remark that the RMSEs follow a more or less similar pattern as the corre-
sponding MAEs for the Epinions-reviews controversial item set, and that longer
propagation paths even have a positive impact on the accuracy for the prod-
uct controversial items; the RMSE decreases are most marked for trust-based
collaborative filtering and trust-based filtering. In other words, less excessive
prediction errors can be made by also taking into account the opinions of users
that are further apart from the target user.
The conclusions from the previous sections still apply for longer propagation
paths: EnsembleTrustCF achieves the lowest RMSEs in almost every setting
(trust-based CF achieves slightly better results for level 3 and 4 on the Epinions-
products data set), and can be seen as the winner for the product CIs due to
the clearly higher coverage and low MAEs and RMSEs. On the reviews data set,
trust-based weighted mean continues to achieve the lowest MAEs.
Summing up, it may be stated that taking into account longer trust chains
has a positive impact on the recommendations with marked increases in cover-
age (with stabilization from level 3 on), whereas the accuracy is not as much
affected in the opposite direction (stabilization from level 2 on).
6.3 Utility of Distrust for Recommendations
While the research on the incorporation of trust for recommendations is thriv-
ing, the investigation on the potential of distrust remains almost unexplored.
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Whereas in the trust modeling domain only a few attempts have been made to
incorporate distrust, in the recommender domain this is even less so, especially
for experimental evaluation. This is due to several reasons, the most important
ones being that very few data sets containing distrust information are available,
and that there is no general consensus yet about how to propagate it and to use
it for recommendation purposes.
In this section, we embark upon the problem of distrust-enhanced recom-
mendations. We discuss three strategies (Section 6.3.1) and provide an ex-
perimental study for controversial reviews (Section 6.3.2). To the best of our
knowledge, the potential of utilizing distrust for memory-based recommenda-
tions has not been experimentally evaluated before (see [86] for one of the only
model-based attempts).
6.3.1 Distrust-Enhanced Recommendation Strategies
The algorithms that we discuss in this section all use, in one way or another,
direct or estimated distrust values. These distrust-enhanced algorithms can be
deployed in web applications where only trust statements are available, but only
fully manifest themselves in an environment where users can also explicitly in-
dicate distrust. This brings us to the domain of trust scores which can represent
both trust and distrust (see Chapter 2), and trust metrics that can compute with
trust scores (see Chapters 3 and 4 for trust score propagation and aggregation
operators resp.). Since we are no longer dealing with only trust values, for the
remainder of this chapter, we will use the terms trust degree, distrust degree
and trust score.
When considering trust score propagation for distrust-enhanced recommenda-
tions, the operators P3 and P4 from Definition 3.10 are ideal, since they actively
incorporate distrust values into the trust estimation process. Note that the max-
imum effect of distrust (as a filter or debugger, see below) will be reached by
using P3. The operators P1 and P2 are also suitable, but their impact will be
much less noticeable because the former only allows distrust in the last link on
the path from the target user to the neighbor, while the latter needs environ-
ments where (explicit) ignorance can be modeled to actively infer distrust in
intermediate links. Whenever trust score aggregation operators are needed, the
bilattice-based, (I)OWA-based or knowledge-enhanced strategies from Chapter
4 can be used. For the combination of propagation and aggregation, we choose
a central authority environment with FPTA.
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The use of distrust for recommender algorithms can be explored in several ways.
A first strategy is to use distrust to filter out ‘unwanted’ individuals from collab-
orative recommendation processes. This approach is related to the trust-based
filtering algorithm from O’Donovan and Smyth (Definition 6.6), which restricts
the neighbors to be trusted users.
Definition 6.9 (Distrust-based filtering). The unknown rating for target item i
and target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈R+\RD wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈R+\RD wa,u
,
in which wa,u denotes the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient, R+ the set of neighbors
of a with a positive PCC, and RD the set of users who evaluated i and for whom
the distrust degree is greater than or equal to a given threshold β.
The algorithm in Definition 6.6 is now adapted so as to exclude distrusted users
as neighbors. Remark that the algorithm does not use trust propagation to
enlarge the set of neighbors, but only distrust propagation to restrict the set:
users that are directly or indirectly distrusted by the target user are filtered out.
In other words, no additional users are taken into account; on the contrary,
less neighbors will take part in the recommendation process. A possible FPTA
implementation for RD is given in the following definition:
Definition 6.10 (Prudent distrust set determination). The set RD of distrusted
users w.r.t. target user a and target item i is defined as
RD = {u|u has rated i ∧ (ta,u, da,u) ≥d (0, β)} ,
with (ta,u, da,u) the direct trust score; if this is not available, then the estimated
trust score is computed as
(ta,u, da,u) = DMAX
i=1···m
(〈P3 ((t1, d1)i, · · · , (tn, dn)i)〉) ,
in which (t1, d1)i, · · · , (tn, dn)i denotes the ith shortest trust score path (of length
n > 1) from target user a to u.
Note that this is a cautious implementation of RD w.r.t. the generated recom-
mendations: whenever there is any trace of evidence larger than β to distrust
user u, u is excluded from the recommendation process. By using P3 as prop-
agation operator, (ta,u, da,u) will most often result in distrust evidence, and by
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choosing DMAX as aggregation operator, we ensure that a user for whom at
least one propagated path results in a trust score with distrust degree > β can-
not take part in the recommendation process.
In the same spirit of distrust as a filter, various researchers have suggested (but
not yet evaluated) that distrust be used to debug a web of trust (see e.g. [53,
170]): suppose that a trusts b completely, b fully trusts x and a completely dis-
trusts x, then the latter fact invalidates the propagated trust result (viz. a trusts
x). As such, distrust-enhanced algorithms may be useful to filter out ‘false pos-
itives’. This strategy leads to two new formulas, adaptations of the algorithms
in Definitions 6.1 and 6.3 in which RT is replaced by RT \RD.
Definition 6.11 (Debugged trust-based weighted mean). The unknown rating
for target item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i =
∑
u∈RT \RD ta,uru,i∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u
,
withRT the set of users who evaluated i and for whom the trust value ta,u is greater
than or equal to a given threshold α, and RD the set of users who evaluated i and
for whom the distrust degree is greater than or equal to a given threshold β.
Definition 6.12 (Debugged trust-based collaborative filtering). The unknown
rating for target item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u
,
withRT the set of users who evaluated i and for whom the trust value ta,u is greater
than or equal to a given threshold α, and RD the set of users who evaluated i and
for whom the distrust degree is greater than or equal to a given threshold β.
These approaches are an extension of resp. trust-based weighted mean (6.1)
and trust-based collaborative filtering (6.3), in the sense that now one needs to
compute two components (RT and RD) instead of only one (RT ). To guarantee
that the two algorithms are conservative extensions of their trust-only counter-
parts, RT is implemented analogously to the strategy used in Definitions 6.1
and 6.3, i.e., if there is no direct information available, then the trust degree
ta,u of (ta,u, da,u) is computed as in Definitions 6.2 and 6.4 respectively. In
other words, for the trust degree estimation only the trust degrees are used.
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For the distrust degree estimation, we take on another approach; comput-
ing the distrust degree in a similar way as the trust degrees in TidalTrust and
MoleTrust would result in unexpected and counterintuitive results: using the
weighted average as aggregation strategy would mean that the opinion of a
strongly distrusted user is more important than the opinion of a less distrusted
agent. Instead, for the implementation of RD in both algorithms, we use Def-
inition 6.10. This approach will probably unjustly exclude some users, but we
consider it more important that it allows to filter out the greater part of the
‘false positives’ in the (propagated) web of trust of the target user.
Note that we cannot use the filters in Definitions 6.11 and 6.12 in a bivalent
trust setting when no propagation is involved, since then a user cannot appear
in RT and RD at the same time.
We can also apply the above filter strategy to EnsembleTrustCF: we propose
to use trust values for those users which can be reached through propagation
but for whom no distrust propagation path can be found, and Pearson’s corre-
lation scores for those in R+ \ RTD with RTD = RT ∪ RD, i.e., the remaining
ones which have a positive correlation with a but do not belong to RT nor RD,
i.e. neither trust nor distrust information is available about them.
Definition 6.13 (Debugged EnsembleTrustCF). The unknown rating for target
item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u(ru,i − ru) +
∑
u∈R+\RTD wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u +
∑
u∈R+\RTD wa,u
,
with RTD = RT ∪ RD, RT the set of users who evaluated i and for whom the
trust value ta,u is greater than or equal to a given threshold α, and RD the set of
users who evaluated i and for whom the distrust degree is greater than or equal to
a given threshold β.
To ensure a conservative extension, we use the same strategies as in Section
6.2.3 to implement RT ; for RD we choose Definition 6.10.
Definitions 6.9, 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 use distrust as a debugger/filter by sep-
arately computing a set of trusted and distrusted users and then selecting the
appropriate neighbors. In other words, distrust is used as a debugger/filter on
the user level; after the selection, the trust degree ta,u is used as weight in the
recommendation process. Another possibility is to perform the debug and/or
filter task immediately on the weight level, as opposed to the user level in the
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aforementioned algorithms. Like this, the RT and RD sets do not have to be
computed separately. As an example, consider the following modification of the
trust-based weighted mean:
Definition 6.14 (Trust score-based weighted mean). The unknown rating for
target item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i =
∑
u∈R max (0, ta,u − da,u) · ru,i∑
u∈R max (0, ta,u − da,u)
,
in which (ta,u, da,u) denote a’s trust score estimation for u.
Note that we call this new method the ‘trust score’-based weighted mean: we
also use the term ‘weighted mean’, as in Golbeck et al.’s approach trust-based
weighted mean (6.1) and its distrust extension (6.11); we also take over an-
other aspect of Golbeck et al.’s approach, namely that only shortest paths to tar-
get item i are taken into account. We use the term ‘trust score-based’ because,
unlike Definition 6.1 and 6.11, we do not only use trust degrees to determine
the weights of the neighbors, but explicitly incorporate the distrust degree too.
In the scenario of Definition 6.14, we use the trust scores as a way to create the
weights for neighbors, and at the same time also as a filter for the neighbors:
the more a neighbor is trusted and the less distrusted, the higher his weight
in the aggregation process. In other words, neighbors are rewarded according
to their trust/distrust difference. Furthermore, users for whom there is more
evidence to distrust than to trust are filtered out. Note that trust score-based
weighted mean is no conservative extension of trust-based weighted mean due
to the different usage of distrust as a debugger/filter.
Remark that, when no propagation is involved, trust score-based weighted
mean reduces to debugged trust-based weighted mean. When propagation is
involved, Definition 6.14 opens the door for new trust metrics to estimate the
trust score (ta,u, da,u), since it does not require to be a conservative extension
of trust-based weighted mean. In particular, we propose the following family of
trust metrics:
Definition 6.15 (Trust score metrics for distrust filter on the weight level). The
trust score (ta,u, da,u) for target user a in user u w.r.t. target item i can be computed
in a FPTA setting by
(ta,u, da,u) = A
i=1···m
(〈P ((t1, d1)i, · · · , (tn, dn)i)〉) ,
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in which (t1, d1)i, · · · , (tn, dn)i denotes the ith shortest trust score path (of length
n > 1) from a to i, A embodies a trust score aggregation operator from Chapter 4
and P a trust score propagation operator from Definition 3.10.
The remarks made in the beginning of this section w.r.t. the propagation oper-
ators apply here as well: the most distrust-intensive approach is obtained by
using P3, while P1 produces the least effect. Since we do not require Definition
6.14 to be a proper extension of Definition 6.1, several options arise for the
choice of aggregation operator; in particular the bilattice-based, (I)OWA-based
and knowledge-enhanced strategies of Chapter 4. In the following section, we
experiment with several of these operators.
A last distrust strategy, besides using it as a filter and/or debugger, is the di-
rect incorporation of distrust into the recommendation process by considering
distrust scores as negative weights, analogous to the use of negative correla-
tion coefficients in the collaborative filtering approach; note the difference with
their use in Definition 6.14 where they lead to weight 0. Similar to the collabo-
rative filtering algorithm with neighbors from R (in which the PCC weights are
in [−1, 1]), we can replace the weights so that they reflect the trust/distrust dif-
ference but are still in [−1, 1]. In particular, we propose Definition 6.16, which
is an extended version of trust-based collaborative filtering in which distrust is
regarded as an indicator for reversing the deviation ru,i − ru. Remark that the
model-based approach in [86] also uses distrust to denote dissimilar users.
Definition 6.16 (Distrust-based collaborative filtering). The unknown rating for
target item i and target user a can be computed as
pa,i = ra +
∑
u∈RTD (ta,u − da,u) · (ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RTD |ta,u − da,u|
,
with RTD = RT ∪ RD, RT the set of users who evaluated i and for whom the
trust value ta,u is greater than or equal to a given threshold α, and RD the set of
users who evaluated i and for whom the distrust degree is greater than or equal to
a given threshold β.
To ensure a conservative extension of trust-based collaborative filtering, we use
MoleTrust to implement RT ; for RD we choose Definition 6.10.
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Table 6.5: Performance of distrust-based algorithms on the controversial items
from the Epinions-reviews data set; with P3 and T = min, MAE and RMSE
∈ [0, 4].
ALGORITHM % COV MAE RMSE
(5.2a) Collaborative filtering with R+ 94 0.96 1.13
(5.2b) Collaborative filtering with R 94 0.93 1.12
(6.16) Distrust-based CF 67 1.00 1.32
(D9) Distrust-based filtering 94 0.95 1.12
(D13) Debugged EnsembleTrustCF 94 0.93 1.10
(PD11) Propagated debugged trust-based weighted mean 86 0.91 1.23
(PD9) Propagated debugged distrust-based filtering 91 0.96 1.18
(PD12) Propagated debugged trust-based CF 86 0.93 1.14
(PD13) Propagated debugged EnsembleTrustCF 92 0.95 1.17
(PD14a) Prop. trust score-b. weighted mean - FIX 90 0.99 1.28
(PD14b) Prop. trust score-b. weighted mean - TMAX 86 0.86 1.17
(PD14c) Prop. trust score-b. weighted mean - KAV 86 0.85 1.17
(PD14d) Prop. trust score-b. weighted mean - K-OWA, α = n, β = 8 86 0.85 1.17
(PD14e) Prop. trust score-b. weighted mean - K-OWA, α = 2, β = 8 86 0.85 1.17
6.3.2 Experimental Results
Since we need data with sufficient trust statements, distrust statements, and
ratings to evaluate the above algorithms, we can only use the Epinions-reviews
data set. We again focus on the controversial items because they receive a vari-
ety of ratings, hence enabling us to maximize the difference in performance be-
tween the approaches. Table 6.5 contains the results of our experiments; we will
compare the results of the distrust-intensive approaches with their trust-only
counterparts of Table 6.3. The abbreviations in the first column represent the
distrust-enhanced (D) and/or propagation (P, on level 2) approaches, while the
numbers refer to the formulas in Section 6.3.1. Recall that the bivalent nature of
the Epinions data does not allow for a complete examination of the algorithms.
Let us first concentrate on the upper part of Table 6.5 in which we evaluate
direct incorporation of distrust, i.e., distrust-based CF which regards distrust as
an indicator to reverse the deviations. We also include the results for collab-
orative filtering with users u in R (users who have rated the target item and
for whom the PCC with the target user, positive or negative, can be computed),
since it is also built on the rationale of reversing deviations. For reference, we
include the CF results with R+ (only positive correlations) as well.
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Figure 6.3.1: Performance of trust-based versus distrust-based CF.
For distrust-based collaborative filtering, the high decrease in accuracy (increase
of MAE as well as RMSE) compared to its trust-only counterpart trust-based
collaborative filtering (Definition 6.3) is not compensated by a similar increase
in coverage; this is also depicted in Figure 6.3.1. This demonstrates that distrust
should not be used as a way to reverse deviations (and is also the reason why
we do not consider longer propagation paths). Note that the same conclusion
does not hold for R versus R+ in CF: the former performs better w.r.t. MAE than
collaborative filtering with R+ for the Epinions-reviews controversial item set.
Recall that in Section 6.1 we stated that trust and similarity, and distrust and
dissimilarity, do not necessarily represent the same information and may there-
fore be treated in different ways: the results in the table above show us that,
for the same type of algorithm and rationale, including dissimilarity improves
the recommendations while this is not the case for the incorporation of distrust.
Furthermore, we also claimed that the use of trust, distrust, similarity and dis-
similarity also depends on the application and the data, which is illustrated by
the comparison of CF with R and R+’s results on the controversial items in the
Epinions-reviews and Epinions-products data sets. The R results for the latter
data set are worse than those for R+, namely an MAE of 1.37 versus 1.34, and
RMSE of 1.67 versus 1.58.
The second part of Table 6.5 focuses on the use of distrust to filter out ‘un-
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wanted’ individuals without propagation. The results for distrust-based filtering
and debugged EnsembleTrustCF show that this kind of distrust filter has little or
no effect on the results of classic collaborative filtering and EnsembleTrustCF:
an item that is only rated by distrusted users is very uncommon because of the
trust/distrust ratio in the data set (only 15% of all relations are distrust-based)
and the fact that we are dealing with popular items. Hence, the unchanged
relative coverage comes as no surprise. Also note that the accuracy slightly im-
proves when filtering out distrusted users. Recall that we cannot use this kind
of filter for debugged trust-based weighted mean and debugged trust-based CF
if no trust propagation is involved, since a user cannot put another user in his
WOT and in his block list simultaneously.
In the third part of Table 6.5 we further investigate the potential of filters; we
focus on the utility of distrust as a debugger for a target user’s web of trust.
This results in extended versions of the strategies in the lower part of Table
6.3. Recall that Definition 6.10 applied to a bivalent setting results in the set
of distrusted users RD of target user a that contains all users who are directly
distrusted by a, who are distrusted by the members of a’s WOT, and users in the
WOT of users who are distrusted by a. In other words, ‘distrust your enemies’
friends, as well as your friends’ enemies’.
This strategy leads to a coverage decrease of about 2%-3% for the debugged
versions of trust-based weighted mean, trust-based CF, and EnsembleTrustCF,
compared to their original propagated counterparts (P1), (P3) and (P7b) in
Table 6.3. In other words, using distrust propagation to filter out false positives
only has a marginal effect on the coverage (due to the trust/distrust ratio and
the popular items). Debugging does improve the performance of trust-based CF
in terms of accuracy, but for the other two algorithms no clear conclusion can
be drawn: the MAEs are never worse than their trust-only counterparts, but the
RMSE results show discrepant values.
Recall that Definition 6.9 does not use trust propagation to enlarge the set
of neighbors, but only distrust propagation to restrict the set. This explains the
decrease in coverage for (PD9) compared to the collaborative filtering method
with R+, whereas for (D9) and CF with R+ the relative coverage remained un-
changed. Note that (PD9) yields equal MAEs but increasing RMSEs.
As discussed in the previous section, another way to use distrust as filter and
debugger is to integrate it on the weight level as opposed to the user level, as
in the trust score-based weighted mean (Definition 6.14). In the bottom part
of the table, we experiment with several implementations of Definition 6.15. In
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particular, we tested the trust score aggregation operators from Chapter 4. As
for propagation, we use the same strategy as for the other results in Table 6.5
(i.e., P3 and T = min), to facilitate a fair comparison. Recall that the results for
the unpropagated version are the same as the ones from Definition 6.11.
Note that KMIN, KMAX and DMAX are not included because the data set
only contains bivalent trust and distrust data, and hence this type of filter will
always yield weight 0 whenever there is at least 1 distrust input; as a conse-
quence, almost no recommendations can be generated. Also recall that KAV
will yield the same results as the arithmetic mean, and that the knowledge-
enhanced OWA operators all coincide with K-OWA. We have included two of
the best performing K-OWA implementations.
Let us compare the use of distrust as a filter on the user level (Definition 6.11)
with filter on the weight level (Definition 6.14). With regard to coverage,
(PD11) and the (PD14) implementations perform almost equally well: using
a filter as in (PD14) may result in a smaller number of trusted neighbors, but
that does not imply a drastic decrease in coverage since most target items
can be reached by several trusted neighbors. The only implementation that
achieves a significantly higher coverage than (PD11) is (PD14a): FIX always
yields the highest number of trusted neighbors (because max (0, ta,u − da,u) =
0.853− 0.147 > 0), and hence never excludes a user from the recommendation
process, as opposed to (PD11) where users with (propagated and aggregated)
evidence to distrust them are immediately left out, which may sooner result
in items that are no longer reachable. Although the relative coverages for the
other trust score-based weighted mean implementations are the same, in ab-
solute numbers TMAX yields somewhat more recommendations (38 682 leave-
one-out experiments) than KAV and the K-OWA’s (resp. 38 626 and 38 553 and
38 552): TMAX results much more often in ta,u − da,u > 0 (due to its trust
maximizing behavior) than in ≤ 0 (which can occur when all inputs denote full
trust or ignorance; a rare scenario). On the other hand, KAV and K-OWA are
much more likely to result in zero weights, especially for K-OWA with β = 8,
as a higher β increases the chance for a high aggregated distrust value, and
consequently a low recommendation weight, or even zero.
While the coverages remain comparable, the accuracy clearly improves when
changing the filter from (PD11) to (PD14), i.e., using the weight-based filter
max(0, ta,u − da,u) instead of the user-based filter RT \RD. Moreover, whereas
propagated debugged trust-based weighted mean (PD11) performed worse than
propagated weighted mean (P1), propagated trust score-based weighted mean
(PD14) even beats (P1). In other words, distrust can indeed play a beneficial
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role in the recommendation process: the filter on the weight level in combina-
tion with distrust-enhanced aggregation operators can safely be used to debug a
web of trust and to accurately estimate the weights for trusted neighbors, which
results in more accurate recommendations. As far as the mutual accuracy re-
lations between the (PD14) implementations are concerned, only FIX scores
visibly worse. However, this is no surprise since FIX does not produce personal-
ized trust estimations at all.
However, Figure 6.3.2 shows us that the aggregation operators do have a dif-
ferent impact on the accuracy of the recommendations when trust propagation
is involved. More specifically, the figure focuses on the target items that cannot
be reached by only taking into account web of trust members of the target user,
i.e., target items that are only accessible by propagation paths of length 2. We
provide a mean absolute error analysis according to the number m of full dis-
trust aggregates that need to be aggregated. Like this, we can better evaluate
the effect of the new distrust filter max (0, ta,u − da,u). We did not include the
RMSEs because they follow the same patterns as described below for the MAEs.
The graph tells us that the quality of the recommendations may heavily rely
on the type of aggregation. The fixed values baseline performs worst on all
cases, followed by TMAX, with MAEs of up to ten times the MAE of the more
sophisticated operators. This means that actively computing the distrust degree
matters (instead of fixing the value as FIX does, or letting it depend on the
computed trust value as TMAX does). This is the strategy followed by KAV and
the K-OWA implementations. Tuning the trust and distrust weights for the av-
eraging aggregation process bears fruit: KAV (with equal weights) yields higher
errors than the K-OWA’s which are more adapted to the characteristics of the
data set; KAV can only beat them for high m.
Remark that for this type of application and the Epinions data, distrust is easily
established; only one eighth of the inputs needs to be considered. For example,
as a comparison, K-OWA with α = n, β = 4 yields MAEs of 0.84, 0.65, 0.92
and 0.85 for resp. m =1-5, 5-10, 10-15 and more than 15 inputs, while K-OWA
with α = 2, β = 4 results in MAEs of 0.84, 0.64, 0.89 and 0.25. This means
that, in the context of distrust-enhanced recommendations, only the strongest
opinions w.r.t. distrust have to be taken into account, and that the contribution
of more agents introduces more noise into the recommendation process. On the
other hand, w.r.t. the trust values, note that for low and intermediate m better
results are achieved when taking into account only the maximum trust value
(α = n), while for high m this is no longer the case. Obviously, when there is
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Figure 6.3.2: Aggregation operators for trust score-based weighted mean on the
controversial items in the Epinions-reviews data set. Split-up according to the
number m of full distrust aggregates; propagation chains of length 2 with P3
and T = min, MAE ∈ [0, 4], n denotes the number of aggregates (trust, distrust
or ignorance).
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much evidence to distrust a neighbor it is not wise to choose the maximum trust
value, because higher trust values yield higher recommendation weights (this
also explains the better performance of KAV for high m).
Note that TMAX did achieve very good results for the Epinions trust score
prediction problem in Section 4.4.5, which reinforces our claim that the choice
of trust score aggregation operator not only depends on the type of data, but
also on the kind of application at hand. As another example, recall that for trust
score prediction and the CouchSurfing data, distrust is not easily established
(three quarters of all inputs). This may indicate that only little distrust evidence
is needed to have an effect on the item recommendation, as discussed in the
above paragraph, while establishing trust and distrust as a trust recommenda-
tion (estimation) for two unknown users in a network is a much more sensitive,
personal, task which does not allow for rushed decisions.
Obviously, there is still much work to be done in the domain of distrust-enhanced
recommendation (which almost received no attention so far), and distrust-
based filters and debuggers in particular. Although the results presented in
this section are still preliminary, they already indicate that regarding distrust as
an indication to reverse deviations is not the road to take. Distrust as a filter
and/or debugger looks more promising, especially when working with weight-
based filters (as opposed to user-based filters).
One must bear in mind that the results depend on several factors, namely
the propagation operator, the aggregation operator, the weight filter, the nature
of the data, etc., and hence that more experiments, on other data sets with
different characteristics, can help establish a more precise conclusion.
6.4 Discussion and Future Work
One of the main problems in the trust-enhanced recommendation domain is the
shortage of suitable test data consisting of gradual trust and distrust statements
and ratings. As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the CouchSurfing data set contains a
variety of trust and distrust statements, but unfortunately is not suitable for our
purposes since it lacks sufficient rating information. The Epinions data do not
have that particular problem, but only contain bivalent trust and distrust (only
in the case of the reviews data set) data, which hinders a full investigation
of the effect and use of the propagation and aggregation operators in trust-
and distrust-enhanced recommendation algorithms. Unfortunately, there are
no ideal data sets publicly available for research.
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One way to alleviate this problem is by looking for other ways to establish trust
relations when the information cannot explicitly be given by the users. Several
sources of social data can be consulted, such as online friend and business net-
works (think e.g. of Facebook or LinkedIn), e-mail communication, reputation
systems, etc. In the recommender system literature, they are often lumped to-
gether and collectively referred to as trust, although they map onto different
concepts: behavioral theory clearly draws a distinction between homophily or
cognitive similarity (similarity between people/tastes/etc.), social capital (rep-
utation, opinion leadership), tie strength (in terms of relationship duration and
interaction frequency), and trust (see e.g. [95, 96]). Potentially all these social
data sources could be incorporated into a (trust-enhanced) recommender sys-
tem, but so far not much research has been conducted to find out which ones
are most useful [7], and whether these sources would provide similar results as
the classical trust-based recommendation approaches discussed in this chapter.
In [8], Arazy et al. embark upon this problem and argue that the design of social
recommenders should be grounded in theory, rather than making ad hoc design
choices as is often the case in current algorithms.
Another research direction of a completely different nature is related to the
direction of the recommendation process; we explain the issue by the following
two examples.
Example 6.3 (Forward recommendation movement). Suppose you want to see
a movie i, but you do not know anything about it; hence, you have to look for
opinions. To find out whether you will like or dislike the movie, you call one of
your friends, say Joe. He tells you that he has no idea, but that he can give you
the telephone number of a friend of his, Mariah, who has seen i. You may call her
and listen to what she has to say about i (‘It’s a very good movie!’). According to
the information you get from Joe about Mariah’s trustworthiness for movie advice,
and taking into account you own trust estimation of Joe, you can form an opinion
on the recommendation of Mariah.
This example depicts a propagation chain with one intermediate link, viz. Joe;
Mariah is the neighbor u (in the algorithms in Sections 6.2 and 6.3). This is
the approach taken by current trust-enhanced recommenders, as explained in
Section 6.1: propagation to the source of the recommendation, followed by
a combination with its rating. However, one can also argue that the movie
information (rating or opinion) can be obtained in another way:
Example 6.4 (Backward recommendation movement). You phone Jack, who
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also has not yet seen the movie, but says that he will phone back later when he
has some information about i (he is going to see some friends and there might be
one who has watched the movie). An hour later, you receive his call and he tells
you that it is a ‘good movie’. Hence, in this situation, you do not know where
the information is coming from; you can only rely upon your trust in Jack as a
recommender and his (possibly derived) recommendation.
In this example, the recommendation process starts at the end of the chain.
Jack (user b) hears the recommendation (the rating) of user u, reformulates
u’s recommendation by taking into account his trust in u, and then passes the
new recommendation on to you (the target user a). Hence, the interpretation
of u’s recommendation by b is not necessarily the same as a’s interpretation of
b’s recommendation: e.g., although b trusts u for movie advice, every time u
waxes lyrical about a romantic movie, b weakens the recommendation because
past experiences have shown him that he always liked the movie, but most of
the time did not love it. If u then tells him that movie i was a ‘very good’ movie,
he may reformulate the recommendation and tell a that it is a ‘good’ movie.
Figure 6.4.1 presents a scheme of the scenarios depicted in Examples 6.3 and
6.4. In the latter example, the process starts at the target item (the end of
the chain) and moves backward to the target user by combining trust R(b, x)
and rating ru,i into a new recommendation rb,i, the same strategy is then re-
peated until a is reached. This is represented by the rectangle. In this scenario,
it is recommendations that are propagated in a right-to-left manner (backward
movement), as opposed to the trust values in Example 6.3, which represents the
classical procedure: the recommendation process starts at the target user (the
beginning of the chain) and moves forward to the target item by propagating
trust estimations R(a, b) and R(b, u) into a new trust estimation in user u (rep-
resented by the circle) and finally combining the propagated (and aggregated)
R(a, u) with rating ru,i.
The backward movement gives more autonomy to the users in the system
and is suited for environments where privacy is an issue, because the only data
that users pass on to each other are (derived) ratings, and their trust and distrust
information is not exposed. The forward approach can easily be implemented
in applications with a central authority. So far, there have been no theoretical
or experimental studies to find out which one of the two directions delivers the
best recommendations. However, related attempts to investigate the relation
between the recommendation/rating strength (think of our example with the
romantic movie) and the reformulation of a recommendation do exist; in the
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a b u i
R(a,b) R(b,u) ru,i
Figure 6.4.1: Possible (dis)trust-enhanced recommendation directions; the cir-
cle denotes the forward movement (first trust estimation of R(a, u) and final
combination with the rating for target item i) and the rectangle the backward
movement (reformulation of the rating).
trust management domain by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes who work with the
notion of semantic distance of trust opinions [3], and in the recommendation
domain by Lathia et al. who use transposed ratings [77].
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed how trust and distrust information can enrich the
recommendation process. We have given an overview of the state of the art
in trust-enhanced recommendation research, with a focus on the approaches of
Golbeck et al., Massa et al., and O’Donovan et al. Most researchers in the trust-
based recommender field introduce their own algorithms and evaluate them on
their own applications/data sets, without including a comparison with other
trust-enhanced techniques. Therefore, we provided a head-to-head compari-
son of collaborative filtering and the trust-based approaches mentioned above,
in terms of their coverage and accuracy of recommendations, with a focus on
controversial items. Our study on two data sets with different characteristics
showed that, for random items, simple baseline strategies can often produce
recommendations of similar quality compared to the more intelligent strate-
gies. However, we showed that they perform much worse for controversial
items, whereas the personalized trust-enhanced algorithms continue to achieve
tolerable accuracy.
We observed that there is no clear winner among the collaborative filtering
and the trust-enhanced approaches, and that there is still room for improve-
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ment. To this aim, we introduced a new algorithm that combines the best of
both the CF and trust world, achieving immediate high coverage while the MAE
and RMSE increases remain within limits. More than that, it achieves the best
RMSEs on controversial items, making it a safe option in environments where
larger prediction errors are not tolerated. The same conclusions came to the
fore in our experiments which concentrated on the impact of the maximum al-
lowed propagation path length in the recommendation process. Also allowing
ratings from users that are further apart from the target user in the trust net-
work has a major positive impact on the coverage, while the accuracy of the
trust-enhanced algorithms remains more or less stable.
In the second part of this chapter, we focused on the unexplored area of distrust-
enhanced recommendations. We have provided the first experimental evalua-
tion of the role of distrust as a debugger and a filter, and its relation to dis-
similarity. We learned that the last option is not the road to take, but that the
first two look more promising: we introduced a new distrust-enhanced strategy
(trust score-based weighted mean) that uses distrust as a debugger and filter
on the weight level, which achieves better results than the basic debug strategy,
and even beats the standard propagated trust-only counterpart.
To our knowledge, the data set we used for our experiments is the only pub-
licly available one that contains explicitly issued distrust statements and enough
item ratings. Only 15% of all relations are distrust-based; consequently, exper-
iments on future data sets with different characteristics may yield clearer an-
swers to the question whether distrust can be used as a debugger and/or filter.
The same remark also applies to other results in this thesis. For example, in data
sets containing users with a more varying rating behavior, more true controver-
sial items can be detected. It remains an open question whether distrust can
play a beneficial role in recommender systems, but we believe that the reported
observations and the questions raised along with them can help researchers to
further examine its possibilities.

Six degrees of separation doesn’t mean that everyone is linked
to everyone else in just six steps. It means that a very small num-
ber of people are linked to everyone else in a few steps, and
the rest of us are linked to the world through those special few.
The Tipping Point, 2000. Malcolm Gladwell
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In Chapter 5, we briefly discussed the most common limitations of recommender
systems. In this chapter, we go more deeply into one of their main challenges,
namely the user cold start problem. Due to lack of detailed user profiles and so-
cial preference data, recommenders often face extreme difficulties in generating
adequately personalized recommendations for new users. Some systems there-
fore actively encourage users to rate more items. The interface of the online
DVD rental service Netflix for example explicitly hides two movie recommenda-
tions, and promises to reveal these after the user rates his most recent rentals.
Since it is very important for e-commerce applications to satisfy their new users
(who might be on their way to become regular customers), it does not come as
a surprise that the user cold start problem receives a lot of attention from the
recommender system community.
One of the promising directions suggests that the incorporation of a trust net-
work can significantly help alleviating the user cold start problem, primarily
because the information included in trust statements about a recommender sys-
tem’s users can be propagated and aggregated, and consequently more people
and products can be matched. By making a few clever connections in the trust
network, newcomers can immediately gain access to a wide range of recommen-
dations. Hence, users are highly encouraged to connect to other users to expand
the network, but choosing whom to connect to is often a difficult task. Given
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the impact this choice has on the delivered recommendations, it is critical to
guide newcomers through this early stage connection process. As research has
shown that interactivity and transparency are two key factors to a better under-
standing and acceptance of recommenders (see e.g. [56, 135]), it is worthwhile
to provide suggestions and explain the effect of making trust connections.
In the following section, we discuss possible ways to alleviate the user cold start
problem and focus specifically on trust-enhanced solutions. To benefit from the
trust algorithms, a new user needs to know which users are best to connect to.
Therefore, in Section 7.2, we identify different user classes in the trust-based
recommender system’s network as mavens (knowledgeable users who write a
lot of reviews), connectors (with a lot of connections in the trust network), and
frequent raters (who rate a lot of reviews). We claim that it is more beneficial
for new users to connect to one of these key figures as opposed to connecting to
a random user. Verifying this claim involves investigating both the quality (i.e.,
accuracy) as well as the amount (i.e., coverage) of the delivered recommenda-
tions.
We deal with the problem on a local level within the trust network. The main
questions to be answered are:
1. If a cold start user a has a user b in his web of trust, how can we quantify
the accuracy and the coverage impact of user b for cold start user a?
2. What can we conclude about the impact of a particular key figure b for the
cold start users in a trust-enhanced recommender system in general?
To help in answering these questions, in Section 7.3 we introduce new measures
that have a clear foundation in social network analysis [154]. Subsequently, in
Section 7.4, we show by a number of experiments that it is more beneficial
for new users to connect to key figures rather than making random connec-
tions, and discuss the impact of this type of connection guidance. To illustrate
the concepts and to evaluate our proposed techniques, we use the largest of
the two Epinions data sets, viz. Epinions-reviews. The results can be general-
ized to other trust-based recommender systems, since the key figure types can
be detected in many kinds of trust-enhanced recommenders. We conclude the
chapter with a discussion of future research directions.
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7.1 The User Cold Start Problem
In Section 5.2, we explained the working of collaborative filtering systems. One
of their key building blocks is the determination of the neighbors (or similar
users), which is often done by computing Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The
effectiveness (accuracy and coverage) of collaborative filtering based recom-
mender systems is significantly affected by the number of ratings available for
each user: the more ratings are available, the more neighbors can be matched,
the more items can be recommended, and the better the quality of the rec-
ommendations (as discussed e.g. in [129]); recall that adaptivity is one of the
advantages of collaborative recommenders. Moreover, generating recommen-
dations is only possible for users who have rated at least two items because
Pearson’s correlation coefficient requires at least two ratings per user, see Def-
inition 5.3. Consequently, an important problem arises with cold start users:
being new users, they have rarely rated a significant number of items, and since
they usually constitute a sizeable portion of the recommender’s user community
(see e.g. [94] and Section 7.1.2), the user cold start problem should not be un-
derestimated.
7.1.1 Alleviating the Cold Start Problem
Most of the approaches that are designed to alleviate the problem combine rat-
ing data with content data, or, in other words, include aspects from content-
based systems to the recommendation process (hybrid recommenders). E.g.,
Middleton et al. [99] exploit information that is delivered by ontologies1, while
Park et al. [111] focus on simple filterbots (acting as pseudo-users who automat-
ically rate items according to certain attributes). There also exist non-content
based approaches, such as Ahn [5] and Huang et al. [61] who only use rating
data: the former introduces a similarity measure which takes into account the
proximity of the ratings, the rating impact and item popularity, while in the lat-
ter approach the set of neighbors is extended by exploring transitive associations
between the items and users. Another recent example is Yildirim et al.’s random
walk algorithm that is based on item rating instead of user rating similarity
[162]. A different way of tackling the problem is by guiding the users through-
out the initial rating stage, see e.g. the fuzzy linguistic approach in [116].
1Formal representations of a set of concepts and the relationships between them, so that ma-
chines and applications can understand and reason with them; see e.g. [140] or www.w3.org/TR/
owl-features
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Some trust-based approaches have also explicitly focused on the use of trust
for the cold start problem, see e.g. [156] in which the problem is tackled by
automatic trust generation even for users who have rated only one item in com-
mon, or the algorithm in [62] that is based on random walks along the trust
network and probabilistic item selection. One of the best-known and most ex-
tensive studies about trust-enhanced memory-based collaborative recommen-
dations for cold start users was done by Massa and Avesani [91, 93]. They state
that it is better to make a few connections in the trust network instead of rating
a similar amount of items to bootstrap the system for cold start users.
Massa and Avesani conducted experiments on the Epinions-products data set
(see Section 5.4.1) for their trust-based collaborative filtering system (see Defi-
nition 6.3), and showed that, for users that have only rated two items (for whom
no correlation coefficient can be computed in a leave-one-out experiment, and
the classical collaborative filtering system cannot be evaluated), a coverage of
45% can be reached (trust propagation up to level 4). For users that have rated
three (four) items, the coverage that collaborative filtering can achieve is 4%
(8%), while the trust-based variant reaches 53% (59%) of all items; hence, it
is clear that a recommender system can greatly benefit from the incorporation
of a trust network when it comes down to generating predictions for cold start
users. The fact that the users who have rated two, three or four items have on
average two to three trust connections (we will show later on that in some data
sets the cold start users have even less trust connections) illustrates that cold
start users initially gain much more from their trust statements than from their
ratings. This demonstrates the importance of drawing the newcomers’ attention
to the trust network, and guiding them through the connection process.
7.1.2 Case Study for the Epinions Community
In this section, we will investigate the cold start situation more thoroughly,
in particular by focusing on the situation in the largest of the two Epinions
data sets, i.e., the Epinions-reviews data set containing reviews and helpfulness
scores. Like this, we are able to detect an extra group of key figures which
are not available in the Epinions-products data set (the so-called mavens, see
Section 7.2). We refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 6.2.2 for a full description of the
review data set.
We focus on users who have evaluated at least one item (review). In this group,
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Table 7.1: Cold start users in the Epinions-reviews data set: users who have
rated exactly one item (CS1), two items (CS2), three (CS3) or four (CS4) items.
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4
% of review raters 36.52 12.32 6.85 4.47
% in largest component 18.43 30.85 38.34 44.88
mean # trust relations 0.27 0.51 0.72 0.99
mean # distrust relations 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09
59 767 users rated only one review, 20 159 only two, 11 216 exactly three and
7 322 exactly four. These cold start users constitute about 60% of all review
raters in the Epinions community. The relative numbers of users are given in
Table 7.1 where the cold start users are denoted by CS1 (exactly one review),
CS2 (two reviews), CS3 and CS4.
Besides evaluating reviews, users can also evaluate other users based on their
quality as a reviewer; these evaluations make up the Epinions web of trust
graph. About 85% of the statements are labelled as trust, which is reflected
in the average number of users in a personal WOT (5.44) and in a block list
(0.94). Due to the large portion of trust statements, we focus on trust informa-
tion only in the remainder of this chapter, and leave the study of the impact of
distrust relations for future research.
The trust graph consists of 5 866 connected components (i.e., maximal undi-
rected connected subgraphs). The largest component contains 100 751 users,
while the size of the second largest component is only 31. Hence, in order
to receive more trust-enhanced recommendations, users should connect to the
largest component. But as shown in Table 7.1, this cluster does not even contain
half of the cold start users. This, combined with the fact that cold start users
evaluate only a few users (as shown in the third and fourth row of Table 7.1),
illustrates that cold start users in the classical sense are very often cold start
users in the trust sense as well.
Better results can be expected when newcomers connect to a large compo-
nent of the trust graph, but they may encounter difficulties in finding the most
suitable people to connect to. Therefore, we define three user classes and iden-
tify them in the network.
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7.2 Key Figures in a Trust-Based Recommender’s
Network
The first class of key figures are mavens, people who write a lot of reviews. This
term is borrowed from Gladwell’s book [39] in which mavens are defined as
knowledgeable people who want to share their wisdom with others. Out of the
three user classes mavens are the most visible to a new user, and hence the ones
which are the easiest to evaluate: the more reviews someone writes, the better
a new user can form an opinion about him and decide to put him in his personal
web of trust or not.
Unlike mavens, frequent raters are not always so visible. They do not nec-
essarily write a lot of reviews but evaluate a lot of them, and hence are an
important supplier for a recommender system, since it is not possible to gener-
ate predictions without ratings. By including a frequent rater in a trust network,
more items can be reached, which has a direct influence on a system’s coverage.
While mavens and frequent raters are not necessarily bound to the trust
network, connectors are: they connect a lot of users and occupy central positions
in the trust network. Such users issue a lot of trust statements (many outlinks)
and are often at the receiving end as well (many inlinks). The strength of
connectors lies not in their rating capacity or visibility, but in their ability to
reach a large group of users through trust propagation. When a trust-enhanced
algorithm has to find a path from one user to another, a connector will be part of
the propagation chain more often than a random user, and propagation chains
containing connectors will on average be shorter than other chains. Shorter
chains have a positive influence on the accuracy of the trust estimations and
recommendations, as discussed in Chapter 6 and [41].
Figure 7.2.1 shows a diagram with examples of each type: the darker the
node, the more reviews the user wrote (maven). The larger the node, the more
reviews the user evaluated (frequent rater). The trust network is denoted by
the arrows representing trust relations; connectors are characterized by many
incoming and outgoing arrows.
In the Epinions-reviews data set, we define a maven as someone who has writ-
ten at least 100 reviews (M-100+), a frequent rater as someone who has evalu-
ated at least 2500 reviews (F-2500+), and a connector as someone who has an
in+out degree of at least 175 (C-175+). With these definitions2, the commu-
2Note that we cannot refine the definitions by taking into account additional information, such
as the length of the review or the product type discussed in the review, because the data set does
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Figure 7.2.1: Diagram of a trust-based recommender systems’ network with
examples of key figures.
nity contains 1925 mavens, 1891 frequent raters and 1813 connectors. These
thresholds are chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the characteristics of the
key figures must be distinctive. For example, among all authors (i.e., users who
wrote at least one review), the average number of reviews written is 4.77 while
the maximum is 1496. Obviously, a user who has written merely 5 reviews can-
not be regarded as a maven. Figure 7.2.2 shows the distribution of the number
of reviews per author; there are over 300 000 authors. The users who wrote
more than 100 reviews constitute about 0.6% of all review writers, which we
consider a good representation of the ‘true’ mavens: they certainly exhibit the
desired behavior, and the size of the group is still large enough to diversify (we
refer to Section 7.4.3 for a further discussion on this topic). The thresholds
for frequent raters and connectors are obtained analogously, each of them rep-
resenting about 1% of the corresponding user sets: the F-2500+ and C-175+
sets constitute about 1.2% of the raters and 1.4% of the trust graph members
respectively. Secondly, the thresholds are also chosen such that the different
key figure sets have similar sizes; this enables us to perform the analysis in the
following paragraph in a fairer way. In Section 7.4, we experiment with other
thresholds as well.
The sets of connectors and mavens share a large number of users, which is not
surprising because mavens are visible through the reviews they write, making it
more likely for others to connect to them by trust statements. This is illustrated
by Figure 7.2.3: the horizontal axis corresponds to the number of reviews a
user has written; the more to the right a user is, the more of a maven he is. The
not contain any other information.
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Figure 7.2.2: Number of reviews written versus number of review authors in
the Epinions-reviews data set.
100 101 102 103 104
100
101
102
103
104
# written reviews
# 
re
ce
ive
d 
ev
alu
at
ion
s
 
 
Figure 7.2.3: Number of reviews written versus number of evaluations received
in the Epinions-reviews data set.
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vertical axis corresponds to the number of evaluations a user has received. The
higher someone is on that axis, the more inlinks he receives (and the more of
a connector he will be). In particular, the conditional probability P(M-100+|C-
175+)≈0.52. More surprising is the relation between connectors and frequent
raters, namely P(F-2500+|C-175+)≈0.64. The intersection of the maven set
and the frequent rater set also contains many users (933), so there clearly is a
strong overlap between the different groups of key figures. This indicates that
users who are active on one front are often active on other fronts as well.
Note that these findings may be influenced by Epinions’ ‘Income Share pro-
gram’ (which rewards writers who contribute reviews that help other users
make decisions3) and the benefits of being selected as a category lead, top
reviewer or advisor4. Some of these classes are related to the key figures we
defined, though our approach for identifying key figures only relies on objective
data, while the selection in the Income Share program is partially subjective.
Note that Epinions’ interface also has an impact on the visibility and relatedness
of the user classes.
Although their characteristics may be influenced by the specific situation, the
three user classes can be detected in many kinds of trust-based recommenda-
tion systems, and hence the results in the remainder of this chapter can easily
be generalized. In the following sections, we investigate the impact of the iden-
tified key figure types in the trust network by means of new social network
analysis measures.
7.3 Measuring the Impact of Trusted Users
In this section we tackle the first question raised in the introduction: we zoom
in on a user a and we inspect a user b in the web of trust of a. More in particular,
we propose a way to quantify the impact of b on the coverage and the accuracy
of the recommendations generated for a through the trust network. In the re-
mainder, we use WOT (a) to denote the web of trust of a, i.e., the users that are
directly trusted by a. A straightforward approach is to remove b from WOT (a)
and to compare the accuracy and the coverage in the resulting network with the
initial situation.
3See http://www1.epinions.com/help/faq/show_~faq_earnings
4See www.epinions.com/help/faq/show_~faq_recognition, both accessed on March 22 2010.
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A classical way to measure the accuracy of recommendations is by using the
leave-one-out method and computing the MAE. The accuracy change AC(b, a)
is then obtained by subtracting the MAE after excluding the ratings and trust
links provided by b, from the MAE when taking into account all available rat-
ings and links (a similar formula can be obtained by using the RMSE).
Definition 7.1 (Accuracy change). Let a be a user and b a member of WOT (a).
We define the change in accuracy caused by user b for user a as
AC(b, a) = MAE(a)−MAE(a,−b),
in which MAE(a) denotes the MAE when all WOT members of a are included,
and MAE(a,−b) the MAE when b is omitted from WOT (a). If b is the only WOT
member of a, then AC(b, a) is not defined.
Consequently, a positive AC denotes higher prediction errors when taking into
account the ratings and links provided by user b. The MAE formula in Definition
5.4 only takes into account items i for which a rating ri is available. Since the
problem with cold start users in the first place is that they have rated only very
few items, the value of n in Definition 5.4 is typically low. Even worse: for a
cold start user a who rated only one item so far, the leave-one-out method can
not even be used as it hides the sole rating available for a, leaving the recom-
mender system clueless. In Section 7.3.1, we therefore propose the use of a
betweenness measure as a more informative way to assess the impact of user b
on the accuracy for a.
The coverage for a relates to the number of items that are accessible from a,
either directly or through trust propagation. The set of accessible items from a
contains all items i that a has rated, or that can be reached through a trust path
from a to a user x who has rated i. In the remainder, let Acc0(a) denote the
set of items that are rated by a, i.e. the set of items that are accessible from a
in zero propagation steps. Through propagation, more items can become acces-
sible from a. We use Accn(a) to denote the set of items that are accessible in
n steps from a but not less, i.e., items i that have n intermediary nodes on the
shortest path from a to i.
Definition 7.2 (Accessible items). We define the set of items accessible from a in
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n ≥ 0 propagation steps, but not less, as
Acc0(a) = {i | item i is rated by a}
Accn(a) =
⋃
{Accn−1(u)|u ∈WOT (a)} \
⋃
{Acck(a)|k = 0 · · ·n− 1}
Note that |Accn(a)| is the number of new items for which a rating can be pre-
dicted in a particular trust-enhanced recommendation algorithm using n prop-
agation steps. In a similar way we can define Accn(a,−b).
Definition 7.3 (Accessible items after omission). Let a be a user and b a member
of WOT (a). We define the set of items still accessible from a in n ≥ 0 propagation
steps after omitting b from a’s web of trust as
Acc0(a,−b) = Acc0(a)
Accn(a,−b) =
⋃
{Accn−1(u)|u ∈WOT−b(a)} \⋃
{Acck(a,−b)|k = 0 · · ·n− 1} ,
in which WOT−b(a) = WOT (a) \ {b}.
Note that normalizing the difference |Accn(a)| − |Accn(a,−b)| by dividing it by
the total amount of items available in a recommender system results in very
small values as a recommender system typically contains thousands of items.
Instead of looking at the number of items still accessible from a after the re-
moval of b and relating this to the total amount of items in the recommender
system, we therefore focus on the number of items that is lost when b is omitted
from a’s web of trust, and relate this to the total number of items accessible
from a. To this end we propose in Section 7.3.2 an adaptation of an existing
fragmentation measure5.
7.3.1 Betweenness
As shorter propagation chains yield more accurate predictions (remember the
results of Golbeck et al.’s research; see Section 6.2.1.1), one way of measuring
5In [151] we reflected on a first effort of measuring the coverage impact of users in a trust
network. The measure we used in that paper is based on the same rationale, but the measure that
we introduce in Section 7.3.2 has a clearer foundation in social network analysis.
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Figure 7.3.1: Examples of accessible items for target user a through WOT mem-
bers b1 and b2; scenario 1 and scenario 2.
the impact of users is by counting how often they are on shortest paths leading
to items. To quantify this, we use the following measure which is inspired by
the well known betweenness measure, commonly used to locate users who have
a large influence on the flow in a network (see e.g. [32, 33, 154]).
Definition 7.4 (Betweenness). Let a be a user and b a member of WOT (a). We
define the betweenness of b for a on level n ≥ 0 as
Bn(b, a) =
1
|Accn(a)|
∑
i∈Accn(a)
(
τai(b)
τai
)
,
in which τai is the number of different shortest paths from user a to item i and
τai(b) is the number of those shortest paths that contain b.
Note that Bn(b, a) ∈ [0, 1]. Also remark that a shortest path from a to i contain-
ing b always contains the edge from a to b as its first link.
Example 7.1. In the first scenario in Figure 7.3.1, 3 items are accessible from a. b1
is on the only shortest path from a to i1 as well as on one of the two shortest paths
from a to i2, hence we obtain B1(b1, a) = 13 ·
(
1 + 12
)
= 12 . Similarly, B1(b2, a) =
1/2. However, when focusing on items reached in an additional propagation step
(scenario 2), the betweenness of b1 and b2 is no longer equal. Because b1 connects
to more users, a can reach more items through b1 than through b2. In other words,
b1 is more of a connector than b2: B2(b1, a) = 8/11, while B2(b2, a) = 3/11. In
scenario 2 we presuppose that all items on level 2 are different from i1, i2 and i3.
Note that if, e.g., i3 were one of the two items rated by b5, the betweenness of b1
would decrease (B2(b1, a) = 7/10) because he is not on the shortest path to i3.
This example illustrates that betweenness rewards connectors. If user b is the
only one in a’s web of trust to have rated a particular item i, then for that i the
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maximal value of τai(b)/τai is added, namely 1. In this sense, betweenness also
rewards frequent raters who contribute to the coverage.
Bn(b, a) gives an indication of the absolute impact of b on the coverage of the
recommendations for a, but it does not provide information on how b compares
to other members of a’s web of trust. However, this is a determining factor
for the real impact of b on the recommendations generated for a. A strong
WOT contains strong users who rate many items and link to other strong users.
Adding b to such a web of trust is less beneficial than adding b to a weak web
of trust: in the latter case, a will often reach more previously unreachable items
through b, whereas more items are already reachable in a strong WOT (thanks
to the strong members). In other words, b will have a more significant influence
when a has a weak web of trust.
We can represent the WOT strength by the betweenness of the best user of the
web of trust besides the key figure, and compare this value to the betweenness
of the key figure.
Definition 7.5 (Betweenness utility). Let a be a user and b a member ofWOT (a).
We define the betweenness utility of user b for user a on level n ≥ 0 as
BUn(b, a) = Bn(b, a)− max
u∈WOT−b(a)
Bn(u, a)
If b is the only WOT member of a and n > 0, then BUn(b, a) = Bn(b, a) = 1.
Note that BUn ranges from −1 to 1. If n = 0 then Bn(b, a) = 0. For n > 0, if all
items are only reachable through user b, then BUn(b, a) = 1; if this is the case
for another WOT member, than BUn(b, a) = −1.
7.3.2 Fragmentation
Instead of focusing on shortest paths, user b’s influence can also be measured
by the reduction in cohesion of the network which occurs if b is deleted from
a’s web of trust. User b is vital for a when he rates a lot of items and when a
lot of these items are only rated by b. Deleting such a high impact user from
a WOT results in a fragmented network with many items appearing in isolated
fragments. For a user a we study the fragmentation in the undirected graph
corresponding to the network like the one depicted in Figure 7.3.1, i.e., the
graph that contains as its nodes all users and items accessible from a in zero or
more propagation steps, and the links that lead to them as its edges.
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Example 7.2. In the first as well as in the second scenario of Figure 7.3.1 all items
are initially in one fragment. If we remove b1 from WOT (a) in the first scenario,
two fragments arise, namely {i1} and {i2, i3}. Similarly, in the second scenario, 9
fragments (of which 8 are islands, i.e. containing only 1 item) are obtained after
deleting the edge from a to b1.
To quantify the fragmentation impact, we count the number of pairs of items
that become disconnected from each other, i.e., items that are in separate frag-
ments after removal of b. Note that a fragment containing s items contains
exactly s · (s − 1)/2 connected item pairs, since all items in the same fragment
are connected to each other. The following measure, which is a modification of
the traditional fragmentation measure (see e.g. [10, 16]), is based on this.
Definition 7.6 (Fragmentation). Let a be a user and b a member of WOT (a). We
define the fragmentation of b for a on level n ≥ 0 as
Fn(b, a) = 1−
∑k
j=1 sj(sj − 1)
|Accn(a)| · (|Accn(a)| − 1) ,
in which k is the number of fragments of Accn(a) after removing b from WOT (a),
and sj is the number of items in the jth fragment.
The numerator describes the situation after the removal of b: there are k frag-
ments and each jth fragment contains sj · (sj − 1)/2 pairs of connected items,
hence the numerator is the total number of connected item pairs after removal
of b. The denominator on the other hand describes the original state of the net-
work, i.e. before omitting b from WOT (a): all |Accn(a)| items are in the same
fragment (i.e. minimal fragmentation) and this fragment contains |Accn(a)| ·
(|Accn(a)| − 1)/2 connected item pairs.
A user b who has only rated items that are also reachable through other users
will yield Fn(b, a) = 0, because the situation after deletion does not differ from
the minimal fragmentation situation. In other words, the fragmentation mea-
sure rewards b’s original contribution to the coverage for a: when b is removed
fromWOT (a), items that have only been rated by b become separate fragments.
The more islands, the more Fn(b, a) approaches 1, the ideal situation. Note that
Fn(b, a) ∈ [0, 1].
Example 7.3. In the first scenario of Figure 7.3.1 it holds that
F1(b1, a) = F1(b2, a) =
2
3
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In the second scenario of Figure 7.3.1, we obtain F2(b1, a) = 104/110 ≈ 0.95 while
F2(b2, a) = 54/110 ≈ 0.49 assuming that all 11 items are in Acc2(a), which re-
flects that b1 plays a more vital role than b2 in the web of trust of a.
Much work has been done on the vulnerability of networks to disconnection. A
large part of it focuses on cutpoint problems, such as the min-k-cut or the min-
k-vertex sharing problem (e.g. [103]). The latter tries to minimize the number
of deleted users to achieve a k-way partition. This problem is complementary
to ours, as we know the number of users to be deleted: in our experiments we
typically remove one user from the web of trust and study the effect.
When assessing the influence of a particular user, it is best to take into account
fragmentation and betweenness together: users that have an equal fragmenta-
tion score might still be distinguished based on betweenness, and vice versa.
Example 7.4. For scenario 3 in Figure 7.3.2 we obtain:
F1(b1, a) = 6/12 B1(b1, a) = 3/8
F1(b2, a) = 0 B1(b2, a) = 2/8
F1(b3, a) = 6/12 B1(b3, a) = 3/8
while in scenario 4 it holds that:
F1(b1, a) = 0 B1(b1, a) = 3/8
F1(b2, a) = 0 B1(b2, a) = 1/8
F1(b3, a) = 6/12 B1(b3, a) = 4/8
If we focus on fragmentation only, then the influence of b3 is the same in both
scenarios. However, it is clear that b3 in scenario 4 is more beneficial, because he
has rated more items, and more item ratings help to obtain more accurate predic-
tions. This is reflected in the betweenness value for b3, which is higher in scenario
4. Analogously, although b1 has the same betweenness in both scenarios, it is clear
that he is more beneficial in scenario 3, since in scenario 4 all items rated by b1 can
also be reached through other users. This is reflected by a higher fragmentation
value for b1 in scenario 3.
Although in theory the fragmentation impact of b for a can range from 0 to 1,
in practice its upper bound is determined by the behavior of all users in a’s web
of trust, more in particular by the number of items that they rated in common.
While for the betweenness measure different users can score well simultane-
ously by occurring frequently on (different) shortest paths, for the fragmen-
tation score they are in competition with each other. Fragmentation rewards
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Figure 7.3.2: Examples of accessible items for target user a through WOT mem-
bers b1, b2 and b3; scenario 3 and scenario 4.
original contributions, so the more items are rated by more than one user, the
harder it is for individual users to achieve a high fragmentation score. We call
the practical upper bound on Fn(b, a) the room for originality.
Definition 7.7 (Room for originality). We define the room for originality w.r.t. a
on level n as
Fmaxn (a) = 1−
|Comn(a)| · (|Comn(a)| − 1)
|Accn(a)| · (|Accn(a)| − 1)
in whichComn(a) represents the set of items inAccn(a) that are accessible through
more than one user of a’s web of trust:
Comn(a) =
⋂
{Accn(a,−x)|x ∈WOT (a)}
Note that Fmaxn is the same for all users in a’s web of trust. F
max
n is reached
when a single user ofWOT (a) reaches all non-common items. This corresponds
to the maximal fragmentation situation possible in practice.
Example 7.5. In scenario 4 of Figure 7.3.2, there is only one non common item,
which is reached by b3. Com1(a) = {i1, i2, i3}, hence
Fmax1 (a) = 1−
3 · 2
4 · 3 =
1
2
This value is indeed reached at F1(b3, a) = 1/2. In scenario 1 of Figure 7.3.1 on
the other hand, Com1(a) = {i2}. In this case Fmax1 (a) is 1 which indicates that
there is more room for original contribution than in scenario 4. Even though in
absolute terms F1(b1, a) = 2/3 from scenario 1 is higher than F1(b3, a) = 1/2
from scenario 4, user b3 from scenario 4 exhibits a stronger behavior as he filled
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the room for original contribution maximally while user b1 from scenario 1 only
managed to fill two thirds.
We take these considerations into account by normalizing the fragmentation
utility w.r.t. the room for originality. Note that FUn ranges from −1 to 1.
Definition 7.8 (Fragmentation utility). Let a be a user and b a member ofWOT (a).
We define the fragmentation utility of user b for user a on level n ≥ 0 as
FUn(b, a) =
Fn(b, a)− max
u∈WOT−b(a)
Fn(u, a)
Fmaxn (a)
If n = 0 then Fn(b, a) = 0. If b is the only WOT member of a and n > 0, then
FUn(b, a) = 1.
7.4 Experimental Results
To answer the second question raised in the introduction, we performed two
kinds of experiments to investigate the effect of key figures on the coverage
and accuracy of cold start recommendations. In particular, the first experiment
focuses on the contribution of key figures who are already in the web of trust
from a cold start user, while the second experiment focuses on the impact of
adding a key figure to a WOT instead of a randomly chosen user. Table 7.2
gives an overview of the measures we evaluated.
The impact of key figures in a trust-enhanced recommender network not
only depends on its characteristics, but also on the recommendation algorithm
that is used. We conduct our experiments for Massa and Avesani’s trust-based
collaborative filtering method (see Definition 6.3), since they have already shown
that their algorithm can help in alleviating the cold start problem (see Section
7.1.1). Furthermore, trust-based filtering and EnsembleTrustCF are less suit-
able for this purpose because they use correlation coefficients, making it more
difficult to measure the actual impact of the key figures on the trust-based rec-
ommendations.
To our knowledge, no studies have been conducted on the influence of key
figures in trust-based recommenders. However, there exists some work on the
impact of collaborative filtering users, in particular studies about identifying
users who influence the buying behavior of other users and hence boost the
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sales of particular items [28, 120]. These studies link up with the broad re-
search area of viral marketing which targets users in the network who have a
high ability to influence others (e.g. to buy a particular item or to spread a new
idea); see for example [80, 126]. However, these approaches differ from ours,
as they focus on influencing the buying behavior of users, do not specifically
measure the impact on the coverage and accuracy, and do not focus on cold
start users. Furthermore, we use characteristics of trust-based collaborative fil-
tering networks to define the key figures.
7.4.1 Contribution of Key Figures
In the first experiment, we analyze the role of key figures in a cold start user’s
web of trust and compare them with random web of trust members. To this aim,
we only consider cold start users who have exactly one key figure of a specific
type in their web of trust. For instance, the set of CS2 users who are connected
with exactly one maven of type M-1000+. We denote such a set as U and
represent a user of U by a. The corresponding key figure is denoted by ka, and
a randomly chosen member of a’s web of trust by ra, i.e., ra ∈WOT (a) \ {ka}.
Table 7.3 shows how many cold start users can be evaluated. Between brack-
ets we include the number of cold start users who only have the key figure as
WOT member, i.e., the number of cold start users for whom ra does not exist.
Since we are dealing with cold start users who are also CS users in the trust
sense, the latter amount will be relatively high compared to the former.
The results for the social network analysis measures in this experiment can be
found in Tables 7.4–7.6. A column (row) corresponds to a specific user group
(key figure), e.g., a M-100 is a maven who wrote at least 100 and at most 499
reviews. We focus on the immediate impact of web of trust members, which
means that, for now, we only consider direct trust information (level 1), i.e.,
without propagation.
Table 7.4 contains the average betweenness and fragmentation values of a
key figure (ABk1 and AF
k
1 resp.), while Table 7.5 contains the average between-
ness and fragmentation of a random other WOT member (ABr1 and AF
r
1 ). Fi-
nally, Table 7.6 contains the results for the best alternative user, i.e., the best
performing member of WOT−b(a) (ABw1 and AF
w
1 ). Note that AB
w
1 and AF
w
1
represent the average WOT strength (see Definition 7.5). Also note that for the
cold start users who only have the key figure in their web of trust we cannot
compute ABr1 , AF
r
1 , AB
w
1 and AF
w
1 .
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Table 7.3: Experiment on contribution of key figures w.r.t. direct trust informa-
tion; number of cold start users to be evaluated (number of cold start users that
only have the key figure in their WOT).
TYPE CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4
F-100000 79(23) 51(10) 48(10) 53(4)
F-50000 257(131) 171(59) 146(42) 131(31)
F-10000 1 124(684) 764(359) 525(315) 462(162)
F-2500 1 412(912) 925(448) 647(259) 537(178)
M-1000 124(58) 87(32) 81(22) 69(15)
M-500 466(253) 336(133) 262(78) 221(57)
M-100 2 319(1664) 1 444(816) 949(513) 781(348)
C-1000 509(264) 355(125) 275(84) 238(55)
C-500 893(508) 592(260) 439(150) 366(120)
C-175 1 948(1296) 1 230(636) 835(385) 646(250)
The formula for the average betweenness value of the key figures for cold start
users who are connected with exactly one key figure of a certain type is given
by (7.1); the other formulas are analogous.
ABk1 =
∑
a∈U B1(ka, a)
|U | (7.1)
A key figure is clearly very influential for a cold start user, with an average ABk1
of 0.80 and an average AF k1 of 0.84. As expected, the betweenness and frag-
mentation values for a random WOT user are significantly lower (an average
ABr1 of 0.16 and an average AF
r
1 of 0.21). Frequent raters score somewhat
higher than connectors and mavens, with an average ABk1 of 0.83 and an aver-
age AF k1 of 0.87. This is not surprising because frequent raters are the real sup-
pliers for a recommender system; without them there would only be few ratings
and consequently less recommendations. Hence, it is more difficult for members
of such a WOT (containing a frequent rater) to obtain a high betweenness and
fragmentation value, than for members of another web of trust. This explains
why ABw1 and AF
w
1 are generally lower for CS users connected to a frequent
rater. For instance, ABw1 is on average 0.15 for frequent raters, as opposed to
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0.18 and 0.19 for connectors and mavens, respectively. More surprising is the
fact that mavens score very well too. This is especially useful for new users
because it is much easier to decide whether to trust the (more visible) mavens.
Figure 7.4.1 depicts the course of the average betweenness and fragmentation
utility of the different key figure types (average over all key figures for a par-
ticular cold start group). Recall that the utility compares the impact of the key
figure (Bk1 and F
k
1 ) to that of the best alternative user in the WOT (B
w
1 and F
w
1 ).
For the fragmentation utility values, also another contextual factor is taken into
account, namely the room for originality Fmax1 .
The figure clearly shows that the use of having a key figure in a web of
trust decreases as the new user becomes more active. Indeed, as is illustrated
in Table 7.1, more active cold start users rate more items and issue more trust
statements; consequently, the web of trust sizes become larger. This means that
there is a higher chance that one of the WOT members is a stronger user, yield-
ing higher values for Bw1 and F
w
1 , and lower values for the key figures.
On the one hand, the figure gives us a good overview of the evolution of the
utility for different classes of cold start users, but on the other hand it also
presents a distorted image of the real impact of the key figure classes due to the
aggregated information: there is no breakdown for the types within the same
key figure class. The actual impact of each individual key figure type is depicted
in Figure 7.4.2. We can make several observations.
Firstly, whereas Figure 7.4.1 suggests that mavens result in higher AFU1’s,
Figure 7.4.2 shows that, overall, frequent raters do achieve the highest frag-
mentation utility values, which is in accordance with the results in the previous
tables: leaving aside the least active frequent raters group, mavens and con-
nectors score less in all but one occasion, namely the group of cold start users
with exactly one M-100 maven in their WOT. This particular maven group also
contains a high number of frequent raters (more than 500 F-2500 and over
300 F-10000+ frequent raters), yielding an immediate impact on the coverage.
This explains e.g. the higher results compared to the F-2500 group (which only
contains key figures that have rated less than 10000 items).
According to Figure 7.4.1 it appears that connectors perform significantly
worse than mavens and frequent raters w.r.t. fragmentation utility, but Figure
7.4.2 demonstrates that this is mainly due to the M-100 group; apart from these
key figures, connectors also achieve good results, and score well compared to
mavens. Note that the mutual relations between the key figure types are pre-
served for the betweenness utility.
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Figure 7.4.1: Experiment on contribution of key figures; average betweenness
and fragmentation utility (ABU1, AFU1 in [−1, 1]) of all key figures for CS users.
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Figure 7.4.2: Experiment on contribution of key figures; average betweenness
and fragmentation utility (ABU1, AFU1 in [−1, 1]) of key figure groups for CS users.
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As discussed in Section 7.3, the fragmentation measures reflect the impact of
users on the coverage of a recommender. Example 7.1 illustrated that the be-
tweenness measures also partially reflect the coverage effect when only taking
into account direct trust information. However, as mentioned earlier, an in-
crease in coverage is beneficial only to the extent that the accuracy does not
drop significantly. In Section 7.3, we proposed to use the accuracy change
(Definition 7.1) to measure the accuracy impact of users, but also explained
that applying the betweenness measures should give us a more informed opin-
ion, especially when not only direct information is taken into account, but also
propagation paths.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the accuracy of the recommen-
dations. We first illustrate that the accuracy change can only give us a hint of a
key figure’s impact on the accuracy of the recommendations for cold start users,
and then proceed by focusing on the betweenness utility results on level 2, i.e.,
for propagated trust information.
We computed the average AC values (AAC) as in formula (7.2). The results
are shown in Table 7.7.
AAC =
∑
a∈U AC(ka, a)
|U | (7.2)
Note that no results are generated for the CS1 group: Definition 6.3 uses the
mean of a user’s ratings, but the leave-one-out method already hides the sole
rating of a CS1 user. Also note that for a CSm user (with m > 1), exactly m
leave-one-out experiments can be performed.
Since items are rated on a scale from 1 to 5, the extreme values of AC and
AAC are −4 and 4. Because we use the leave-one-out method, we can only
take into account items that are rated by the cold start user a, i.e., items of
Acc0(a). On level 1, AAC measures the average accuracy change for items that
are immediately accessible through users u of WOT (a), i.e., items that are in
Acc0(u). In other words, for a particular cold start user a, the leave-one-out
experiment can be applied on the items of Acc0(a) ∩
⋃
u∈WOT (a)Acc0(u).
On level 2, we consider items that become accessible through trust propa-
gation (items in Acc0(a) and in
⋃
u∈WOT (a)Acc1(u)); the values are obtained
by subtracting the MAE of the predictions generated by information reached
through trusted third parties (TTPs) other than the key figure, from the MAE
of the predictions based on all TTPs (including the key figure). In other words,
positive accuracy changes denote higher prediction errors when taking into ac-
count the key figure.
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Table 7.7: Experiment on contribution of key figures; average accuracy change
(in [−4, 4]) of all key figures for cold start users.
direct information only propagation length 2
TYPE CS2 CS3 CS4 CS2 CS3 CS4
F-100000 −0.23 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.01
F-50000 −0.04 −0.09 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.08
F-10000 0.16 −0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02
F-2500 −0.06 0.03 −0.03 −0.05 0.01 0.00
M-1000 0.05 −0.14 −0.12 0.09 0.05 0.13
M-500 0.02 −0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01
M-100 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01
C-1000 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.05
C-500 0.06 −0.05 0.05 −0.01 0.00 0.02
C-175 0.01 0.03 −0.04 −0.01 0.00 −0.04
The results for direct trust information demonstrate that the absence or pres-
ence of a key figure in a web of trust does not significantly affect the accuracy.
In other words, the key figures have a positive effect on the coverage (as has
been shown in the preceding experiment), while maintaining sufficient accu-
racy. The results for propagated information (items on level 2 but not on level
1) lead to the same conclusion. However, we should note that these results can
only serve as a very cautious indication of the accuracy impact. Firstly, since
we are dealing with cold start users, only few leave-one-out experiments can be
conducted. For a CS2 user for example, maximum 2 ratings can be predicted,
but for the CS2 users in the level 1 experiment in Table 7.7, on average merely
1.2 items can be reached. For CS3 and CS4 this is respectively 1.5 and 1.8 on a
maximum of 3 and 4. There are more reachable items on level 2 (1.7 for a CS2
user, 2.2 for a CS3 and 2.9 for a CS4 user), but still it remains a fact that one
needs more predictions to come to a preciser conclusion. Furthermore, for CS1
users, no accuracy change at all can be computed.
The betweenness utility is based on how many times the key figure appears
on shortest paths leading to the items (see Section 7.3.1). Since it has been
shown that shorter trust paths lead to more accurate predictions (see Chapter
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6), the betweenness utility can be used as a more informative measure of the
accuracy impact. This is especially true for cold start users for whom it is not
possible to compute meaningful accuracy change values. Another argument to
focus on the betweenness utility values instead of the accuracy change is that
the former also enables us to investigate the accuracy advantage of key figures
for CS1 users.
Figure 7.4.3 depicts the evolution of the betweenness utility when using direct
trust information only, or by allowing trust propagation. The dark bars repre-
sent the same information (but in a different presentation) as in the upper part
of Figure 7.4.2, i.e, ABU1. The light bars represent ABU2. The graphs show
that also on level 2 the utility of key figures decreases as the cold start users
become more active.
Recall that the frequent raters achieved in almost every scenario the highest
ABU1’s. However, this is no longer the case for ABU2. In fact, of the three
key figure types it is the only one which always results in utility decreases going
from level 1 (direct information) to level 2 (propagation). Indeed, the strength
of frequent raters lies in their immediate impact on coverage, and not in cen-
trality (the latter leading to higher occurrence on shortest paths, resulting in
better accuracy). For example, take a look at the drastic decreases going from
F-50000 to F-100000.
Connectors are supposed to be more central in the network, and hence one
expects high betweenness utility increases. This starts to reveal itself in the be-
tweenness utility evolution for level 2. However, the increases are small, and
in some cases even connectors result in utility decreases. This phenomenon
can be explained by the fact that the items on level 2 can be reached through
more WOT members of the cold start users than the items on level 1, and that
this has an impact on the betweenness values. In Definition 7.4, if a key figure
b is the only member of WOT (a) through which item i can be reached, then
τai(b)/τai = 1, which results in high betweenness values. However, the more
WOT members other than the key figure contribute to i, the lower τai(b)/τai
will be, yielding lower betweenness values too. This explains the small utility
difference w.r.t. level 1 and 2 in Figure 7.4.3.
The above argumentation is also confirmed by an inspection of the room for
originality values Fmax1 and F
max
2 (see Definition 7.7). Recall that they measure
the ‘popularity’ of the items in Acc(a), in the sense that they reflect the number
of users who have rated them and the number of paths leading to them. The
more WOT members who can contribute to an item i, the lower the Fmax values
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Figure 7.4.3: Experiment on contribution of key figures; average betweenness
utility (in [−1, 1]) of key figures groups for cold start users, focus on direct
information (dark bars) and propagation paths of length 2 (light bars).
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will be. Indeed, for Figure 7.4.3, the Fmax2 values are lower than their level 1
counterparts. As an example, for the CS3 user group, all Fmax1 values approach
1, whereas for C-175, C-500 and C-1000, the Fmax2 values amount to 0.77, 0.67
and 0.60 respectively, which explains why the C-175 group achieves the highest
ABU2 values.
Note that mavens continue to perform very well: they do not only achieve good
fragmentation scores, but can also compete with connectors on several occa-
sions, for direct as well as propagated information. Also note that the level 2
graphs in Figure 7.4.3 confirm our finding that key figures are active on several
fronts: the good results for mavens reflect the fact that they also exhibit the
connector characteristic.
7.4.2 Benefit over Random Users
The number of users in the previous experiments is fairly small compared to
the total number of cold start users; for example, 84.36% of the CS4 users
have no F-2500 in their WOT, as opposed to 7.34% whose web of trust contains
exactly one. To take into account a larger group of users, we also conducted an
experiment with groups of CS users who have no key figure of a particular type
in their WOT. We denote such a group by U . The number of users in each group
can be found in Table 7.8; note the difference in order of magnitude with the
numbers in Table 7.3.
The goal of the experiment is then to investigate the effect of adding a key
figure to such a cold start user’s web of trust. For instance, we connect a M-100,
M-500 or M-1000 to each CS2 user whose WOT does not contain a maven. In
particular, for one experiment, we calculate for each user a in a given group
U the difference DFU(a) between the fragmentation utilities FU1(k, a) and
FU1(r, a), in which k represents a randomly chosen key figure of a given type
and r a randomly chosen member of the set of all active users. Active users
are those who rated at least one user or one item, hence this set contains key
figures as well. DBU is defined analogously for betweenness. In other words,
DFU and DBU measure the extra gain when adding a key figure to the WOT
instead of a random user.
Figures 7.4.4 and 7.4.5 depict the average utility differencesADFU andADBU
for each user group when a specific key figure is added to the WOT. The formula
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Table 7.8: Experiment on benefit over random users; number of cold start users
to be evaluated.
TYPE CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4
F-2500+ 56 601 18 273 9 875 6 177
M-100+ 56 601 18 099 9 742 6 101
C-175+ 56 431 17 986 9 673 6 065
for ADFU ∈ [−2, 2] is given by (7.3), the formula for the average betweenness
utility difference is analogous.
ADFU =
∑
a∈U DFU(a)
|U | =
∑
a∈U (FU1(k, a)− FU1(r, a))
|U | (7.3)
Clearly, adding a key figure to a web of trust is more beneficial than adding
a random user. For example, the fragmentation utility of an added key figure
increases on average with 0.41 compared to the utility of the randomly added
user.
The figures also show that, in general, the more active the key figure is, the
more advantageous it is to have such a user in a WOT. E.g., users who are con-
nected with a F-10000+ have a larger DFU and DBU than users connected
with a F-2500. This phenomenon also occurs with mavens and connectors,
which confirms once again that users who are active on one front (being a
maven or connector) are often active on other fronts as well (being a frequent
rater, i.e., boosting the number of accessible items).
Note that the differences become larger for more active CS users. As Table
7.9 illustrates, this is because the utility of randomly added users decreases
more rapidly than the utility of key figures when the cold start user rates more
items. Note that the table contains three lines for random users, for each cold
start user class, i.e., the CS users who are not connected to any frequent rater,
the CS users who have no maven in their WOT, or no connector.
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Table 7.9: Experiment on benefit over random users; average fragmentation
and betweenness utility of key figures and random users for cold start users.
AFU1 ABU1
TYPE CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4
F-100000 0.9997 0.9993 0.9992 0.9990 0.9998 0.9997 0.9995 0.9994
F-50000 0.9991 0.9982 0.9978 0.9973 0.9995 0.9990 0.9988 0.9985
F-10000 0.9964 0.9928 0.9909 0.9894 0.9981 0.9962 0.9951 0.9940
F-2500 0.9883 0.9772 0.9716 0.9654 0.9940 0.9878 0.9846 0.9817
Random 0.7298 0.5516 0.4432 0.3209 0.9076 0.8350 0.7892 0.7408
M-1000 0.9917 0.9849 0.9798 0.9794 0.9960 0.9917 0.9908 0.9891
M-500 0.9794 0.9595 0.9500 0.9398 0.9898 0.9801 0.9738 0.9700
M-100 0.9574 0.9210 0.9059 0.8739 0.9783 0.9591 0.9501 0.9363
Random 0.7402 0.5640 0.4459 0.3451 0.9106 0.8403 0.7976 0.7489
C-1000 0.9876 0.9975 0.9703 0.9136 0.9934 0.9880 0.9842 0.9812
C-500 0.9832 0.9677 0.9615 0.9524 0.9912 0.9837 0.9808 0.9723
C-175 0.9705 0.9490 09329 0.9598 0.9855 0.9732 0.9653 0.9573
Random 0.7463 0.5772 0.4650 0.3453 0.9132 0.8470 0.8035 0.7558
7.4.3 Discussion
For new users, choosing the right web of trust members can come as an over-
whelming task. Therefore, the recommender system can guide and interact
with such cold start users by proposing a list of members which are worth ex-
ploring because they have an immediate and positive impact on the generated
recommendations. Such ‘suggestion lists’ are a common technique in social net-
working sites. For example, in FilmTrust6, Golbeck encourages users to expand
their network by showing two lists of users which people can connect to: a
set of random users and a set of random people with no friends in the net-
work. LinkedIn7 and Live QnA7 provide similar services with their ‘Just joined
LinkedIn’ and ‘Meet a QnA superstar’ lists respectively.
The results in the previous sections indicate that trust-enhanced recom-
mender systems can be improved by including a new building block for alle-
viating connection guidance issues. In particular, we propose to suggest key fig-
ures (mavens, connectors, frequent raters) as possible connections for cold start
users. Such assisting systems can be further refined. Because not every user
has the same likes and dislikes, the system can propose several types of users,
6See trust.mindswap.org/FilmTrust
7See www.linkedin.com and qna.live.com
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think for instance of a ‘mainstream’ key figure who rates a lot of popular items,
or one with more distinct preferences. Furthermore, the system could narrow
down the selection and present more ‘tailor-made’ key figures if the user has
indicated that he is only interested in some specific item categories. Of course,
the key figures only appear as suggestions; a new user can (and must) always
check whether the candidates are worth to be included in his web of trust.
A possible consequence of our technique is that mavens and frequent raters
eventually become connectors too, since the more people connect to key fig-
ures, the higher the number of inlinks they will have and hence the more of
a connector they will be. Note that we showed in Section 7.2 that this phe-
nomenon already occurs in a moderate form in the original dataset.
A related side effect is the appearance of clusters around established users
in the trust network. If this clustering is undesirable, it can be restricted by
choosing appropriate thresholds for the key figure selection. If one chooses high
thresholds, a small number of ‘true’ key figures are obtained, which might lead
to a small number of star-like clusters. This can be avoided by low thresholds,
yielding many key figures. By generating random suggestion lists of these key
figures, the network can remain more equally connected. In other words, the
occurence of strong clusters diminishes, but along with it also the power of
the selected key figures, because we have shown that less active key figures
yield lower betweenness and fragmentation values. Hence, it is clear that the
thresholds must be chosen carefully in agreement with the characteristics of the
recommender system’s network, and that a trade-off should be made between
the desired performance and network topology.
7.5 Conclusions and Future Work
The user cold start problem is one of the main challenges for classical recom-
mender systems. It has been shown that including a trust network among the
users can alleviate the problem, but this requires that newcomers make clever
connections in the trust network. Unfortunately, cold start users in the classical
sense are very often cold start users in the trust sense as well, meaning that they
have very few users in their personal web of trust. In this chapter, we proposed
to tackle this problem by guiding the new users throughout the trust connection
phase. More specifically, we proposed to suggest newcomers to add identified
key figures to their web of trust instead of randomly chosen users, as the former
lead to much more beneficial cold start recommendations.
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To prove the advantages of this approach, we first need suitable measures to
assess the influence of WOT members on the amount (coverage) and the qual-
ity (accuracy) of the generated cold start recommendations. However, we ex-
plained that the traditional coverage and accuracy measures are not very useful
in cold start situations. Therefore, we introduced a new set of techniques that
are more informative and that have a clear foundation in social network analy-
sis. Each measure reflects a different aspect of the influence on the newcomers’
recommendations: the betweenness-based measure focuses on a user’s ability
to reach items via short propagation chains (measuring the impact on the ac-
curacy), while the fragmentation-based measure focuses on a user’s capacity
for delivering new items (measuring the impact on the coverage). Since these
measures only reflect the impact of a single WOT member, without taking into
account environmental factors such as the strength of the other WOT users,
we also introduced two utility measures which reflect the actual advantage of
adding a particular user to a newcomer’s web of trust.
Secondly, we need techniques to identify advantageous users in the trust-
based recommender network. We proposed to classify users according to the
number of reviews they write, the numbers of items they rate and the amount
of trust connections they have. This led to three key figure classes: mavens who
share their knowledge by writing a lot of reviews, frequent raters who provide a
lot of ratings, and connectors who are central in the trust network because they
trust, and are trusted by, many users.
The final step to prove our claim involved a series of experiments on the re-
view data set from Epinions. Our first experiments illustrated that all three key
figure types are very influential in a cold start user’s web of trust. The second
set of experiments clearly demonstrated that generated recommendations for
new users are indeed much more beneficial (w.r.t. coverage and accuracy) if
they add an identified frequent rater, connector or maven to their web of trust
instead of a randomly chosen user.
Every key figure type has its pros and cons: frequent raters immediately
boost the number of generated recommendations (positive impact on coverage),
but have little power in connecting the newcomers to other users in the system.
The latter is exactly the strength of connectors, who occupy central positions
in the trust network and hence will appear much more often on shortest paths
to items (positive impact on the accuracy). The last class of key figures, the
mavens, have the advantage of being visible through the reviews they write,
which greatly facilitates the process of deciding whom to trust. Newcomers
may safely be encouraged to connect to mavens, because the experiments show
202 7 Connection Guidance for Cold Start Users
that they are often active on other fronts (connecting and rating) as well, which
leads to an immediate positive effect on the generated recommendations.
Hence, the incorporation of a new assistance component that computes
connection suggestions (identified mavens, connectors and frequent raters) for
newcomers in a trust-based recommender system can greatly enhance the rec-
ommendation experience. Furthermore, aside from interaction and personal-
ization, another benefit of our connection guidance technique is the ability to
better explain the effect of WOT members on coverage and accuracy of the sys-
tem, which is a new step in the development of more transparent recommender
systems. For these reasons, we think that our technique might be a good asset
for existing and future trust-enhanced recommender systems.
There are several interesting paths for further research on connection guidance.
For instance, by refining the connector type (think of ‘outconnectors’ with many
outlinks) one may gain an insight into the impact of connectors when taking
into account propagation. Furthermore, besides an in-depth study of connector
types, the applicability of the proposed techniques for other trust-enhanced rec-
ommendation types, and an investigation of the potential and impact of distrust
relations on the key figure identification process, one can also investigate the
power of other key figures like hubs and authorities. These can for example
be identified by using well-known evaluation measures such as HITS [70] and
PageRank [109].
Remark that the connection guidance issue that we have discussed in this
chapter links up with the broader problem of trust bootstrapping, i.e., the prob-
lem of how to establish initial trust relations in the network. O’Donovan, too,
addresses this problem, but in a very different way: he introduces PeerChooser,
a new procedure to visualize a trust-based collaborative filtering recommender
system [105]. One of the main features of the system is its possiblity to extract
trust information on the fly, directly from the user at recommendation time. This
is done by moving specific icons (representing users in the system) on an inter-
active interface. In this way, the user can indicate his mood and preferences,
thereby actively providing real-time trust information.
We believe that the problems of connection guidance and trust bootstrap-
ping deserve the attention of the research community, especially since they can
greatly contribute to a better acceptance of trust-enhanced recommenders.
I may not have gone where I intended to go, but I think I have
ended up where I needed to be.
The Long Dark Tea-Time of the Soul, 1988. Douglas Adams
Conclusions
With the advent of e-commerce applications and the ever growing popularity of
social networking tools, a novel kind of recommender systems has been born;
the so-called trust-enhanced recommenders which infer trust information from
the social network between their users, and incorporate this knowledge into
the recommendation process to obtain more personalized recommendations.
Since the pioneering work of Jennifer Golbeck and Paolo Massa, research on
trust-based recommendations is thriving and attracts and inspires an increasing
number of scientists around the world. In this dissertation, we contributed to
some of the most recent and exciting developments in this still nascent domain,
namely the potential of distrust, recommendations for controversial items, and
connection guidance for cold start users.
Trust metrics and recommendation algorithms are the two key building blocks
in every trust-enhanced recommender system. For the first pillar, our novel con-
tributions are particularly in the modeling and computation of distrust. In our
quest for a lightweight (dis)trust model that can be used in many intelligent
web applications, we reviewed the current approaches and came to the conclu-
sion that they cannot cope with knowledge defects such as (partial) ignorance
and conflicting information, although these issues can have a significant im-
pact on the (ranking of) trust estimations and recommendations. Therefore, we
proposed to model trust and distrust as two distinct but related concepts, and
introduced a bilattice-based model that resolves the problems w.r.t. representa-
tion of ignorance and inconsistency (Chapter 2). Furthermore, the new model
enables us to preserve a large part of the available trust provenance informa-
tion; information which can play a vital role in the trust computation process
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(propagation and aggregation), especially when also distrust is involved.
While the concepts of trust propagation and trust aggregation take hold, the
study of their counterparts for distrust is scarcely out of the egg. Our main con-
tributions in the field of trust metrics are in this challenging, yet largely unex-
plored domain. We contributed to a better understanding of the matter by inves-
tigating the propagation and aggregation problem on a theoretical basis but also
from a practical point of view. In particular, we introduced new families of trust
score propagation operators on the basis of fuzzy logic concepts, so that they can
be used to model different kinds of distrust behavior. We showed on two large
real-world social data sets from the e-commerce and opinions site Epinions and
the travellers network CouchSurfing that the distrust-oriented propagation op-
erators perform better than the standard trust-only operators (Chapter 3). The
same data sets were used to study the trust score aggregation problem. We in-
vestigated how standard aggregation properties and methods can be extended
for use in a bilattice setting, and focused on the potential of ordered weighted
averaging strategies and the incorporation of knowledge defects. We demon-
strated that the latter two approaches can produce significantly more accurate
trust estimations than the classic operators for bilattice elements (Chapter 4).
Although the results in this first part of the thesis shed more light on the
problem of propagation and aggregation, the study of computational trust and
distrust is still a work in progress. For example, besides the further exploration
and implementation of propagation methods, aggregation strategies, and their
combination, another interesting research path that we have not tackled so far
is the update of trust and distrust information: as relationships can evolve over
time, it is certainly worthwhile to investigate the effect of changes in the trust
network on the generated trust estimations.
The second part of the dissertation deals with the application of trust networks
to the field of recommender systems. In this part, too, we paid special attention
to distrust. We provided the first experimental study on its potential in memory-
based collaborative recommendation processes; we demonstrated through ex-
periments on a review data set from Epinions that distrust cannot be used as
an indication to reverse opinions, but that its role as debugger of trust predic-
tions, or as a filter of neighbors is more promising: we showed that a weight
filter in combination with the trust score aggregation operators from Chapter
4 can produce more accurate recommendations without loosing in terms of
coverage, compared to Golbeck’s trust-based weighted mean which only uses
(propagated) trust information (Chapter 6).
W.r.t. trust, we gave a comprehensive overview of the domain of trust-
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enhanced recommendation algorithms and focused specifically on their perfor-
mance for controversial items, since these are very challenging for a recom-
mender system to accurately recommend. To this aim, we introduced a new
detection measure which is more suited for the evaluation of the different rec-
ommendation approaches for controversial items (Chapter 5). We conducted
a head-to-head comparison of collaborative filtering and state of the art trust-
enhanced algorithms, and demonstrated that for random items simple baseline
strategies prove to be equally effective. However, we also showed that the more
sophisticated algorithms outperform the basic approaches when it comes down
to controversial items, but that there is still room for improvement. Therefore,
we introduced a new algorithm that combines the best of both the trust world
and the collaborative world, resulting in immediate high coverage while the ac-
curacy of the delivered recommendations remains adequate (Chapter 6).
Our last contribution in the domain of trust-enhanced recommendations, be-
sides our focus on distrust and controversial items, is related to the user cold
start problem, a major issue that is high on the agenda because generating
satisfying recommendations for newcomers can greatly contribute to a better
acceptance of (trust-based) recommender systems (Chapter 7). We tackled the
problem on the user level, as opposed to the algorithm level for the controversial
item problem. We provided a set of social network analysis techniques based
on the classic betweenness and fragmentation measures to quantify the impact
of several classes of useful key figures in a trust-enhanced recommender’s net-
work, in the sense that they have an immediate positive impact on the accuracy
and coverage of the system for cold start users. Experiments on a large data
set from Epinions clearly showed that the generated recommendations for new
users are more beneficial if they connect to an identified key figure compared
to a randomly chosen user, which illustrates that guiding new users throughout
the early stage trust connection process certainly bears fruit.
Research on trust-based recommender systems is broad and diverse, so nat-
urally not all its aspects are covered in this dissertation. One interesting direc-
tion for future work is the investigation of the potential of trust and distrust
as mechanisms to detect and prevent abuses and malicious users. Others in-
clude e.g. live user experiments to get a better idea on the performance, ben-
efits and disadvantages (think of transparency, participation, novelty, etc.) of
trust-enhanced recommendation algorithms.

Samenvatting
Aanbevelingssystemen (Eng. recommender systems) spelen op een proactieve
manier in op de informatienood van gebruikers door hen attent te maken op
‘items’ (boeken, films, jobs, webpagina’s, files, ...) die interessant voor hen
kunnen zijn. Steeds meer webapplicaties maken, naar het voorbeeld van de
e-commerce gigant Amazon.com, gebruik van dergelijke systemen. Het on-
derzoek naar aanbevelingssystemen is recent in een stroomversnelling terecht-
gekomen, onder meer dankzij een prestigieuze wedstrijd uitgeschreven door het
Amerikaanse videoverhuurbedrijf Netflix8.
Het succes van aanbevelingstechnieken hangt af van een goede kennis van
de gebruiker en zijn gedragspatronen. Meer en meer wordt daarbij ook rekening
gehouden met de sociale netwerken waarin de gebruiker participeert: als een
klant van een e-commerce site bv. aangeeft dat hij een hoog vertrouwen stelt
in de mening van bepaalde andere klanten, kan die informatie gebruikt worden
om tot betere aanbevelingen te komen. Vertrouwensnetwerken kwantificeren dit
soort kennis: ze laten gebruikers toe om door middel van vertrouwensscores
aan te geven hoeveel ze elkaar vertrouwen en/of wantrouwen. Aangezien zo’n
virtueel vertrouwensnetwerk meestal ijl is, is het bepalen van de scores van
de gebruikersparen waarvan men geen expliciete score verkregen heeft (met
behulp van de zogenaamde vertrouwensmaten, Eng. trust metrics) een funda-
menteel probleem, waarnaar het onderzoek nog relatief in de beginfase zit.
In vertrouwensgebaseerde aanbevelingssystemen wordt informatie afgeleid uit
het vertrouwensnetwerk tussen de gebruikers, en wordt die gecombineerd met
andere kennis (bv. de beoordelingen van gebruikers voor de items) om zo meer,
8Zie http://www.netflixprize.com
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en meer gepersonalizeerde en nauwkeurige, aanbevelingen te genereren. Sinds
het pionierswerk van Jennifer Golbeck en Paolo Massa begin de jaren 2000
groeit en bloeit het onderzoek naar vertrouwensgebaseerde aanbevelingstech-
nieken. In dit proefschrift hebben wij ons toegespitst op enkele van de meest re-
cente en uitdagende ontwikkelingen in dit nog jonge, opkomende onderzoeks-
domein, namelijk het potentieel van wantrouwen, het aanbevelen van contro-
versie¨le items, en connectiebegeleiding voor nieuwe gebruikers (Eng. cold start
users).
Vertrouwensmaten en aanbevelingsalgoritmen zijn de twee hoofdingredie¨nten
van een goed functionerend vertrouwensgebaseerd aanbevelingssysteem. Voor
de eerste component leggen we ons vooral toe op het modelleren van, en
rekenen met, wantrouwensinformatie. We beginnen in Hoofdstuk 2 met een
overzicht van bestaande vertrouwens- en wantrouwensmodellen en bespreken
hun tekortkomingen. De huidige aanpakken zijn niet in staat om op een correcte
manier om te gaan met kennisdefecten zoals (partie¨le) onwetendheid en con-
flicterende informatie (inconsistenties), hoewel deze zaken een grote impact
kunnen hebben op de (rangschikking van) vertrouwensschattingen en aanbe-
velingen. Daarom stellen we een nieuw bitraliegebaseerd vertrouwensmodel
voor dat vertrouwen en wantrouwen behandelt als twee verschillende, maar
afhankelijke componenten, en de representatieproblemen met betrekking tot
onwetendheid en inconsistentie tot een minimum kan beperken. Bovendien
stelt het ons in staat om een groot deel van de herkomstinformatie van de
vertrouwensscores (Eng. trust provenance) te bewaren; informatie die een es-
sentie¨le rol kan spelen bij het rekenproces, vooral wanneer ook wantrouwen in
rekening gebracht moet worden.
In de volgende twee hoofdstukken concentreren we ons op de mechanismes
die nodig zijn om vertrouwens- en wantrouwenswaarden te voorspellen binnen
het bitralieraamwerk. Twee belangrijke bouwstenen daarbij zijn vertrouwens-
scorepropagatie en -aggregatie. In grote vertrouwensnetwerken is het eerder
zeldzaam dat elke gebruiker rechtstreeks verbonden is met elke andere gebrui-
ker. Dit betekent dat, als gebruiker a zich een vertrouwensmening wil vormen
over een onbekende gebruiker x (bv. omdat x een film beoordeeld heeft die a
ook wil zien), a dan een van zijn vertrouwde kennissen kan raadplegen, die op
zijn beurt een connectie kan aanspreken, enz. tot er een gebruiker bereikt kan
worden die verbonden is met x. Het voorspellingsproces van de vertrouwens-
score langs het geconstrueerde pad van a naar x wordt propagatie genoemd.
Aangezien a meestal meerdere vertrouwensconnecties kan aanspreken, is er
ook een mechanisme nodig om de vertrouwensscores die afkomstig zijn van
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verschillende bronnen te combineren. Dit proces wordt aggregatie genoemd.
Terwijl de concepten vertrouwenspropagatie en -aggregatie steeds meer in-
geburgerd beginnen te raken, staat het onderzoek naar hun tegenhangers voor
wantrouwen nog in de kinderschoenen. Onze belangrijkste bijdragen op het
gebied van vertrouwensmaten situeren zich in dit fascinerende en grotendeels
onverkend domein. Door zowel het probleem op theoretische basis en van-
uit praktisch oogpunt te bestuderen, dragen we bij tot het overbruggen van de
kloof tussen theoretisch propagatie- en aggregatieonderzoek en vertrouwensge-
baseerde webtoepassingen. In het bijzonder introduceren we in Hoofdstuk 3
vier nieuwe families van propagatie-operatoren voor vertrouwensscores. Deze
zijn gebaseerd op concepten uit de vaaglogica, waardoor de operatoren gebruikt
kunnen worden om een groot aantal attitudes tegenover gewantrouwde gebrui-
kers te modelleren. Aan de hand van datasets van de e-commerce- en opiniesite
Epinions.com en het reizigersnetwerk CouchSurfing.org, twee webapplicaties
met een sterke sociaal netwerk-component, tonen we aan dat de propagatie-
operatoren die actief wantrouwen verwerken nauwkeurigere resultaten opleve-
ren dan de klassieke operatoren die enkel met vertrouwen werken.
Het onderzoek op vlak van aggregatie voor scalaire waarden omvat een
waaier aan operatoren. In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we welke aggregatie-
eigenschappen en -operatoren betekenisvol uitgebreid kunnen worden voor ge-
bruik in een bitraliekader voor vertrouwensscores. Verder richten we ons op
het potentieel van geordende gewogen gemiddelde (Eng. Ordered Weighted
Average, OWA) strategiee¨n en het effect van kennisdefecten (tekort of teveel
aan informatie) voor de schatting van vertrouwensscores. Experimenten op
de Epinions en CouchSurfing datasets tonen aan dat operatoren die rekening
houden met kennisdefecten of gebruik maken van OWA-technieken resulteren
in nauwkeurigere schattingen dan de basisoperatoren voor bitralie-elementen.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift leggen we ons toe op de toepassing van
vertrouwensmaten op aanbevelingssystemen, de zogenaamde vertrouwensge-
baseerde aanbevelingssystemen. In Hoofdstuk 5 behandelen we de principes
van aanbevelingssystemen en bespreken we hun meest voorkomende proble-
men waaronder ijlheid, nieuwe gebruikers, en controversie¨le items. Aanbe-
velingsalgoritmes ondervinden zeer vaak moeilijkheden bij het genereren van
persoonlijke aanbevelingen voor controversie¨le items omdat er geen consensus
bestaat over de beoordeling voor een item dat een grote groep ‘supporters’ heeft
maar ook veel tegenkanting krijgt. We stellen een nieuwe detectiemethode voor
die toelaat om beter de verschillen in kwaliteit voor controversie¨le item aanbe-
velingen tussen verschillende aanbevelingsalgoritmen te bepalen.
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In Hoofdstuk 6 leggen we ons toe op aanbevelingssystemen die gebruik maken
van vertrouwens- en wantrouwensinformatie. We bespreken en vergelijken de
state of the art in vertrouwensgebaseerde aanbevelingsalgoritmes met collabo-
ratief filteren (CF) en enkele eenvoudige strategiee¨n aan de hand van Epinions
datasets voor producten en recensies. Onze experimenten tonen aan dat de ge-
avanceerde methodes nauwelijks de baselines kunnen overtreffen als willekeurig
geselecteerde items aanbevolen worden, zowel op vlak van accuraatheid als
het aantal items waarvoor een aanbeveling gegenereerd kan worden (bereik,
Eng. coverage). Wanneer het echter aankomt op controversie¨le items blijken
de vertrouwensgebaseerde algoritmes veel effectiever, maar er is duidelijk nog
ruimte voor verbetering. Daarom stellen we een nieuw algoritme voor dat het
beste van zowel de vertrouwenswereld als de wereld van collaboratief filteren
combineert, zodat onmiddellijk een groot aantal items bereikt kan worden ter-
wijl de nauwkeurigheid aanvaardbaar blijft.
In het tweede deel van het proefschrift besteden we verder ook extra aan-
dacht aan het potentieel van wantrouwen (hoofdstuk 6): we leveren de eerste
experimentele studie van het nut van wantrouwen in een aanbevelingscontext.
Op basis van een recensiedataset van Epinions leggen we uit dat wantrouwen
niet gebruikt kan worden als een indicatie om opinies om te keren, maar dat zijn
rol als debugger van vertrouwensgewichten of filter van buren in CF-gebaseerde
algoritmes veelbelovender is: we tonen aan dat een gewichtenfilter in combi-
natie met de aggregatie-operatoren uit hoofdstuk 4 nauwkeurigere aanbeve-
lingen kan leveren zonder in te boeten aan bereik, in vergelijking met Golbecks
algoritme dat enkel gebruik maakt van (gepropageerd) vertrouwen.
Onze laatste bijdrage op vlak van vertrouwensgebaseerde aanbevelingen, naast
de focus op wantrouwen en controversie¨le items, heeft betrekking op het nieuw-
komersprobleem (Eng. user cold start problem), een van de grootste problemen
waarmee aanbevelingssystemen te kampen krijgen: aangezien nieuwe gebrui-
kers nog geen gedetailleerd gebruikersprofiel hebben wordt het enorm moeilijk
om aanbevelingen te genereren, laat staan gepersonalizeerde. Dit probleem
staat hoog op de agenda van e-commerce toepassingen, omdat het leveren van
goede aanbevelingen voor nieuwe gebruikers noodzakelijk is om het klantenbe-
stand uit te breiden; als potentie¨le klanten niet snel genoeg nauwkeurige aanbe-
velingen krijgen, zullen ze minder geneigd zijn om het systeem in de toekomst
te blijven gebruiken.
In Hoofdstuk 7 tonen we aan dat het klassieke nieuwkomersprobleem ook
optreedt in vertrouwensgebaseerde aanbevelingssystemen, en dat het daarom
belangrijk is om nieuwe gebruikers aan te sporen om zo snel mogelijk deel
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uit te maken van het vertrouwensnetwerk. Maar kiezen met welke gebruikers
men wil connecteren is vaak een moeilijke opgave. Aangezien die beslissing
een significante impact kan hebben op de geleverde aanbevelingen, is het van
essentieel belang om nieuwkomers te begeleiden doorheen het vertrouwenscon-
nectieproces. Daarom stellen we een aantal technieken voor om verschillende
types sleutelfiguren (connectoren, experten en beoordelaars; Eng. connectors,
mavens en frequent raters) te identificeren in het netwerk van een vertrouwens-
gebaseerd aanbevelingssysteem. We laten ons inspireren door traditionele so-
ciale netwerkanalysematen bij het cree¨ren van twee methodes om de impact
van sleutelfiguren te meten, op vlak van nauwkeurigheid en bereik van de aan-
bevelingen. Experimenten op de recensiedataset van Epinions tonen duidelijk
aan dat het voor nieuwkomers veel voordeliger is om te connecteren met een
ge¨ıdentificeerde sleutelfiguur dan met een willekeurig gekozen gebruiker.
De onderzoeksresultaten besproken in deze doctoraatsthesis werden gepubli-
ceerd in, of zijn ter publicatie aangeboden voor, gespecialiseerde wetenschap-
pelijke tijdschriften [143, 147, 148, 149], een handboek voor aanbevelingssys-
temen [152], en de proceedings van internationale conferenties en workshops
[24, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 150, 151, 153].
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